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TURNING A BLIND EYE: WHY WASHINGTON KEEPS GIVING
IN TO WALL STREET
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.*

As the Dodd–Frank Act approaches its third anniversary in mid-2013,
federal regulators have missed deadlines for more than 60% of the
required implementing rules. The financial industry has undermined
Dodd–Frank by lobbying regulators to delay or weaken rules, by suing
to overturn completed rules, and by pushing for legislation to freeze
agency budgets and repeal Dodd–Frank’s key mandates. The financial
industry did not succeed in its efforts to prevent President Obama’s reelection in 2012. Even so, the Obama Administration has continued to
court Wall Street’s leaders and has not given a high priority to
implementing Dodd–Frank.
At first glance, Wall Street’s ability to block Dodd–Frank’s
implementation seems surprising. After all, public outrage over Wall
Street’s role in the global financial crisis impelled Congress to pass
Dodd–Frank in 2010 despite the financial industry’s intense opposition.
Moreover, scandals at systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) have continued to tarnish Wall Street’s reputation since Dodd–
Frank’s enactment. However, as the general public’s focus on the
financial crisis has waned—due in large part to massive governmental
support that saved Wall Street—the momentum for meaningful financial
reform has faded.
Wall Street’s political and regulatory victories since 2010 shed new
light on the financial industry’s remarkable success in gaining broader
powers and more lenient regulation during the 1990s and 2000s. Four
principal factors account for Wall Street’s continued dominance in the
corridors of Washington. First, the financial industry has spent massive
sums on lobbying and campaign contributions, and its political
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influence has expanded along with the growing significance of the
financial sector in the U.S. economy. Second, financial regulators have
aggressively competed within and across national boundaries to attract
the allegiance of large financial institutions. Wall Street has skillfully
exploited the resulting opportunities for regulatory arbitrage
Third, Wall Street’s political clout discourages regulators from
imposing restraints on the financial industry. Politicians and regulators
encounter significant “pushback” whenever they oppose Wall Street’s
agenda, and they also lose opportunities for lucrative “revolving door”
employment from the industry and its service providers. Fourth, the
financial industry has achieved “cognitive capture” through the
“revolving door” and other close connections between Wall Street and
Washington. A widely-shared “conventional wisdom” persists in
Washington—notwithstanding abundant evidence to the contrary—that
(i) giant SIFIs are safer than smaller, more specialized institutions, (ii)
SIFIs are essential to meet the demands of large multinational
corporations in a globalized economy, and (iii) requiring U.S. SIFIs to
comply with stronger rules will impair their ability to compete with
foreign financial conglomerates and reduce the availability of credit to
U.S. firms and consumers.
Despite Wall Street’s continued mastery over Washington, two recent
events could lead to a renewed public focus on the need for stronger
restraints on SIFIs. In March 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder
admitted that global SIFIs are “too big to jail,” and a Senate
subcommittee issued a stunning report on pervasive managerial failures
and regulatory shortcomings surrounding JPMorgan Chase’s “London
Whale” trading scandal. In response to those events, Senators Sherrod
Brown and David Vitter introduced a bill that would require SIFIs to
satisfy much higher capital requirements and would also limit their
access to federal safety net subsidies. The Brown-Vitter bill could prove
to be a milestone because it demonstrates Dodd–Frank’s inadequacy
and also focuses the “too big to fail” debate on issues where Wall Street
is most vulnerable, including dangerously low levels of capital at the
largest banks and extensive public subsidies exploited by those banks.
“Turn a blind eye”: “To knowingly refuse to acknowledge something
which you know to be real”;1 “to refuse to see: be oblivious”2

1. Turn a Blind Eye, PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/turn-a-blindeye.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). Admiral Horatio Nelson reportedly inspired this saying at the
Battle of Copenhagen in 1801, when he ignored a superior’s signal to disengage from the enemy fleet.
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“I remind people, we do have the best capital markets in the world.”
(Jamie Dimon, chairman of JPMorgan Chase, June 19, 2012)3
“[T]he size of some of these [financial] institutions becomes so large that
it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with
indications that if you do prosecute, . . . it will have a negative impact on
the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” (Attorney
General Eric Holder, March 6, 2013)4
“[D]on’t you see? Too big to fail isn’t a problem with the system. It is
the system . . . . The bigger [global corporations] get, the bigger financial
institutions will have to get.” (Robert Rubin, former Treasury Secretary
and former senior executive at Goldman Sachs and Citigroup)5

I. Introduction..................................................................................... 1288
II. The Financial Industry’s Campaign to Block Dodd–Frank’s
Implementation ........................................................................ 1296
A. The Industry’s Lobbying Efforts to Impede Dodd–Frank’s
Reforms .............................................................................. 1296
1. Enhanced Regulatory Requirements for SIFIs ........ 1297
Instead, he put his spyglass to his blind eye and said, “I have only one eye, I have a right to be blind
sometimes . . . I really do not see the signal.” JAMES STANIER CLARKE & JOHN M’ARTHUR, 2 THE LIFE
OF ADMIRAL LORD NELSON, K.B. FROM HIS LORDSHIP’S MANUSCRIPTS 270 (1809).
2. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1349 (11th Ed. 2004). Kathleen Engel and
Patricia McCoy have previously used this phrase to characterize the manner in which Wall Street
investment banks “securitize[d] subprime home loans without determining if loan pools contain[ed]
predatory loans” and thereby “actively facilitated abusive lending.” Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A.
McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039,
2040 (2007).
3. William D. Cohan, Wall Street Forgets its Job Is to Create Jobs, BLOOMBERG (June 24,
2012 6:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-24/wall-street-forgets-its-job-is-to-createjobs.html (quoting testimony by Mr. Dimon during a hearing on the “London Whale” trading scandal
before the House Financial Services Committee on June 19, 2012); see also infra Part IV(C)(2)
(describing that scandal and Mr. Dimon’s role in it).
4. Transcript: Attorney General Eric Holder on ‘Too Big to Jail’, AM. BANKER (Mar. 7, 2013)
(quoting testimony by Mr. Holder before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Mar. 6, 2013) (available on
Lexis).
5. DAVID ROTHKOPF, POWER, INC.: THE EPIC RIVALRY BETWEEN BIG BUSINESS AND
GOVERNMENT—AND THE RECKONING THAT LIES AHEAD 266 (2012) (quoting from undated recent
interview with Mr. Rubin). Mr. Rubin served as co-chairman of Goldman Sachs before serving as
Treasury Secretary during the Clinton Administration, and he then served as senior counselor, chairman
of the executive committee, and a director of Citigroup from 1999 to 2009. During his tenure at
Citigroup, Rubin encouraged the bank to engage in high-risk securitization and trading activities. Those
activities inflicted massive losses on Citigroup and led to the bank’s near-failure and bailout by the U.S.
government in 2008. CHARLES GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT: HOW THREE DECADES OF WALL STREET
GREED AND GOVERNMENT MISMANGEMENT DESTROYED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 145-47,
190-91, 304-08, 317-20, 482-83 (2009); Eric Dash & Louise Story, Rubin Leaving Citigroup; Smith
Barney for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009, at B1; Ken Brown & David Enrich, Rubin Under Fire,
Defends His Role at Citi, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2008, at A1; Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup
Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1.
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2. Regulations Implementing the Volcker Rule and
Title VII of Dodd–Frank ....................................... 1302
B. The Industry’s Litigation Strategy to Block Financial
Reforms .............................................................................. 1308
1. The Industry’s Reliance on “Cost–Benefit
Analysis” in Challenging Financial Reforms........ 1308
2. Any Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Dodd–
Frank’s Reforms Must Consider the Huge Costs
of the Financial Crisis and the Comparable
Benefits of Avoiding Future Crises ...................... 1312
C. The Financial Industry’s Legislative Strategy to Roll Back
Financial Reforms .............................................................. 1317
1. The Industry’s Legislative Efforts to Undermine
Dodd–Frank .......................................................... 1317
2. The Financial Industry and Its Legislative Allies
Have Persisted in Their Efforts to Weaken
Dodd–Frank Despite Recent Financial Scandals .. 1322
III. Federal Regulators and Congress Followed Deregulatory
Policies Promoted by the Financial Industry That
Encouraged Reckless Lending and Led to the Financial
Crisis ........................................................................................ 1328
A. Federal Regulators Permitted Financial Institutions to
Engage in Unsound and Predatory Lending Practices That
Produced an Unsustainable Credit Boom........................... 1328
1. Federal Regulators Issued Weak “Guidelines” That
Allowed Banks and Thrifts to Engage in HighRisk Mortgage Lending ........................................ 1329
2. Federal Agencies Adopted Weak Capital Rules
That Encouraged Banks and Thrifts to Expand
Their Involvement with High-Risk Mortgage
Lending and Securitization ................................... 1333
3. Federal Regulators Allowed Banks and Thrifts to
Increase Their Exposure to High-Risk Loans by
Acquiring Nonbank Mortgage Lenders ................ 1336
B. Federal Regulators Failed to Take Effective Enforcement
Measures to Stop Predatory Lending and Preempted State
Efforts to Do So ................................................................. 1338
C. The Financial Industry Strongly Resisted Attempts by
Federal Regulators to ImposeTighter Supervision during
the Credit Boom ................................................................. 1340
D. Bank Regulators and Congress Provided Massive
Assistance to Major Banks during the Financial Crisis ..... 1345
E. Federal Agencies Provided Extensive Forbearance to the
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Largest Banks during the Financial Crisis ......................... 1347
1. Federal Officials Demanded Changes in
Accounting Rules That Enabled Large Banks to
Avoid Mark-to-Market Losses on Troubled
Mortgage-Related Assets ...................................... 1348
2. Federal Regulators Postponed the Imposition of
Consolidated Capital Requirements for Assets
Held by Off-Balance-Sheet Conduits ................... 1349
3. Federal Officials Provided Forbearance for
Second-Lien Loans Held by Banks but Refused
to Provide Meaningful Principal Relief for
“Underwater” Homeowners .................................. 1351
F. The Financial Industry Persuaded Congress to Pass a
Series of Measures That Facilitated the Subprime Credit
Boom .................................................................................. 1359
IV. Why Does Wall Street Exercise So Much Influence over
Washington? ............................................................................ 1363
A. The Financial Industry Wields Enormous Political
Influence through Campaign Contributions and Lobbying 1363
1. The Financial Industry’s Formidable Political
Clout...................................................................... 1363
2. Does Wall Street’s Political Clout Help to Explain
Why Federal Officials Have Not Taken Strong
Enforcement Actions Against Major Financial
Institutions and Their Top Executives? ................ 1370
a. The Lack of Criminal Enforcement Against
Leading Financial Institutions and Their
Senior Executives ........................................... 1372
b. Ineffective Civil Enforcement Measures
Against Large Banks and Their Senior
Officers ........................................................... 1379
B. Large Financial Institutions Have Used Regulatory
Arbitrage and Capture to Undermine Supervisory
Restrictions on Their Activities ......................................... 1390
1. Competition Among Domestic and Foreign
Regulators Has Encouraged Regulatory Arbitrage1390
a. Domestic Competition for Regulatory Charters 1390
b. International Regulatory Competition for the
Allegiance of Large Financial Institutions ..... 1393
2. Structural Flaws and Conflicts of Interest in U.S.
Financial Agencies Have Increased Their
Vulnerability to Industry Influence and
Regulatory Arbitrage ............................................ 1398
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3. The “Revolving Door” and “Cultural Capture”
Provide Important Sources of Regulatory
Influence for the Financial Industry ...................... 1406
a. The Impact of the “Revolving Door” in
Magnifying the Financial Industry’s
Influence in Washington ................................. 1407
b. The Impact of “Cultural” and “Cognitive”
Capture” in Undermining the Effectiveness
of Financial Regulation................................... 1417
C. Attorney General Holder’s “Too Big to Jail” Admission
and JPMorgan’s “London Whale” Trading Debacle Show
that TBTF Banks Continue to Operate Without Effective
Control by Federal Regulators ........................................... 1428
1. Attorney General Holders’ “Too Big to Jail”
Testimony Confirms that Federal Agencies
Cannot Discipline the Largest Financial
Institutions Effectively .......................................... 1429
2. The Senate Investigation of JPMorgan’s “London
Whale” Scandal Shows that Wall Street Banks
Continue to Engage in Speculative Risk-Taking
While Avoiding Regulatory Oversight ................. 1430
V. Conclusion: Wall Street’s “Victory” over Dodd–Frank, the
Brown–Vitter Bill and the Future Direction of the TBTF
Debate ...................................................................................... 1437
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost three years have gone by since Congress passed the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank)6
in July 2010, but Dodd–Frank’s reform program still remains largely
unfinished. During the past year, advocates of financial reform have
expressed growing dismay as federal regulators missed deadlines for
more than three-fifths of the rulemakings mandated by Dodd–Frank.7
6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (enacted July 21, 2010).
7. For recent expressions of this dismay, see Haley Sweetland Edwards, He who makes the
rules, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2013, 2013 WLNR 6615176 (“As of now, roughly two-thirds of the
400-odd rules expected to come from Dodd–Frank have yet to be finalized.”); Barbara Rehm,
Regulators’ Reputation Sinks Along with Industry’s, AM. BANKER, Mar. 28, 2013, 2013 WLNR
7543392 (“[I]n the 32 months since [Dodd–Frank’s] enactment, regulators have done little to restore the
public’s confidence in the government’s ability to police the financial system.”); Gary Rivlin, How Wall
Street Defanged Dodd–Frank, THE NATION, May 20, 2013 (arguing that the failed implementation of
Dodd–Frank provides “a perfect case study of the ways an industry with nearly unlimited resources can
avoid a set of tough-minded reforms it doesn’t like”); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text
(showing that regulators missed 175 of the 279 rulemaking deadlines that expired by June 2013). For
earlier expressions of similar views, see Donna Borak, After Year of Progress, Dodd–Frank Rule Phase
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As explained in Part II of this article, the financial industry has pursued
a three-front campaign that has blocked the fulfillment of many of
Dodd–Frank core reforms. First, the industry’s aggressive lobbying
efforts have persuaded regulatory agencies to delay or water down
regulations mandated by Dodd–Frank. Second, industry trade groups
have filed lawsuits to strike down completed rules. Third, the industry
helped to elect a Republican majority in the House of Representatives in
2010 and again in 2012, and Republican leaders have introduced
numerous bills to repeal or weaken key provisions of Dodd–Frank.
Although Wall Street failed to defeat President Obama in the 2012
election, President Obama has continued to court Wall Street executives
and has not spent meaningful political capital in pushing for a robust
implementation of Dodd–Frank’s reforms.8
In response to the financial industry’s efforts to undermine Dodd–
Frank, a group of former senior government officials, private-sector
leaders and financial experts launched a new nonprofit group known as
the Systemic Risk Council (SRC) in 2012.9 SRC member and former
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) chairman Brooksley
Born declared that Dodd–Frank’s reforms “are under attack by many of
the firms who brought us the financial crisis.”10 SRC chair and former
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) chairman Sheila Bair
similarly warned that “[t]he public is becoming cynical about whether
the regulators can do anything right, which is undermining support for
reforms.”11
Hits Roadblocks, AM. BANKER, July 16, 2012 (quoting Cornelius Hurley’s warning that “every day we
are realizing more that reform efforts are inadequate”); William D. Cohan, Does Congress Want
Another Economic Meltdown?, BLOOMBERG, June 10, 2012 (“Wall Street’s well-paid army of lawyers
and lobbyists continues to make a mockery of the whole re-regulation process.”); Roger Lowenstein,
Derivatives Lobby Has U.S. Regulators on the Run, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 17, 2012 (“The derivatives
industry is squeezing Washington like a python.”); Matt Taibbi, How Wall Street Killed Financial
Reform, ROLLING STONE, June 24, 2012 (“The fate of Dodd–Frank over the past two years is an object
lesson in the government’s inability to institute even the simplest and most obvious reforms, especially
if those reforms happen to clash with powerful financial interests.”); Neil Barofsky, Bungled Bank
Bailout Leaves Behind Righteous Anger, BLOOMBERG, July 22, 2012 (“Dodd–Frank hasn’t solved the
problem it was meant to address—the power and influence of banks deemed too big to fail . . . . The
banks have also been gaming and watering down the [implementing] rules and regulations.”).
8. See infra notes 183–85, 401–403 and accompanying text.
9. Joe Adler, Bair’s Systemic Risk Council to Highlight ‘What’s Not Happening,’ AM. BANKER,
June 19, 2012. SRC’s mission “includes counteracting efforts by the [financial services] industry to
undercut reforms established by Dodd–Frank.” Id.; see also Former FDIC Chair to Lead Systemic Risk
Council, Monitor Financial Regulation, BUSINESS WIRE, June 6, 2012 (quoting John Rogers, an SRC
member, who explained that the SRC “will serve as an essential sounding board for systemic risk
reforms focused on strong investor protection, and offer a critical voice to promote the enforcement of
regulations, financial disclosure and transparency”).
10. Adler, supra note 9 (quoting Ms. Born).
11. Floyd Norris, Group Forms to Urge Strict Oversight of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012,
at B4 (quoting Ms. Bair).
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The financial industry’s ability to delay and weaken the
implementation of Dodd–Frank seems surprising at first glance. Intense
popular anger at Wall Street for its central role in causing the financial
crisis provided the political impetus for Dodd–Frank’s enactment.12
Public confidence in banks and bankers has fallen to very low levels
since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007.13 In a survey
taken at the end of 2011, 56% of respondents agreed that “the power and
influence of banks and other financial institutions represented a major
threat to the country.”14
The public has directed much of its outrage at the largest banks.
Consumers have condemned big banks for their role in triggering the
financial crisis, for opposing the adoption and implementation of Dodd–
Frank after receiving huge government bailouts, and for engaging in
abusive foreclosure, debt collection and fee-setting practices.15 As
12. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd–Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2012) (stating
that Dodd–Frank’s enactment followed a “financial collapse . . . that threatened financial institutions on
a global scale and brought the problem of systemic risk to the attention of a public already infuriated at
financial institutions (and their highly compensated investment bankers) [for] being bailed out at
taxpayer expense”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t’ ‘Screw Joe the Plummer’: The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform, (Mar. 26, 2012), at 13 (“The public detested the 2008 bailouts and, as economic and
employment fears lingered into 2010, popular backlash increased, reaching a crescendo as news of
lavish bonuses and compensation packages at bailed-out financial firms hit the press.”), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925431; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd–Frank Act: A Flawed and
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 962 (2011) (“The severity
and duration of the financial crisis, along with rising costs of governmental support for troubled [large
banks], produced public outrage and created a strong consensus in favor of reforming financial
regulation.”).
13. See, e.g., Remarks by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair to the ABA Government Relations
Summit, Mar. 16, 2011 (stating that “[i]n April 2010, a Pew Research poll found that just 22 percent of
respondents rated banks and other financial institutions as having a ‘positive effect on the way things are
going
in
the
country’”),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2011/spmar1611.html; Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson
& Francesco Guerrara, US public loses faith in business, FT.COM, Jan. 25, 2011 (reporting on “a
backlash against bankers and their bonuses, with the number of Americans who trust US banks dropping
to a low of 25 per cent, down from 33 per cent a year ago and 71 per cent before the financial crisis”);
Dawn Kopecki, Wall Street Leaderless in Rules Fight as Dimon Diminished, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 20,
2012 (reporting on a Gallup poll in June 2012, which found that only 21% of Americans had a “great
deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in U.S. banks, compare with 41% in 2007, representing “the lowest
level of consumer confidence in U.S. banks since Gallup Inc. began polling on the question in 1979”);
see also Barbara A. Rehm, Reputation Remains Industry’s No. 1 Problem, AM. BANKER, June 7, 2012
(stating that “[t]he banking industry’s image is about as awful as it’s ever been. Polls prove it and
popular culture reflects it.”).
14. Maurice E. Stucke, Occupy Wall Street and Antitrust, Univ. of Tenn. Coll. of Law Res.
Paper No. 179, Mar. 2012, at 4 (quoting results of a December 2011 survey by Pew Research Center for
the People & the Press), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=.2002234.
15. See, e.g., Carter Dougherty, Major Banks Largest Source of Consumer Bureau Complaints,
BLOOMBERG, June 19, 2012 (reporting that Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup “were the
subjects of the largest number of [consumer] complaints to the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau in 2011”); Joe Nocera, Why People Hate the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2012, at A27
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explained in Part II(C)(2), a series of recent scandals further eroded
Wall Street’s reputation. MF Global, a large commodities broker,
collapsed in late 2011. JPMorgan Chase (JPMorgan), the largest U.S.
bank, disclosed a huge loss from its “London Whale” trading debacle in
May 2012. Barclays, UBS and RBS paid large fines in 2012 and early
2013 to settle charges that they colluded with other major international
banks to manipulate the London interbank offered rate (Libor), an
overnight bank lending rate that determines interest rates for more than
$300 trillion of worldwide debt obligations. Finally, HSBC and
Standard Chartered, two of the five largest U.K. banks, paid similarly
large penalties in 2012 to resolve charges that they violated federal laws
prohibiting money laundering, terrorist financing and financial
transactions with Iranian businesses.
Notwithstanding these new scandals—which resembled the abuses
that led to the financial crisis—the financial industry has shown a
continuing ability to influence politicians and regulators.16 The
industry’s persistent clout is due to the public’s inability to maintain a
long-term focus on financial reform, as well as the industry’s
overwhelming advantages in lobbying and other forms of political and
regulatory influence. As John Coffee has shown, financial regulatory
reform typically follows a “regulatory sine curve,” in which (i) a
financial crisis provokes widespread outrage and public demands for
reform, which cause Congress and regulators to impose more stringent
(declaring that “the country . . . hates the banks these days” due to the abusive foreclosure and debt
collection practices of the largest banks); Robin Sidel, Customers to Banks: It’s You, Not Me, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 2, 2011, at C1 (reporting on customers’ anger caused by “rising fees” and “a flood of
foreclosures” at big banks); Richard Burnett, Consumers unhappy with banks, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(FL), Dec. 23, 2010, at B5 (reporting that most consumer complaints “involve large banks, while
community banks and credit unions, though far more numerous, draw far fewer complaints”) (available
on Lexis); Americans’ anger not easing over banks’ practices, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (WV), Dec. 10,
2010, at P3D (available on Lexis) (reporting on customers’ anger over “excessive fees” and “foreclosure
practices they view as unfair,” and quoting the view of bank analyst Paul Miller that “[t]he culture at
banks has been to chase profits at all costs, even if it hurts their customers”); see also Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the
Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1046 (2009) (stating that large financial institutions
“were the primary private-sector catalysts for the destructive credit boom that led to the subprime
financial crisis, and they have become the epicenter of the current global financial mess”). For
discussions of efforts by large financial institutions to defeat Dodd–Frank or, in the alternative, to
weaken its key provisions, see SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 191–92, 205–07, 213–14 (2010); Wilmarth, supra
note 12, at 1025–34; John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule: Obama’s economic adviser and his battles over
the financial-reform bill, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 25.
16. See, e.g., Phil Mattingly, Wall Street Supporters in Congress Unmoved by Libor Probe,
BLOOMBERG, July 3, 2012 (reporting that “Wall Street’s defenders in Congress are sticking by the
[financial] industry, undaunted by the Barclays fine or trading losses of more than $2 billion at JP
Morgan Chase”); John Kemp, Wall St and Republicans team up to curb CFTC, REUTERS, June 7, 2012
(contending that Wall Street’s Republican allies in Congress were “deeply cynical” in voting to cut the
CFTC’s operating budget while attacking the CFTC for not having adequately regulated MF Global).
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rules on the financial industry, and (ii) after the crisis has passed and
conditions seem to return to “normal,” the public loses interest in the
financial sector and the industry pushes Congress and regulators to
repeal or soften the new rules.17 Thus, as the financial crisis recedes in
the public’s memory, the financial industry can weaken previously
enacted reforms by exerting direct political influence through campaign
contributions and lobbying, as well as indirect influence through
“revolving door” employment opportunities offered to legislators and
regulators.18
The financial industry’s success in obstructing Dodd–Frank’s
reforms—despite recent blows to Wall Street’s already tarnished
reputation—sheds new light on an enduring mystery from the financial
crisis. Commentators have repeatedly asked why financial regulators
“adopted policies that induced financiers to take excessive risks” during
the period leading up to the crisis, even though regulators “often knew
their policies were destabilizing the financial system many years before
the crisis.”19 Part III of this article provides an overview of legislative
and regulatory mistakes that helped to inflate the enormous and
unsustainable credit boom which triggered the crisis. From the early
1990s until the crisis broke out in 2007, Congress and federal regulators
repeatedly ignored warning signs and implemented policies that
encouraged reckless lending and securitization practices by banks,
savings associations (thrifts) and nonbank mortgage companies. Those
ill-fated policies included repealing restrictions on affiliations between
banks and securities firms, watering down capital requirements,
preempting state consumer protection laws, removing regulation of
over-the-counter derivatives, and giving “superpriority” treatment in
bankruptcy to derivatives and repurchase agreements for mortgagerelated securities. After the financial crisis began, federal officials gave
enormous amounts of financial assistance to threatened megabanks and
also provided extensive forbearance by suspending mark-to-market
17. Coffee, supra note 12, at 1029–31.
18. Id. at 1029–31, 1076–81; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 88–100, 133–37,
147–49, 175–88 (providing a similar explanation for why financial scandals often do not produce
effective reforms); infra Part IV (describing the sources of the financial industry’s political and
regulatory influence).
19. JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO JR., AND ROSS LEVINE, GUARDIANS OF FINANCE:
MAKING REGULATORS WORK FOR US 5 (2012); see also KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY,
THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 149 (2011) (“Federal regulators acted in time to stop a complete collapse of the
world economy, but where were they when consumers and their advocates, researchers, cities, and states
were warning about the growing abuses in the subprime market?”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FINANCIAL L. 881, 932 (2012) (“Why didn’t federal regulators stop
financial institutions from generating huge volumes of high-risk credit that exploited consumers, risked
their own soundness and undermined the stability of the financial markets?”).
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accounting rules and by allowing the largest banks to defer losses on
extensive portfolios of impaired second-lien housing loans.
Politicians, regulators and bankers subsequently asserted that the
financial crisis was caused by “an unforeseeable confluence of events”
that created a “perfect storm . . . no one could anticipate.”20 However,
those claims are demonstrably false.21 A recent study of regulatory
failures during the credit boom concluded that “financial
regulators . . . repeatedly designed, implemented, and maintained
policies that helped precipitate the global financial crisis . . . . [T]hey
recklessly endangered the global economy.”22 Part III of this article
provides additional support for that conclusion.
Part IV offers four principal reasons for the pervasive legislative and
regulatory mistakes that led to the financial crisis, as well as the
financial industry’s success in undermining the implementation of
Dodd–Frank. First, the financial industry wields enormous influence
due to its massive spending on political campaigns and lobbying and its
outsized share of the U.S. economy. The industry spent more than $8.6
billion on political contributions and lobbying between 1998 and 2012
and earned very favorable returns on those investments. The industry
achieved a series of major legislative victories between 1994 and 2005
and defeated several bills that attempted to restrict subprime lending.
While the industry could not prevent Dodd–Frank’s passage, it did
succeed in weakening several of Dodd–Frank’s key provisions and in
subsequently obstructing the statute’s implementation.
Second, regulators have strong incentives to compete within and
across national borders to attract the allegiance of major financial
institutions. Competition among domestic and foreign regulators
encourages officials to follow policies that please their existing
20. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 1; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at
11 (“Some people like to call the subprime crisis a perfect storm. That’s not what it was . . . Had anyone
in Washington cared, the virus could have been checked.”); compare Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash,
Where Was The Wise Man?, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2008, § BU, at 1 (quoting Citigroup executive
committee chairman and former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, who stated, “I don’t know of anyone
who foresaw a perfect storm, and that’s what we’ve had here.”).
21. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 1–5, 85–86, 118–20, 204–06; see also id. at 205
(“[T]his crisis is not essentially about unforeseeable shocks . . . . Rather, many regulators made many
mistakes, problems grew ever worse over years, regulators learned of or should have recognized the
cumulating problems arising from their policies and from the obvious changes in the financial
landscape, and yet the regulators chose not to respond until it was too late.”); ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 19, at 10, 204 (“[T]he federal government witnessed what was happening [with abusive subprime
lending] and made a deliberate decision to desist from any meaningful action . . . . [T]he federal
government bears strong collective responsibility for the subprime crisis and the enormous financial
harm it inflicted on ordinary Americans.”).
22. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 4–5; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19,
at 11 (“This book is born of frustration: frustration that Congress and federal regulators refused to heed
warnings about the subprime market and let subprime loans spiral out of control.”).
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regulated constituents and attract new ones. Similarly, legislators fear
that restrictive policies might cause global financial firms to move large
segments of their operations to foreign jurisdictions. During the two
decades leading up to the financial crisis, large financial institutions
skillfully exploited these opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and
secured legislative and regulatory concessions that enabled those
institutions to expand their operations and assume greater risks. Since
Dodd–Frank’s enactment, the financial industry has continued to assert
the need for international “competitiveness” as a rationale for not
adopting strong new safeguards for megabanks.
Third, the financial industry’s political clout discourages regulators
from imposing tougher restraints on financial institutions. Regulators
who dare to challenge the industry encounter intense “pushback” from
industry trade groups and their political and regulatory allies. In
addition, the “revolving door” between government service and
financial-sector jobs encourages regulators to accommodate industry
demands for deregulation and supervisory “flexibility.” The most
egregious form of regulatory accommodation has occurred in the area of
law enforcement. Regulators and law enforcement agencies have
repeatedly invoked the need to preserve financial stability as a reason
not to impose criminal sanctions (or even harsh civil sanctions) on large
financial firms or their top executives. As a result, not a single major
financial firm, or a single senior executive of such a firm, has been
criminally prosecuted despite widespread evidence of serious
misconduct at many large financial institutions.
Fourth, over the past three decades politicians, regulators and industry
leaders have developed a common “mindset” that promotes deregulation
and opposes effective supervision of large financial institutions. Prior to
the outbreak of the crisis in 2007, the “conventional wisdom” in
Washington and on Wall Street strongly supported “financial innovation
and deregulation” and opposed “governmental interference in the
economy.”23 Officials who disagreed with this consensus “were
marginalized as people who simply did not understand the bright new
world of modern finance.”24
Since Dodd–Frank’s passage, the largest banks and their political and
regulatory supporters have continued to advance many of the same
arguments that were widely accepted as “conventional wisdom” before
the crisis. As explained in Part IV(B), those arguments include claims
that (i) large financial conglomerates are essential to meet the demands
of a globalized economy, and (ii) requiring megabanks to satisfy

23. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 89–90, 97–101 (quotes at 89, 101).
24. Id. at 97.
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stronger prudential regulations will impair their ability to compete with
foreign universal banks and reduce the availability of credit for
businesses and consumers. The continued repetition of these shopworn
arguments by industry representatives and their political and regulatory
allies—despite the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression—
speaks volumes about Wall Street’s continuing political clout. In
addition, the industry contends that the “costs” of new financial reforms
will outweigh their likely “benefits.” However, the industry refuses to
acknowledge the enormous costs that our nation and many other
countries have incurred due to weak or nonexistent regulation during the
pre-crisis boom.25
As explained in Part IV(C), two events in March 2013 demonstrated
that megabanks remain too big to fail (TBTF) as well as too big to
manage or discipline effectively. First, Attorney General Eric Holder
acknowledged during a Senate committee hearing that the Department
of Justice was very reluctant to pursue criminal charges against the
largest financial institutions because of the potentially destabilizing
impact of such prosecutions on domestic and global financial systems.
Second, a Senate investigative report on JPMorgan’s “London Whale”
trading scandal revealed systemic failures in risk management and
oversight by both the bank’s management and the bank’s primary
regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
The analysis set forth in this article might lead to the discouraging
conclusion that the battle for financial reform is over, because Wall
Street’s political influence is just too strong and too pervasive for reform
advocates to overcome. However, Part V suggests that Attorney
General Holder’s “too big to jail” admission and the Senate investigative
report on JPMorgan’s “London Whale” trades could prove to be
watershed events. Shortly after those events occurred, a national survey
found that half of American adults supported a mandatory breakup of
the largest banks, and the Senate voted 99–0 in favor of a non-binding
resolution calling for an end to government subsidies for megabanks.
In April 2013, Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and David Vitter (RLA) introduced a bill that would require banks larger than $50 billion to
maintain significantly higher levels of equity capital, with the most
stringent capital mandate imposed on banks larger than $500 billion.
The bill was hailed by some senior regulators and by many policy
analysts and journalists as a strong challenge to the TBTF subsidies
enjoyed by megabanks. Wall Street institutions and their lobbyists
fiercely attacked the bill, and the Obama Administration indicated its

25. See infra Part II(B)(2) (providing a summary of some of the principal costs of the financial
crisis).
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lack of support by claiming that Dodd–Frank had already solved the
TBTF problem. Notwithstanding that opposition, the Brown–Vitter bill
could significantly alter the TBTF debate by (i) highlighting the
inadequacy of Dodd–Frank’s reforms, as implemented to date, and (ii)
focusing the TBTF debate on issues where Wall Street is highly
vulnerable, including the largest banks’ dangerously low levels of equity
capital and the extensive subsidies those banks receive from the federal
government. It remains to be seen whether continued revelations of
excessive risk-taking and other abuses on Wall Street will finally
mobilize the American people to demand fundamental legislative
reforms, like Brown–Vitter, which could finally break Wall Street’s
stranglehold over financial policy.
II. THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY’S CAMPAIGN TO BLOCK DODD–FRANK’S
IMPLEMENTATION
Financial institutions and their trade associations have pursued a
campaign on three fronts to undermine Dodd–Frank’s reforms. First,
they have lobbied extensively to delay and weaken rulemakings
mandated by Dodd–Frank. Second, they have filed lawsuits to overturn
final rules that the industry opposes. Third, they helped to elect a
Republican majority in the House of Representatives in 2010 and again
in 2012, and House Republican leaders have pushed bills to repeal key
reforms or to hamstring the ability of federal agencies to carry out those
reforms.26 In mid-2012, former CFTC chairman Brooksley Born
publicly warned that the financial industry was succeeding in its efforts
to block Dodd–Frank’s reforms by “lobbying for the dismantling of
protections in the Act, delay[ing] rulemaking procedures, challenging
the rules in the courts, trying to defund regulatory agencies and
preventing appointment of key regulators.”27
A. The Industry’s Lobbying Efforts to Impede Dodd–Frank’s Reforms
As soon as Congress passed Dodd–Frank, the financial industry
unleashed a massive lobbying campaign to undermine the ability of
federal agencies to issue rules to implement the statute.28 Due in large
26. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 7; Rivlin, supra note 7; Taibbi, supra note 7.
27. Adler, supra note 9 (quoting Ms. Born).
28. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2010, at A1; Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Not Over Until it’s in the Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2010, at BU1; Stacy Kaper, Now for the Hard Part: Writing All the Rules, AM. BANKER, July
22, 2010, at 1; Cheyenne Hopkins, Bankers Seek Ways to Gut Prop-Trading Ban, AM. BANKER, Nov.
19, 2010, at 1; Asjylyn Loder & Phil Mattingly, Wall Street Lobbyists Besiege CFTC to Shape
Derivatives Rules, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2010, 12:20 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
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part to the success of that campaign, federal agencies failed to adopt
more than three-fifths of the 279 rules whose issuance was required by
June 2013.29 Prominent examples of the financial industry’s lobbying
prowess include the industry’s ability to delay adoption of final rules
governing systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) as well as
implementation of the Volcker Rule and Dodd–Frank’s new regulatory
regime for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.
1. Enhanced Regulatory Requirements for SIFIs
After encountering heavy industry resistance, the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) moved at a snail’s pace toward Dodd–
Frank’s goal of identifying nonbank financial companies that should be
designated and regulated as SIFIs.30 Dodd–Frank authorizes FSOC to
designate nonbank SIFIs in order to place those companies under the
systemic risk oversight regime administered by the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB).31 However, almost three years elapsed before FSOC
finally proposed to designate the first group of nonbank SIFIs in June
2013.32
After withdrawing proposed rules that were strongly opposed by the

14/wall-street-lobbyists-besiege-cftc-to-influence-regulations-on-derivatives.html.
29. Frank Pompa & Denny Gainer, Who Killed Financial Reform: After three years, key parts of
the plan to avert another Wall Street crisis remain undone, USA TODAY, June 4, 2013, at 1A (available
on Lexis) (reporting that federal regulators missed 175 (about 63%) of the 279 Dodd–Frank rulemaking
deadlines that had passed by June 3, 2013, and regulators failed to issue proposed rules for 64 of the 175
missed deadlines); see also DAVIS POLK, DODD–FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 2 (June 2013), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/3bafb045-659b-40f0-be66 00c49ba3bffd/Presentation/Publi
cationAttachment/c5d1116c-35b9-46db-8ed1-055523d30e9f/Jun2013_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf
(providing same information) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Progress Report].
30. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 993–94 (discussing Dodd–Frank’s creation of FSOC and
FSOC’s responsibility for designating nonbank financial companies as SIFIs if “material financial
distress” at such companies “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States”) (quoting
Dodd–Frank § 113(a)(1)).
31. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 993–95, 1006–08 (discussing FSOC’s authority to designate
nonbank SIFIs, and explaining that the FRB may impose a range of prudential regulations, including
capital and liquidity requirements, to mitigate the systemic risk posed by nonbank SIFIs).
32. On June 3, 2013, FSOC “voted to make proposed determinations regarding an initial set of
nonbank financial companies [that would be designated as nonbank SIFIs] under section 113 of the
Dodd–Frank Act.” Jeff Bater, Systemic Risk: Council Votes on Proposed Determinations Of Nonbank
SIFIs; Doesn’t Name Firms, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 1027 (2013) (quoting Treasury Department
spokesperson Suzanne Elio). FSOC did not name the firms that were subject to the proposed
determinations, but American International Group (AIG), GE Capital and Prudential disclosed that they
received notices of proposed designation from FSOC. Update 3-U.S. regulators propose scrutiny of
AIG, Prudential, GE Capital, REUTERS, June 3, 2013. Each of the firms receiving the proposed
designations would have the right to request a hearing within 30 days thereafter. If any of those firms
did request a hearing, FSOC would be required to hold a nonpublic hearing to decide whether to issue a
final order designating that firm as a nonbank SIFI. Id.
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financial industry,33 FSOC did not issue final rules governing the
process for designating nonbank SIFIs until April 2012. Those rules
establish a lengthy procedure—including three stages of FSOC
evaluation, followed by the right of an identified nonbank financial
company to demand a hearing and seek judicial review—before FSOC
can make a final designation.34 Due to FSOC’s long delay in issuing
even its first set of proposed designations, major nonbank financial
firms—including leading insurance companies and large asset
managers—have remained outside Dodd–Frank’s systemic risk
oversight regime, even though “[t]he ability to keep a closer eye on
financial giants other than banks is a major aspect of [Dodd–Frank].”35
Dodd–Frank authorized FSOC to designate nonbank SIFIs in order to
“prevent the chaos that occurred” when federal regulators were forced to
bail out American International Group (AIG), the nation’s largest
insurance company, in the fall of 2008.36 By identifying nonbank SIFIs,
FSOC would bring those companies “within the perimeter of prudential
rules” and would enable the FRB to exercise the types of supervisory
powers that it needed but did not possess over large securities firms and
insurance companies during the financial crisis.37 FSOC’s painfully
slow progress toward designating nonbank SIFIs has clearly undermined
one of Dodd–Frank’s primary objectives.38
33. R. Christian Bruce, Systemic Risk: FSOC Plans Three-Stage Analysis to Tag Systemically
Risky Nonbanks, 97 BNA’S BANKING REP. 634 (2011) (reporting that FSOC scrapped its original
proposal for rules governing the designation of nonbank SIFIs after that proposal “sparked a chorus of
protests from critics”); see also Dave Clarke, Financial Risk Council Readies Systemic Tag, REUTERS
(Apr. 3, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/us-financial-regulation-sifiidUSBRE83211A20120403 (reporting that “[l]arge insurers, hedge funds and other [nonbank] financial
firms are hoping to avoid the systemic designation and have been trying to convince regulators to leave
them alone”).
34. Mike Ferrulo, Systemic Risk: Officials Say Selection, Supervision of SIFIs Will Be Tailored
to Each Firm’s Risks, 98 BNA’S BANKING REP. 891 (May 22, 2012) (describing FSOC’s issuance on
April 3, 2012, of final regulations governing the process for designating of nonbank SIFIs).
35. Clarke, supra note 33; see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2–3 (2010) (explaining that Dodd–
Frank authorizes FSOC to “require nonbank financial companies to be supervised by the Federal
Reserve if their failure would pose a risk to U.S. financial stability,” in order to prevent “the harm that
could be inflicted on the financial system and economy by the failure of . . . [systemically important]
nonbank financial firms operated with inadequate government oversight”).
36. Clarke, supra note 33; see also FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 139–42, 200–02, 344–51 (2011) [hereinafter
FCIC Report], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (describing
the factors contributing to the federal government’s emergency bailout of AIG, including the lack of
effective regulation of AIG and the failure by federal officials to identify the systemic risks created by
AIG’s massive issuances of credit default swaps).
37. Daniel K. Tarullo, FRB Governor, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (May 2,
2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120502a.pdf [hereinafter
Tarullo, May 2, 2012 Speech].
38. Barbara A. Rehm, Editor at Large: Dodd–Frank’s Big Misses: Systemic Risk, Reg Reform,
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The financial industry’s opposition has also bogged down the FRB’s
efforts to establish enhanced prudential requirements for both nonbank
SIFIs and bank SIFIs (banking organizations with assets over $50
billion), as required by Sections 165 and 166 of Dodd Frank.39 The
FRB did not issue proposed rules under Sections 165 and 166 until the
end of 2011, nearly eighteen months after Dodd–Frank’s enactment.40
The FRB’s proposed rules included heightened capital and liquidity
requirements, counterparty credit exposure limits, risk management
standards, periodic stress test requirements and early remediation
sanctions for SIFIs that fail to comply with the FRB’s enhanced
prudential standards.41 The FRB explained that its proposals were
designed to reduce the systemic risks posed by large, complex financial
institutions and to decrease the likelihood of future taxpayer bailouts of
TBTF institutions.42
In response, financial industry trade groups attacked every major
aspect of the proposed rules.43 Five trade associations representing the
AM. BANKER, July 21, 2011, at 1 (contending that Dodd–Frank “was supposed to prevent a repeat of the
2008 financial crisis by identifying which firms are too big to fail and then subjecting them to tighter
oversight and higher capital standards,” and maintaining that FSOC’s delay in designating nonbank
SIFIs “exposes a lack of leadership that is fueling uncertainty and anxiety”). As discussed above, FSOC
did not issue proposed designations for the first group of nonbank SIFIs until June 2013. See supra note
32 and accompanying text. In contrast, FSOC acted more quickly in designating eight “financial market
utilities” (FMUs) as “systemically important” under Title VIII of Dodd–Frank in July 2012. The eight
designated FMUs operate multilateral systems for clearing, transferring and settling payments and other
financial transactions (including purchases and sales of securities and other financial instruments).
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 110–11, 145–87, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
39. See Dodd–Frank, §§ 165–66.
40. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594 (Jan. 5, 2012) [hereinafter FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs]; see also R.
Christian Bruce, Regulatory Reform: Fed Launches New Phase in Bank Oversight with Tougher Rules
for Systemic Institutions, 98 BNA’S BANKING REP. 5 (2012).
41. See FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 594–602 (providing an overview of the
FRB’s proposal); Bruce, supra note 40 (same).
42. In the preamble to its proposed rules, the FRB stated that “[t]he recent financial crisis
showed that some financial companies had grown so large, leveraged, and interconnected that their
failure could pose a threat to overall financial stability.” FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40,
at 595. The FRB also observed that “[t]he market perception that some companies are ‘too big to fail’
poses threats to the financial system” by reducing incentives for market discipline of those companies
and by producing “competitive distortions” through lower funding costs for those firms. Id.
43. Donna Borak, Regionals, Big Banks Raise Fears on Slew of Fed Rules, AM. BANKER, May 8,
2012 (reporting that banks and financial trade groups filed 90 comment letters, which included claims
that the FRB’s proposal “went too far and needs to be significantly reworked”); Dave Clarke, Big Isn’t
(Apr.
27,
2012,
6:01
PM),
Bad,
Banks
Tell
Fed,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/us-financial-regulation-fed-idUSBRE83Q19Q20120427
(reporting that “[l]obbying groups representing the big banks are pushing back against” the FRB’s
proposal); Cheyenne Hopkins & Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan’s Zubrow Says Fed Risk Rule May Hurt
Markets, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2012, 8:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0430/jpmorgan-s-zubrow-says-fed-risk-rule-may-hurt-markets.html (reporting that JPMorgan’s comment
letter argued that the FRB’s proposal went “well beyond” Dodd–Frank’s mandate and sought to impose
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largest U.S. financial institutions challenged the FRB’s proposals for
being “premised” on the view that “big is bad” and “size inherently is a
major indicator of and contributor to systemic risk.”44 The associations
alleged that the FRB “has set a course to use Section 165 [of Dodd–
Frank] to achieve . . . a reduction in the size of large banks through sizebased regulation.”45 The associations maintained that any “approach
grounded in a ‘too big’ or ‘big is bad’ concept is . . . misguided and
detrimental to a sound, strong banking system and a strong economy.”46
Wall Street firms and trade associations also strongly opposed the
FRB’s proposal to establish a single counterparty credit limit (equal to
ten percent of a SIFI’s capital stock and surplus), which would impose a
ceiling on its aggregate net exposure to any other nonbank SIFI or bank
holding company (BHC) having assets over $500 billion.47 Industry
participants maintained that the credit limit proposal “would needlessly
reduce liquidity in the financial system and thereby dampen economic
activity,”48 and “could destabilize markets” by restricting the ability of
SIFIs to execute risk-hedging transactions with large counterparties.49
In May 2012, senior executives of several major banks held a
“closed-door meeting” with FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo (the official
who heads the FRB’s bank supervision efforts). During that meeting,
they criticized the FRB’s efforts to establish stronger prudential
standards for SIFIs and to implement the Volcker Rule.50 One news
“‘disruptive’ standards”).
44. Letter from The Clearing House Ass’n L.L.C., American Bankers Ass’n, Financial Services
Forum, Financial Services Roundtable, and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Ass’n, to the FRB
16
(Apr.
27,
2012),
available
at
http://op.bna.com/bar.nsf/id/cbre8tukx4/$File/tradegroupletter165166.pdf [hereinafter Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter]. The
five trade associations that signed the letter “collectively represent financial institutions accounting for a
substantial majority of banking and financial assets in the United States.” Id. at 1 n.1.
45. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 16 (pointing out that the
preamble to the FRB’s proposal stated that the proposed rules “would provide incentives for [SIFIs] to
reduce their systemic footprint”) (quoting FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 596).
46. Id. at 16–17; see also infra notes 696-707 and accompanying text (discussing arguments
presented by the largest financial institutions and their allies in support of the alleged benefits created by
big banks).
47. While Section 165(e)(2)) of Dodd–Frank generally limits single-party credit exposures to 25
percent of a SIFI’s capital and surplus, the statute authorizes the FRB to adopt rules imposing stricter
limits if the FRB determines such limits are “necessary to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the
United States.” Dodd–Frank, § 165 (e)(2); see also FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at
600, 612–14 (discussing proposed single-counterparty credit limit exposure limits for SIFIs).
48. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 4.
49. Hopkins & Kopecki, supra note 43 (quoting and summarizing JPMorgan’s comment letter);
see also Lauren Tara LaCapra, Banks Fight Fed’s Push to Make Them Less Entwined, REUTERS (June
26,
2012,
3:05
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/25/us-banks-derivatives-rulesidUSBRE85O16820120625 (reporting that “the industry is spooked by [the credit risk exposure] rules”).
50. Bradley Keoun et al., Joshua Zumbrun & Cheyenne Hopkins, Dimon Cites “Give and Take”
After Bank Chiefs Meet at Fed, BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-03/dimon-meets-tarullo-as-banks-lobby-fed-on-softer-
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report described the meeting as “highlight[ing] the magnitude of Wall
Street’s campaign to blunt new regulations” because it showed the
determination of “Wall Street bosses . . . to personally lobby the Federal
Reserve about softening proposed reforms that might crimp their
profits.”51
Mr. Tarullo did not respond directly to the bankers’ objections at the
meeting.52 However, in a speech given earlier on the same day, Mr.
Tarullo stated that it was “sobering to recognize that, more than four
years after the failure of Bear Stearns began the acute phase of the
financial crisis, so much remains to be done.”53 He also expressed his
“concern . . . that the momentum generated during the crisis will wane
or be redirected to other issues before reforms have been completed.”54
He further warned that, if regulators failed to complete a “rigorous
implementation” of Dodd–Frank’s reforms, “we will have lost the
opportunity to reverse the pre-crisis trajectory of increasing too-big-tofail risks.”55 The content and timing of Mr. Tarullo’s speech indicated
that he viewed Wall Street’s lobbying campaign as a significant and
potentially dangerous obstacle to the accomplishment of Dodd–Frank’s
reforms.
In mid-2013—a full year after Mr. Tarullo’s speech—the FRB’s
proposals for enhanced prudential requirements for SIFIs remained
unfinished business.56 Indeed, the FRB and its fellow banking agencies
(the FDIC and OCC) completed less than two-fifths of the regulations
rules.html (describing Governor Tarullo’s private meeting with CEOs of JPMorgan, Bof A, Goldman,
Morgan Stanley, U.S. Bancorp and State Street); see also Donna Borak, Fed Discloses Details of
Private Meeting with Bank CEOs, AM. BANKER, May 3, 2012 (same); Craig Torres & Cheyenne
Hopkins, A Fed Regulator Who Actually Regulates, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 26, 2012, at 13
(explaining that Mr. Tarullo is “the Fed governor in charge of bank supervisions and regulation” and
“[i]n the past three years, no one has done more to strengthen the government’s grip on the financial
system”).
51. Keoun et al., supra note 50.
52. Borak, supra note 50 (reporting that Mr. Tarullo listened but did not respond to comments
made by the bank CEOs during the meeting).
53. Tarullo, May 2, 2012 Speech, supra note 37; see also Keoun, supra note 50 (reporting that
Mr. Tarullo delivered his speech “earlier in the day” before he met with the bank CEOs).
54. Tarullo, May 2, 2012 Speech, supra note 37.
55. Id.
56. Barbara A. Rehm, Regulators’ Reputation Sinks Along with Industry’s, AM. BANKER, Mar.
28, 2013, at 1, 2013 WLNR 7543392 (reporting that the FRB had not yet adopted final rules
establishing “enhanced prudential standards” for SIFIs even though those rules “are key to preventing
the next crisis”); see also Satish M. Kini et al., The Federal Reserve’s Proposal and the Foreign
Banking Community: A Practical Guide for Foreign Banks, 32 BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES
POLICY REPORT No. 5 (May 2013), at 21, 21, 26 (reporting that the FRB issued proposed rules in
December 2012 that would establish enhanced prudential standards for large foreign banks with
significant operations in the U.S., and the proposed standards for foreign banks were “generally
consistent” with the enhanced prudential standards that the FRB proposed for SIFIs in December 2011
but had not yet adopted in final form).
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those agencies were required to adopt by June 2013.57
2. Regulations Implementing the Volcker Rule and Title VII of Dodd–
Frank
Wall Street firms and financial trade associations have also waged
determined wars of attrition against rulemakings designed to implement
Section 619 (the Volcker Rule) and Title VII of Dodd–Frank.58 By mid2013, industry members had battled the Volcker Rule to a virtual
standstill, and they had significantly delayed the implementation of Title
VII.
The Volcker Rule prohibits banking organizations from engaging in
“proprietary trading,” and it also limits their investments in hedge funds
and private equity funds.59 The financial industry has sought to
undermine the Volcker Rule’s effectiveness on numerous grounds,
including by persuading regulators to adopt very broad interpretations of
the statute’s exemptions for “market making” and “risk-mitigating
hedging.”60
When federal regulators issued a proposed set of
implementing regulations in October 2011, the American Bankers
Association immediately condemned the “oversized nature and
complexity” of the proposal and declared that the proposal was
“unworkable.”61 A month later, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
57. Dodd–Frank Progress Report, supra note 29, at 5 (showing that the FDIC, FRB and OCC
finished only 40 of 104 rulemakings whose deadlines had passed by June 3, 2013).
58. See SEN. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8–9, 29–35, 90–101 (2010) (describing the Volcker Rule and
the new regime for regulating derivatives under Title VII of Dodd–Frank); Pompa & Gainer, supra note
29 (describing the financial industry’s success in blocking the implementation of the Volcker Rule and
Dodd–Frank’s provisions governing derivatives).
59. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1025–30 (describing the Volcker Rule, which prohibits
“proprietary trading” by banking organizations and sharply limits their investments in hedge funds and
private equity funds); Krawiec, supra note 12, at 14–16 (same).
60. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1028–30; Dave Clarke & Jonathan Spicer, Regulators
Split on Hedging Under Volcker Rule, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2011, 12:42 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/21/us-financial-regulation-volcker-idUSTRE78K42R20110921;
Hopkins, supra note 28; Yalman Onaran, Attack on Volcker Rule Seen Exaggerating Cost of Disruption
to Bond Market, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0118/attack-on-volcker-rule-seen-exaggerating-cost-of-disruption-to-bond-market.html;
Cheyenne
Hopkins, Silla Brush & Phil Mattingly, Volcker Rule Faces Critics as Effective Date Nears,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2012, 11:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-14/u-s-volckerrule-faces-harsh-global-critics-months-before-it-takes-effect.html.
61. Yin Wilczek, Regulatory Reform: Banking Regulators Issue Volcker Proposal, 97 BNA’S
BANKING REP. 633 (2011) (quoting the American Bankers Association’s press release issued on Oct. 11,
2011); see also Phil Mattingly & Cheyenne Hopkins, U.S. Regulators to Defend Volcker Rule Ban on
Proprietary Trades, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-20/u-sregulators-to-defend-volcker-rule-ban-on-proprietary-trades.html (reporting that financial firms attacked
the regulators’ proposal to implement the Volcker Rule for being “too complex and potentially
damaging for financial markets,” and noting that the proposal included nearly 1,300 questions and was
almost 300 pages long).
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attacked the proposal as “the poster child of regulatory complexity” and
demanded that federal regulators withdraw the proposal and issue a new
set of proposed rules.62
The complexity of the regulators’ Volcker Rule proposal resulted in
part from their decision to include highly detailed exemptions and safe
harbors in response to concerns expressed by the financial industry.63
Similarly, the industry persuaded regulators to include in the proposal a
broad extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule, in order to “level
the playing field” between U.S. and foreign banks.64 However, after
regulators issued their proposal, U.S. bankers encouraged foreign banks
and foreign regulators to oppose the proposal’s international scope.65
American financiers also urged foreign officials to object to the
regulators’ proposal because it would not permit banks to trade foreign
sovereign bonds, while the statutory language of the Volcker Rule
allows banks to trade U.S. government securities.66 Due to the intense
opposition marshaled by financial industry, federal regulators failed to
issue final implementing regulations for the Volcker Rule by the
statutory deadline of July 21, 2012.67 A Treasury official subsequently
predicted that regulators would adopt a “final version” of the Volcker

62. U.S. Chamber Calls for Re-Proposal and Delay of Volcker Rule, U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/november/us-chambercalls-re-proposal-and-delay-volcker-rule; see also Regulatory Reform: U.S. Chamber Calls on
Regulators to Withdraw, Repropose Volcker Rule, 97 BNA’S BANKING REP. 890 (Nov. 22, 2011).
63. Bankers’ Objections to Volcker Rule Fail on the Merits, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2011, 8:00
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-20/big-u-s-banks-main-objections-to-volcker-rule-failon-the-merits-view.html (“The complexity [in the proposal] is largely financial-industry lobbyists’ own
doing” because “many of the proposed rule’s 298 pages and 383 questions are devoted to carving out
exceptions” requested by the industry); Mattingly & Hopkins, supra note 61 (reporting the view of Rep.
Barney Frank that the proposal’s complexity resulted from efforts by regulators to “accommodate[] the
concerns” of the financial industry).
64. Yalman Onaran, Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule, Inciting Foreign Outrage, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 23, 2012, 3:56 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-23/banks-lobbied-to-widenvolcker-rule-before-inciting-foreigners-against-law.html (quoting Douglas Landy, head of U.S. financial
regulatory practice at the Allen & Overy law firm).
65. Id.
66. Id.; Cheyenne Hopkins, U.S. Regulators Exploring Volcker Exemption for Foreign Sovereign
Debt, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/u-sregulators-weigh-volcker-exemption-for-sovereign-debt.html. The Volcker Rule expressly exempts
trading by banking organizations in U.S. government securities but does not contain a similar exemption
for securities issued by foreign governments. Dodd–Frank § 619(d)(1)(A).
67. Donna Donna Borak, Fed’s Raskin Pushes for Tougher Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER, July 25,
2012 (reporting that “[r]egulators have already missed the statutory deadline to finalize the Volcker Rule
by July 21”); see also Donna Borak, Fed’s Plosser: “Volcker Rule” Outcome Still Murky, AM. BANKER,
Apr. 13, 2012 [hereinafter Borak, “Fed’s Plosser”] (reporting that the Volcker Rule proposal was
“opposed by many banks and even some foreign governments”). In April 2012, the FRB issued
guidance confirming that banks would not be expected to comply fully with the Volcker Rule (as finally
implemented) until July 21, 2014. Donna Borak, Regulators Offer Long-Awaited Guidance on
Compliance With Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER, Apr. 20, 2012.
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Rule by the end of 2012.68 However, in mid-2013 the Volcker Rule
remained unfinished, and final adoption was “nowhere in sight.”69
The financial industry has similarly delayed efforts by the CFTC and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement Title VII
of Dodd–Frank, which establishes a comprehensive regulatory regime
for OTC derivatives.70 Prior to Dodd–Frank’s passage, the OTC
derivatives business was largely unregulated and was also a leading
source of profits for the largest U.S. banks.71 Not surprisingly, major
banks strongly opposed Title VII’s provisions that mandate centralized
clearing, public reporting and collateralization of swaps trading, and that
also require banks to transfer some of their derivatives trading activities
to separately-incorporated affiliates.72 Since Dodd–Frank’s enactment,
Wall Street banks and their allies have conducted a massive lobbying
campaign to weaken or delay the implementation of Title VII that is
68. Final Volcker Rule Expected by Year-End—Treasury Official, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2012,
11:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/21/volcker-timeline-idUSL2E8JL4CB20120821.
69. Darrell Delamaide, Volcker rule delay shows financial reform’s flaws, USA TODAY, April
10, 2013, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/04/10/delamaide-columnvolcker-rule/2070951/; see also Pompa & Gainer, supra note 29 (reporting that the Volcker Rule
“remains unfinished and long behind schedule” in June 2013).
70. Under Title VII, the SEC regulates “security-based swaps” while the CFTC regulates other
types of “swaps.” The agencies are required to “consult and coordinate” in adopting rules and orders
governing such instruments with the goal of “assuring regulatory consistency and comparability to the
extent possible.” Dodd–Frank, § 712(a)(1), (2). For discussions of the reforms mandated by Title VII
of Dodd–Frank, see Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with
Legislative Sunlight: Dodd–Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an
Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 152–55 (2011); Adam
J. Krippel, Regulatory Overhaul of the OTC Derivatives Market: The Costs, Risks, and Politics, 6
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 269, 281–97 (2011).
71. Krippel, supra note 70, at 281–82 (explaining that five large U.S. banks controlled 96% of
all derivatives held by U.S. banks and also controlled almost two-fifths of global derivatives markets);
Kambiz Foroohar, Gensler Evolving in Derivatives War Sees No Deed Go Unpunished, BLOOMBERG
(June 21, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-21/gensler-evolving-inderivatives-war-sees-no-deed-go-unpunished.html (reporting that the five largest U.S. banks generated
$30 billion in annual profits from trading in derivatives).
72. See Alison Vekshin & Phil Mattingly, Lawmakers Reach Compromise on Financial
Regulation, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0625/lawmakers-reach-compromise-on-financial-regulation.html (describing lobbying battles and debates
over Dodd–Frank’s provisions regulating OTC derivatives); see also Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 103034 (explaining that Section 716 of Dodd–Frank (the Lincoln Amendment) was originally designed to
force banks to move most of their OTC derivatives trading activities into separate nonbank affiliates;
however, the House-Senate conference committee significantly weakened Section 716 by inserting
several exemptions as a result of “intense opposition” from Wall Street banks and their legislative
allies); Krippel, supra note 70, at 284–85 (explaining that the “watered down” Lincoln Amendment
applies to less than one-fifth of the OTC derivatives market); see also Jesse Hamilton, OCC Tells Banks
To Start Planning Safe Phase-out of Swaps Trades, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2013) (reporting that the
OCC and FRB gave U.S. banks and foreign banks with U.S. operations two additional years—i.e., until
July 2015—to comply with the Lincoln Amendment’s requirement to transfer equity swaps, commodity
swaps and certain non-cleared derivatives to separate affiliates), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201306-12/occ-tells-banks-to-start-planning-safe-phase-out-of-swaps-trades.html.
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comparable to their epic battle against the Volcker Rule.73
For example, the financial industry persuaded the CFTC and the SEC
to adopt rules defining “swap dealers” as firms conducting more than $8
billion of swap trades each year, a much higher trading threshold than
the $100 million trading level the agencies originally proposed.74 In
addition, the agencies’ definition of “swap dealers”—which triggers the
applicability of many of Title VII’s most demanding requirements—
allows dealers to exclude hedging transactions in determining whether
their annual trading volume exceeds the $8 billion threshold.75 Some
advocates of financial reform viewed the much higher threshold and the
broad hedging exemption as “discouraging,” and one advocate remarked
that “[t]he $8 billion exemption level . . . demonstrates the enormous
lobbying effort of Wall Street and major energy and commodity
companies that have been working to undermine Dodd–Frank.”76
The CFTC and SEC did not adopt final rules defining “swap” and
“end-user”—terms that govern the scope of many of Title VII’s
requirements—until July 2012.77 The final definitions of those terms
contained significant carve-outs from Title VII’s regulatory regime,
including exclusions of commercial firms and smaller banks from
clearing requirements as well as exemptions for insurance products, loan
participations and commodity forwards from the regulatory definition of
“swaps.”78 The broad scope of those exemptions provoked a dissent
73. Loder & Mattingly, supra note 28; Lowenstein, supra note 7.
74. Alexandra Alper & Sarah N. Lynch, Update 6—U.S. Regulators Spare All But Biggest Swap
Dealers, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2012, 6:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/financialregulation-swaps-idUSL2E8FI44Y20120418.
75. Id. (describing the hedging exemption, and explaining that swap dealers “must register with
regulators and back up their trades with more capital and collateral”); Steven Sloan & Jesse Hamilton,
Regulators Approve $8 Billion Threshold for Swaps Dealers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 18, 2012, 4:52 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-18/swap-regulators-set-to-approve-8-billion-threshold-fordealers.html (reporting on the new rules defining “swap dealers” and explaining that those dealers “will
ultimately be subject to the highest capital and collateral requirements for [swap] market participants”).
76. Alper & Lynch, supra note 74 (quoting Tyson Slocum, director of Public Citizen’s Energy
Program).
77. Richard Hill, CFTC Adopts Definition for Swaps; Action Key to Breaking Rules Logjam, 44
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1381 (July 16, 2012) (explaining that many of Title VII’s provisions “could
not be implemented” until the CFTC and SEC adopted a final definition of “swap,” while a final
definition of “end-user” was needed to delineate the scope of Title VII’s clearing requirements); see also
Alexandra Alper, U.S. Regulator Finally Defines a Swap, Starts Reform Countdown, REUTERS (July 10,
2012,
2:06
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/10/us-cftc-swap-definitionidUSBRE8690S120120710 (noting that the CFTC and SEC originally proposed rules defining “swap”
in April 2011 but did not adopt final rules until July 2012).
78. Richard Hill, CFTC Adopts Definition for Swaps; Action Key to Breaking Rules Logjam, 44
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1381 (July 16, 2012); Silla Brush, CFTC Approves Swap Definition
(July
11,
2012,
12:01
AM),
Triggering
Dodd–Frank
Rules,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-10/cftc-votes-4-1-to-approve-swap-definition-startingoverhaul-1-.html (explaining that the end-user exemption from Title VII’s clearing requirements
includes banks smaller than $10 billion of assets as well as commercial and manufacturing firms).
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from Commissioner Bart Chilton as well as expressions of concern from
public interest groups.79
Major U.S. and foreign banks also lobbied federal regulators to
exempt all swaps traded in overseas jurisdictions from Title VII’s
regulatory regime.80 Section 722(d) of Dodd–Frank authorizes the
CFTC to apply Title VII’s provisions to overseas swap activities if those
activities “have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or
effect on, the commerce of the United States,” or if overseas activities
violate regulations adopted by the CFTC “to prevent the evasion of any
provision of [Title VII].”81 CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler advocated a
broad application of Title VII’s mandates to foreign derivatives trading
by U.S. banks and by foreign banks with a significant U.S. presence.
Mr. Gensler pointed out that several major financial institutions
(including AIG, Bear Stearns (Bear), Citigroup, JPMorgan and Lehman
Brothers (Lehman)) had suffered large losses in recent years from
overseas trading.82 However, Mr. Gensler failed to persuade a majority
of CFTC’s five commissioners to approve a proposed regulation that
would reach overseas swaps trades.83
Instead, the CFTC issued proposed guidance on regulation of
overseas trading in June 2012. The proposed guidance recommended a
“more flexible” approach for regulating cross-border swaps trading,
including allowing a limited group of overseas units of U.S. and foreign
banks to rely on “substituted compliance” by following foreign rather
than U.S. derivatives rules.84 Notwithstanding its less ambitious scope,
79. Alper, supra note 77 (reporting that Commissioner Chilton dissented because of his concern
that the final rule’s exclusion for forward contracts could “create loopholes for swaps masquerading as
commodity forwards,” thereby opening a “new Enron loophole”); Richard Hill, Following Key Dodd–
Frank Rulemaking, Some Worry About Exclusions, Exemptions, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1383
(July 16, 2012) (describing Commissioner Chilton’s dissent and additional concerns expressed by Public
Citizen and Americans for Financial Reform about the broad scope of several exemptions in the CFTC’s
final rule).
80. Silla Brush, Goldman Sachs Among Banks Fighting to Exempt Half of Swap Books,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-30/goldman-sachsamong-banks-lobbying-to-exempt-half-of-swaps-from-dodd-frank.html (reporting that more than half of
the derivatives trading activities of the five largest U.S. banks took place overseas); Gregory Meyer &
Aline van Duyn, US Banks Plead to Limit Range of Swap Rules, FT.COM (Mar. 16, 2011, 10:01 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fb9b1c78-500b-11e0-9ad1-00144feab49a.html#axzz2B1t80iX3
(reporting on lobbying efforts by U.S. and foreign banks).
81. Dodd–Frank § 722(d)(i)(1), (2).
82. Keynote Address by CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler on the Cross-Border Application of
Swaps Market Reform at Sandler O’Neil Conference, June 6, 2013, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-141 [hereinafter Gensler June 6, 2013
Speech]; Testimony by CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler before the U.S. House Committee on Financial
Services, June 19, 2012, available at www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-117
[hereinafter Gensler June 19, 2012 Testimony].
83. Ben Protess, A Debate Goes Behind Doors, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2012, at B1.
84. Id.; see also Alexandra Alper, CFTC Floats Overseas Treatment of Swaps Rules, REUTERS
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the proposed guidance was strongly opposed by CFTC Commissioner
Scott O’Malia, by foreign regulators, by “market participants around the
world” and by “dozens of members of Congress” after aggressive
lobbying by major banks.85
In June 2013, Commissioner O’Malia and Wall Street trade
associations urged the CFTC to postpone any further action on its
proposed cross-border guidance. They also argued that the CFTC must
harmonize its guidance with the SEC’s issuance of a much weaker
proposal on cross-border trading. In contrast to the CFTC’s guidance,
the SEC’s cross-border proposal would give overseas units of U.S. and
foreign banks much greater leeway to avoid U.S. regulation by showing
“substituted compliance” with foreign derivatives rules.86
As described below, the financial industry and its Republican allies in
Congress have succeeded in cutting or freezing budget appropriations
for the CFTC and SEC, thereby undermining the ability of both agencies
to complete dozens of rulemakings mandated by Dodd–Frank.87 In June
2012, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler condemned industry efforts to
slash his agency’s budget, declaring that the requested budget cuts
would “effectively put the interests of Wall Street ahead of those of the
American public by significantly underfunding this agency.”88 Due in
large part to the financial industry’s efforts, the CFTC and SEC failed to
finish almost half of the rulemakings they were required to complete by

(June 29, 2012, 6:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-cftc-cross-borderidUSBRE85S15M20120629 (explaining that the CFTC’s proposal was issued in the form of “proposed
guidance”).
85. Richard Hill, International Developments: O’Malia Urges Fellow CFTC Commissioners To
Extend Delay in Cross-Border Swap Rules, 45 SECURITIES REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1097 (2013); see also
Eric Lipton, Banks Resist Strict Controls of Foreign Bets, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1 (reporting
that “Wall Street bankers and some of the world’s top finance ministers are waging a bitter international
campaign to block” the CFTC’s proposed cross-border guidance, and that leading banks have lobbied
heavily to persuade Democratic and Republican members of Congress to oppose the guidance); Alper,
supra note 84 (reporting that Mr. O’Malia criticized the guidance as “overly broad” and stated that “if I
were asked to vote on the proposed guidance as final, my vote would be no”).
86. Hill, supra note 85; Dave Michaels, Bill to Limit CFTC Cross-Border Authority Faces U.S.
House Vote, BLOOMBERG, June 12, 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0612/bill-to-limit-cftc-cross-border-authority-faces-u-s-house-vote.html; see also Yin Wilczek, SEC’s
Proposed Cross-Border Approach to Swaps Includes ‘Substituted Compliance, 45 SECUIRITES REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 813 (2013) (describing the SEC’s cross-border swaps proposal issued on May 1, 2013,
and reporting that “market participants welcomed” the proposal but “regulatory watchdog Better
Markets called the proposal a ‘major disappointment’ that would fail to adequately protect U.S.
investors”).
87. See infra notes 160-62, 405 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of industrybacked legislative measures reducing or freezing budget appropriations for the CFTC and SEC).
88. Stephen Joyce, Derivatives: Gensler Criticizes Vote on CFTC Budget, Says Dodd–Frank
Requires More Funding, 98 BANKING REP. (BNA) 1030 (June 12, 2012) (quoting speech by Mr.
Gensler on June 7, 2012, responding to a House subcommittee’s vote to reduce the CFTC’s budget by
more than 12% compared to the previous year).
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June 2013.89 As a result, Title VII’s implementation fell far behind
schedule, and it remained very doubtful in mid-2013 when (or if) Title
VII would become fully effective.90
B. The Industry’s Litigation Strategy to Block Financial Reforms
The financial industry has impeded the implementation of Dodd–
Frank’s reforms through litigation as well as lobbying. The industry’s
litigation strategy has focused on attacking new regulations for not being
supported by an adequate analysis of their likely costs and their potential
benefits. The strategy has been successful to date, in part because
neither the regulators nor the courts have properly accounted for the
enormous costs of the financial crisis and the very large potential
benefits of adopting reforms that could prevent or mitigate similar crises
in the future.
1. The Industry’s Reliance on “Cost–Benefit Analysis” in Challenging
Financial Reforms
In Business Roundtable v. SEC,91 the Business Roundtable and the
Chamber of Commerce attacked the SEC’s proxy access rule (Rule 14a11).92 The D.C. Circuit struck down the rule, agreeing with the trade
association plaintiffs that the SEC failed to conduct an adequate cost–
benefit analysis (CBA) as required by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.93 Commentators have
89. DODD–FRANK PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 5 (showing that the CFTC and SEC
failed to complete 66 of 141 rulemakings whose deadlines had passed by June 3, 2013); Edwards, supra
note 7 (explaining how the financial industry used lobbying, the courts and Congress to frustrate the
CFTC’s and SEC’s efforts to implement Dodd–Frank); Rivlin, supra note 7 (same).
90. Rivlin, supra note 7.
91. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
92. See id. at 1146–47 (explaining that Rule 14a-11 allowed qualifying shareholders to nominate
and elect directors by gaining access to the proxy materials distributed by corporate management).
Section 971 of Dodd–Frank gave the SEC discretionary authority to adopt its proxy access rule. See
infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing Section 971). In addition to its role as a plaintiff in
Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce has played a leading role in lobbying against the
passage and implementation of Dodd–Frank. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 886 n.14 (noting the Chamber
of Commerce’s determined opposition to Dodd–Frank’s creation of the CFPB); Devin Leonard, Tom
Donohue: Obama’s Tormentor, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2010 (describing the Chamber of
Commerce’s implacable opposition to Dodd–Frank and its intention to lobby vigorously against
implementation of the statute); Taibbi, supra note 7 (describing the Business Roundtable and Chamber
of Commerce as “Wall Street[‘s] . . . two favorite lobbying arms”).
93. Business Roundtable, supra note 91. at 1146, 1148 (holding that the SEC was required to
“consider” the effect of its proxy access rule on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation”); id. at
1148–49 (concluding that the SEC “failed . . . adequately to assess the economic effects” of the proxy
access rule and “inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule”); see also
Jonathan D. Guynn, Note: The Political Economy of Financial Rulemaking after Business Roundtable,
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questioned whether it was proper for the court to refuse to defer to the
SEC’s evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of the rule,
particularly as the SEC’s preamble to the final rule included a lengthy
economic assessment of costs and benefits that occupied “nearly twenty
pages” in the Federal Register.94
In December 2011, the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) and SIFMA filed a similar lawsuit challenging the
validity of a CFTC regulation, which established “position limits” for
commodities trading.95 ISDA and SIFMA alleged that the CFTC failed
to make a statutorily required finding that its position limits were
“necessary” to prevent excessive speculation or to deter market
manipulation.96 The trade associations also charged that CFTC “failed
to satisfy its independent statutory obligation to conduct a meaningful
cost–benefit analysis.”97 Thus, the suit against the CFTC’s regulation
involved the “same issue—the supposed lack of sufficient cost–benefit
analysis—that the Chamber of Commerce used to derail the proxy
access rule.”98
In September 2012, the federal district court vacated and remanded
the CFTC’s regulation, but the court did not address the plaintiffs’ CBA
99 VA. L. REV. 641, 659-62 (2013) (describing “five flaws with the SEC’s [cost-benefit analysis] that
the court found particularly vexing” in Business Roundtable).
94. Guynn, supra note 93, at 641, 643-44, 665, 658 (quote), 658n.111 (citing Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56753-71 (Sept. 18, 2010); see also id. at 667
(“The court’s decision in Business Roundtable not to defer to the SEC looks much more like de novo
review. The SEC had evidence upon which to rely, and according to a recent critique of Business
Roundtable, the studies favored by the court were methodologically flawed as well. The SEC’s
CBA . . . would have been upheld as reasonable under the arbitrary and capricious standard”); Note,
Administrative Law—Corporate Governance Regulation—D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule
Arbitrary and Capricious for Inadequate Economic Analysis—Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.2d
1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1092-93 (2011) [hereinafter Business Roundtable
Commentary] (“Courts hardly outperform the SEC at evaluating the imperfect science of
economics . . . Not surprisingly given the complexity of economic analysis, Judge Ginsburg’s opinion
[in Business Roundtable] made missteps similar to those for which he scolded the SEC.”); Edwards,
supra note 7 (“[Judge] Ginsburg appears to ignore the precedent set by the foundational 1984 Chevron
case, which . . . stressed that judges must afford ‘deference’ to an agency’s interpretation of a statute,
especially when it’s ‘evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise’”).
95. Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n v.
CFTC, No. 11-CV-2146, 2012 WL 385627 (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 2012); see also Stephen Joyce & Vin
Wilczek, Derivatives: Publication of Rule Sets Date of Oct. 12 For Start of Contested Position Limits
Regime, 99 BANKING REP. (BNA) 305 (Aug. 14, 2012) (discussing the filing and status of SIFMA’s and
ISDA’s lawsuit challenging the CFTC’s rule on position limits). Section 737(a) of Dodd–Frank
authorizes the CFTC to establish aggregate position limits for commodities trading contracts in order to
“diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation” and “to deter and prevent market manipulation”
while, at the same time, ensuring “sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers” and preserving “the
price discovery function of the underlying market.”
96. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction at 19, Int’l
Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, No. 11-CV-2146, 2012 WL 385627 (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 2012).
97. Id. at 27 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2) (2000)).
98. Taibbi, supra note 7.
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claim. Instead, the court held that the CFTC wrongly interpreted the
Commodities Exchange Act as requiring the CFTC to establish position
limits without making any determination as to whether such limits were
necessary to address excessive speculation or market manipulation. The
court’s decision did not resolve questions about the nature and substance
of the CBA that the CFTC would be required to perform before issuing
a revised position limits rule.99.
The financial industry’s demands for extensive CBA studies have
become a highly effective weapon in the industry’s fight to block or
delay agency rules needed to implement Dodd–Frank.100 One analyst
warned that if courts support such demands with the fervor
demonstrated by Business Roundtable, the result could be a “judicial
blockade on complex financial rulemaking, which would impede
regulators’ ability to police the marketplace in accordance with
congressional intent.”101 The same commentator observed that “[s]uch
stringent [judicial] oversight should be especially suspect when statutes
suggest proregulatory congressional intent,” as Section 971 of Dodd–
Frank did in granting the SEC specific authority to adopt a proxy access
rule.102
99. Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279-84 (D.D.C. 2012); see
also Yin Wilczek, Future Trading: Court Vacates and Remands CFTC Position Limits Regulation, 99
BANKING REP. (BNA) 568 (Oct. 2, 2012) (discussing the impact of the court’s decision on the CFTC’s
authority to adopt a revised position limits rule); Alexandra Alper, Jonathan Leff & Karey Wutkowski,
Analysis: After Five-Year Push, Is It RIP for Commodity Limits?, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2012, 1:03 AM)
(same), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/02/us-regulation-commodities-limitsidUSBRE8901CS20121002.).
100. See, e.g., Guynn, supra note 93, at 669 (“The financial industry has already responded to the
Business Roundtable decision by increasing its focus on agency compliance with applicable CBA
mandates in its comment letters on proposed rulemaking and by filing lawsuits challenging various rules
based on an alleged failure to conduct an adequate CBA”); Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter,
supra note 44, at 7 (declaring that “any analysis of the impact of a proposed rulemaking, even more so
in the context of broad reforms, is incomplete without a cost/benefit analysis”); The Impact of Dodd–
Frank on Customers, Credit, and Job Creators: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets
and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 112th Cong. 11 (2012) (Testimony of Dennis M. Kelleher,
President and CEO, Better Markets, Inc.) [hereinafter Kelleher Testimony] (stating that the financial
industry’s “latest weapon to kill or weaken financial reform is to claim that every rule and regulation
passed to implement [Dodd–Frank] must be subjected to exhaustive ‘cost–benefit analysis’”).
101. Business Roundtable Commentary, supra note 94, at 1092; see also Guynn, supra note 93, at
671 (“There is already evidence that the financial regulatory agencies have slowed down the process of
issuing rules under the Dodd–Frank Act as a result of Business Roundtable’s rigorous scrutiny. Many
agencies feel bullied by the requirement to improve their CBA apparatus.”); Edwards, supra note 7
(stating that Business Roundtable has been “paralyzing for the agencies . . . . How extensive must their
cost-benefit analyses be? . . . Everyone is trying to figure out how to move forward without getting
sued.”) (quoting an unnamed former CFTC staff member).
102. Business Roundtable Commentary, supra note 94, at 1094–95. Section 971 provides that the
SEC’s proxy rules “may include” a proxy access requirement. Dodd–Frank § 971(a)(2). The
conference report on Dodd–Frank explained that Section 971 “authorizes the SEC to write . . . proxy
access rules” but requires the SEC to consider “the burden on small [corporate] issuers” and the
appropriateness of “exemptions” from such rules. H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 873 (2010) (Conf. Rep.),
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In their joint comment letter, five leading financial industry trade
groups attacked the FRB’s proposal to establish enhanced prudential
requirements for SIFIs because the proposal “reflects little or no
attempt . . . to weigh the enormous costs to [SIFIs] and U.S. financial
markets associated with the proposals against the likely benefits of the
proposals for the goal of U.S. financial stability.”103 The groups
asserted that the FRB’s proposed rules would impose “excessive
limitations on the ability of U.S. banks to take controlled risks” and
would create the danger that “the still nascent economic recovery may
likely be stalled and future economic growth will be curtailed by a
reduced availability of credit.”104 The groups also charged that “no
country has adopted . . . legislation or regulations having the scope of
Dodd–Frank,” and the “combined impact” the FRB’s proposed rules and
other rules implementing Dodd–Frank “may place U.S. banks at an
unwarranted competitive disadvantage compared to those countries that
have not implemented a comparable approach.”105
As explained below, the financial industry previously used the same
arguments to support deregulation and block effective supervisory
controls during the unsustainable credit boom that led to the financial
crisis. During that credit boom, as now, the industry and its supporters
repeatedly claimed that stronger regulations would impose excessive
compliance burdens on financial institutions, reduce the availability of
credit to businesses and consumers, and endanger the global
competitiveness of U.S. banks and financial markets.106 Congress and
regulators acceded to the industry’s claims and failed to adopt measures
that could have prevented or mitigated the worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression.107 Given that unfortunate history, policymakers
and courts should be highly skeptical when the financial industry
reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 729-30. The Senate committee report on Dodd–Frank stated that
Section 971 “gives the SEC wide latitude in setting the terms of such proxy access.” S. REP. NO. 111176, at 146 (2010). The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable did not include any any
reference to Section 971 or any discussion of its legislative history.
103. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 7–8.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id. at 9; see also id. at 4 (warning that “excessive limitations on the ability of U.S. banks to
take controlled risks will reduce the role of the United States as a leader in the global financial system”).
106. See infra notes 258-65, 533-49, 696-707 and accompanying text; see also Kelleher
Testimony, supra note 100, at 9–10 (noting that “[s]ince the emergence of financial market regulation,
the financial services industry has argued that new regulatory requirements will have a devastating
impact by imposing unbearable compliance costs” and “[o]pponents of reform under the Dodd–Frank
law are following this familiar pattern”).
107. See infra Parts III(A)-(C), (F); Kelleher Testimony, supra note 100, at 10 (contending that
“the financial collapse and economic crisis . . . were a direct result of too little regulation. In the years
leading up to the crisis, huge sectors of our financial markets (such as swaps) were completely
unregulated, and other sectors (such as mortgage-backed securities) were poorly regulated”) (emphasis
added).
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presents the same arguments as justifications for blocking Dodd–Frank’s
reforms.
2. Any Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Dodd–Frank’s Reforms
Must Consider the Huge Costs of the Financial Crisis and the
Comparable Benefits of Avoiding Future Crises
The financial industry’s cost–benefit arguments are deeply flawed
because they rarely, if ever, include any detailed consideration of the
enormous benefits that society would receive from avoiding a
catastrophic financial crisis similar to the recent crisis.108 A
comprehensive analysis of the costs of the recent crisis is beyond the
scope of this article. However, the following brief overview of some of
the major costs inflicted on U.S. financial markets and the general
economy is sufficient to demonstrate the devastating impact of the crisis
as well as the huge potential benefits from reforms that could avoid or
mitigate a similar disaster in the future.
The financial crisis imposed two principal categories of costs on U.S.
financial markets and the general economy.
First, the federal
government created serious distortions in the financial markets through
its dramatic interventions to rescue TBTF financial institutions and
preserve market stability:
•

The federal government “provided more than $6 trillion of
support to financial institutions during the financial crisis, when
such support is measured by the peak amounts of outstanding
assistance under the [Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)]
capital assistance programs, [Federal Reserve (Fed) ] emergency
lending programs, FDIC debt guarantees, and other asset
purchase and guarantee programs.”109

108. See Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 3 (stating that the five
financial industry trade associations supported regulatory reform that “protects the financial system
against potential systemic meltdowns of the type faced in the recent crisis,” but the associations made no
effort to quantify the potential benefits of avoiding such a crisis); BETTER MARKETS, THE COST OF THE
WALL-STREET CAUSED FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND ONGOING ECONOMIC CRISIS IS MORE THAN $12.8
TRILLION
8
(2012),
available
at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/bettermarkets.pdf [hereinafter Financial Crisis Costs] (declaring that the
financial industry “is really advocating for an incomplete and biased version of ‘cost–benefit analysis’
that . . . ignores the costs of the crisis to society and also ignores the benefits of financial reform to
society”); see also Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation 13 (Aug. 6,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2085336 (observing that “[i]t is
very difficult to put a dollar value” on the potential benefits of avoiding financial crises, and therefore a
“strict cost–benefit approach” encourages regulators to ignore such benefits and to focus on the more
easily quantifiable costs of complying with new regulations).
109. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could Solve the TooBig-to-Fail Problem and Align US and UK Financial Regulation of Financial Conglomerates (Part 1),
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•

The federal government rescued eleven large financial
institutions that were threatened with failure. Officials arranged
bailouts for two of the three largest U.S. banks (Bank of America
(BofA) and Citigroup) as well as the largest U.S. insurance
company (AIG). Regulators provided financial assistance for
emergency acquisitions of two other major banks (Wachovia and
National City), the two biggest thrifts (Washington Mutual
(WaMu) and Countrywide), and two of the five largest securities
firms (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch (Merrill)). Regulators
also granted emergency approvals for conversions of two other
leading securities firms (Goldman Sachs (Goldman) and Morgan
Stanley) into BHCs in order to place those institutions under the
Fed’s protection.110

•

In early 2009, federal regulators publicly announced—in
connection with “stress tests” for the 19 largest BHCs (each
having assets over $100 billion)—that the federal government
would provide any capital assistance needed to ensure the
survival of those institutions. As a practical matter, regulators
thereby certified the TBTF status of all 19 BHCs.111

Studies have shown that the TARP capital infusions, FDIC debt
guarantees and Fed emergency lending programs provided “very large
transfers of wealth from taxpayers to the shareholders and creditors of
the largest [financial institutions]” during a period when the recipient
institutions would have had great difficulty in raising funds in the capital
markets.112 Other studies have concluded that major banks have
benefited from large subsidies—including a significantly lower cost of
raising funds—by virtue of their presumed TBTF status before, during
and after the crisis.113 The federal government’s TBTF rescues
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Mar. 2012, at 1, 3; see also infra notes 283-86 (describing the
massive financial assistance provided by the federal government to large financial institutions).
110. Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 3.
111. Id. at 3; see also Kelleher Testimony, supra note 100, at 5 (quoting a joint statement issued
by the federal bank regulators on Feb. 23, 2009, which declared that the federal government would
“preserve the viability of systemically important financial institutions so that they are able to meet their
commitments”).
112. Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 5, 20 nn.40–41 (citing five studies that evaluated the impact of
federal assistance programs for the largest banks during the financial crisis).
113. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 4–5, 19 nn.24–29 (summarizing a study by A. Joseph
Warburton and Daniz Anginer, finding that large U.S. banks enjoyed a funding cost advantage (due to
an implicit TBTF subsidy) equal to $4 billion per year before the financial crisis, rising to $60 billion
annually from 2007 to 2009, and peaking at $88 billion in 2008); Frederic Schweikhard & Zoe
Tsesmelidakis, The Impact of Government Interventions on CDS and Equity Markets, June, 2012, at 1–
4, 32–34, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943546; (concluding that large U.S. banks benefited
from total reductions in bond funding costs (due to an implicit TBTF subsidy) of nearly $130 billion
between 2007 and 2010); Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy
Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions 3–7, 11–12 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working
Paper No. WP/12/128, 2012) (finding that large banks in the U.S. and 15 other developed nations
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confirmed the existence of those subsidies, thereby weakening creditor
discipline over large financial institutions and encouraging those
institutions to assume even larger risks.114 In addition, TBTF subsidies
give big banks unfair competitive advantages over smaller banks and
therefore create unjustified incentives for “further consolidation and
concentration in the financial system.”115
The second major category of costs from the financial crisis results
from the fact that the crisis triggered the most severe economic
recession since the 1940s.116 The “Great Recession”117 has inflicted
tremendous economic losses on the U.S., as shown by the following
illustrative statistics:
•

The U.S. is projected to lose approximately $7.6 trillion of gross
domestic product (GDP) from 2008 to 2018, representing the
cumulative difference between the actual and forecast GDP for
those years and “potential GDP—what GDP would have been
but for the financial and economic crises.”118 In addition,
government spending in response to the crises is expected to

received average funding cost advantages (due to implicit TBTF subsidies) equal to 60 basis points in
2007 and 80 basis points in 2009); Why Should Taxpayers Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year?,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 20, 2013 (editorial) (concluding, based on the foregoing study by Ueda and di
Mauro, that the ten largest U.S. banks receive “a taxpayer subsidy of $83 billion a year” and the five
largest banks—JPMorgan, BofA, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and Goldman—“account for $64 billion of the
total subsidy, an amount roughtly equal to their typical annual profits”); see also Joseph Noss &
Rhiannon Sowerbutts, The Implicit Subsidy of Banks (Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 15,
May 28, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2071720 (concluding that large U.K. banks
benefited from a funding cost advantage of £40 billion in 2010, due to an implicit TBTF subsidy).
114. Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 4; FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 595; Noss
& Sowerbutts, supra note 113, at 4.
115. FRB Proposed Rules for SIFIs, supra note 40, at 595 (stating that “[t]he market perception
that some companies are “too big to fail” . . . produces competitive distortions because [such]
companies . . . can often fund themselves at a lower cost than other companies . . . and tends to
artificially encourage further consolidation and concentration in the financial system”); accord
Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 5–6 (“In recent years, and particularly during the present crisis, [large
banks] have operated with much lower capital ratios and have benefited from a much lower cost of
funds, compared with smaller banks . . . Given the major advantages conferred by TBTF status, it is not
surprising that [large banks] have pursued aggressive growth strategies during the past two decades to
reach a size at which they would be considered TBTF by regulators and the financial markets.”); Noss &
Sowerbutts, supra note 113, at 4 (“[B]anks that benefit from the implicit [TBTF] subsidy have a
competitive advantage over those that do not” because the expectation of governmental support results
in “lowering those banks’ cost of funding” and “may enable guaranteed banks to expand at the expense
of non-guaranteed banks.”).
116. Kevin J. Lansing, Gauging the Impact of the Great Recession, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER
2011–21 (July 21, 2011) (“The ‘Great Recession,’ which started in December 2007 and ended in June
2009, was the most severe economic contraction since 1947.”).
117. Id.; see also Paul Wiseman, US Economic Recovery Is Weakest Since World War II,
ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Aug. 15, 2012 (reporting that “[m]any economists say the agonizing
recovery from the Great Recession . . . is the predictable consequence of a housing bust and a grave
financial crisis”).
118. Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 13.
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“increase the national debt by $8 trillion as of 2018.”119
•

Due to sharp declines in the prices of homes and financial assets,
household net worth declined by $19 trillion (in 2012 dollars)
from July 2007 to the depths of the crisis in early 2009.120
Median household net worth fell 38.8% from 2007 to 2010, and
average household net worth fell 14.7% during the same
period.121

•

Home values dropped by one-third from the peak of the housing
boom in 2006 through the end of 2011, resulting in a loss of
about $7 trillion in household wealth.122

•

In March 2013, almost ten million homes (representing nearly a
fifth of all residential properties with a mortgage) were worth
less than the outstanding balance on their mortgages.123 “About
7 million mortgage holders have had to leave their homes since
2007 because of foreclosure or a short sale, in which a property
is sold for less than is owed.”124 Five million additional homes
were “at least 30 days delinquent or in some stage of
foreclosure” in March 2013.125

•

8.5 million jobs disappeared between 2007 and 2009, and the

119. Id. at 41, 62; see also Allen, supra note 108, at 12 n.41 (stating that, according to the
Congressional Budget Office, “the United States incurred an additional $7 trillion in government debt as
a direct result of the recession following the Financial Crisis”).
120. Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 33.
121. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL. No. 2, (June 2012), at 1, 16-17 (noting that median
household net worth in 2010 “was close to levels not seen since the 1992 survey,” while mean
household net worth in 2010 “fell to about the level of the 2001 survey”), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf.
122. Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 36.
123. Prashant Gopal, Homeonwers With Negative Equity Below 20% of Borrowers, BLOOMBERG,
June 12, 2013 (reporting that the number of “underwater homes,” whose owners owed more than the
market value of their homes, declined to “9.7 million, or 19.8 percent of all U.S. homes with
mortgages . . . down from 21.7 percent at the end of [2012]”), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201306-12/homeowners-with-negative-equity-below-20-of-borrowers.html.
124. Prashant Gopal, Americans Seize Second Chance Mortgages Post-Foreclosure, BLOOMBERG
(April 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-03/americans-seize-second-chance-postforeclosure-mortgages.html; see also Kathleen M. Howley & Thom Weidlich, Seizures Threatened in
Massachusetts with Naked Loans Challenge: Mortgages, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2012) (reporting that
“[a]bout 5 million homes have been lost to foreclosure” between 2006 and 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-21/seizures-threatened-in-massachusetts-with-naked-loanschallenge-mortgages.html; Dan Levy & Heather Perlberg, Foreclosures Jump as Banks Bet on Rising
U.S. Home Prices, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2013) (stating that 670,000 additional homes were
repossessed via foreclosures in 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-13/foreclosures-jumpas-banks-bet-on-rising-u-s-home-prices.html.
125. John Gittelsohn, Housing Crash Fades as Defaults Decline to 2007 Levels, BLOOMBERG
(May 6, 2013) (also reporting that the number of homes in delinquency or foreclosure proceedings in
March 2013 were “down from a peak of 7.7 million in January 2010, [but] still more than double the 2.2
million non-currenct mortgages in January 2005”).
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unemployment rate exceeded 10% at its peak in October 2009.126
The unemployment rate remained above 8% from February 2009
through August 2012, representing “the longest stretch in
monthly [employment] records going back to 1948.”127 In
addition, the “underemployment rate” (which includes
unemployed workers, part-time workers seeking full-time
positions and those who stopped looking for jobs) remained
above 14% during the same period.128
•

A Labor Department survey revealed that problems with longterm unemployment persisted after the recession ended in mid2009, due to the weakness of the economic recovery. The survey
found that only a quarter of six million “displaced workers” who
lost their jobs between 2009 and 2011 were able to find a job
with equivalent pay by January 2012. Almost a third of those
workers took a job that paid less, and nearly half were still
unemployed or had stopped looking for work by the latter
date.129 The percentage of families falling below the poverty
line rose from 12.5% to 15.1% between 2007 and 2010, and the
number of Americans receiving food stamps increased from 33
million to 46 million between 2009 and July 2012.130

In view of the tremendous losses inflicted by the financial crisis, a
prominent advocate of financial reform has aptly described as
“ridiculous” the financial industry’s claims that “it cannot be reregulated to prevent it from causing yet another crisis if the costs it must
bear are too great.”131 Even so, the industry will undoubtedly continue
to use Business Roundtable as a basis for challenging the compliance
costs imposed by Dodd–Frank’s reforms. Without a proper accounting
of the costs of the financial crisis and the potential benefits of avoiding
future crises, the industry’s legal challenges pose a very significant
126. Lansing, supra note 116, at 3.
127. Paul Wiseman & Christopher S. Rugaber, US Hiring Picked Up in July; So Did
Unemployment, ASSOCIATED PRESS FINANCIAL WIRE (Aug. 3, 2012) (available on Lexis) (reporting
that the unemployment rate increased to 8.3% in July 2012 from 8.2% in June); Shobhana Chandra,
Miss in U.S. Payrolls Spurs Talk of New Fed Stimulus, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-07/payrolls-in-u-s-rose-96-000-in-august-jobless-ratefalls.html (reporting that the unemployment rate fell to 8.1% in August 2012, as 368,000 Americans left
the labor force, and the unemployment rate “has exceeded 8 percent since Feb. 2009, the longest stretch
in monthly records going back to 1948”).
128. See Wiseman & Rugaber, supra note 127, at 3 (reporting an underemployment rate of 15%
in July 2012); Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 23 & fig. 5 (showing that “the broadest measure
of unemployment, the U-6 rate,” peaked at 17.5% in October 2009 and remained above 14% through
July 2012).
129. Peter Whoriskey, Laid-Off Workers Struggle to Rebound, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2012, at
A01 (describing a Labor Department survey of “displaced workers” who lost their jobs due to plant
closings or layoffs after having been employed for at least three years).
130. Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 55–56.
131. Kelleher Testimony, supra note 100, at 11.
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obstacle to Dodd-Frank’s implementation, creating a situation in which
“the public, the markets, and the economy as a whole will once again be
vulnerable to another financial catastrophe.”132
C. The Financial Industry’s Legislative Strategy to Roll Back Financial
Reforms
In addition to lobbying and suing regulators, the financial industry
has pursued an aggressive strategy to secure favorable legislation that
will (i) repeal or water down key provisions of Dodd–Frank or (ii)
cripple the ability of regulatory agencies to implement those provisions.
The industry’s generous contributions helped Republicans to secure
control of the House of Representatives and to increase their strength in
the Senate in the 2010 midterm elections. After the new Congress
convened in January 2011, Republican congressional leaders (with
support from pro-industry Democrats) orchestrated a multipronged
series of attacks on Dodd–Frank’s reforms. Republican efforts to
undermine Dodd–Frank persisted despite a series of new financial
scandals that further tarnished Wall Street’s already battered reputation.
1. The Industry’s Legislative Efforts to Undermine Dodd–Frank
After the financial industry failed to prevent Dodd–Frank’s passage, it
immediately launched an aggressive campaign to secure legislative
measures that would weaken or roll back Dodd–Frank’s key reforms.
During the midterm elections of 2010, financial institutions and their
trade associations gave a majority of their political contributions to
Republican congressional candidates.133 The industry’s tilt toward
Republicans in 2010 represented a significant shift from 2008, when the
industry gave a majority of its support to Democrats.134 That shift
reflected the industry’s anger over the passage of Dodd–Frank, which
was supported by most Democrats but opposed by most Republicans in
Congress.135
132. Id. at 7.
133. See Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, CENTER FOR
RESPONSIVE
POLITICS
(last
visited
on
June
14,
2013),
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=All&ind=F (showing that the finance, insurance
and real estate sector gave Republican candidates 53% of its $319 million of political contributions
during the 2010 election cycle) [hereinafter CRP Political Contribution Report].
134. See id. (showing that the finance, insurance and real estate sector gave Democratic
candidates 51% of its $521 million of political contributions during the 2008 election cycle).
135. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 889–90 (discussing reasons for the financial industry’s shift from
supporting Democrats in 2008 to supporting Republicans in 2010); see also id. at 889 n.25 (noting that
only 19 Democratic House members and one Democratic Senator opposed Dodd–Frank, while only
three Republican House members and three Republican Senators supported it).
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The 2010 midterm elections gave Republicans control of the House
and several additional seats in the Senate.136 Even before the new
Congress convened in January 2011, Republican House leaders
announced plans to challenge Dodd–Frank’s reforms in several key
areas.137 The financial industry and its Republican allies particularly
targeted the CFPB, which they had vehemently opposed during the
debates leading up to Dodd–Frank’s passage.138 In 2011, Republicans
passed legislation in the House to weaken the CFPB’s independence and
authority by (i) replacing CFPB’s single Director with a five-member
bipartisan commission, (ii) expanding FSOC’s authority to veto CFPB’s
regulations, and (iii) removing CFPB’s assured source of funding from
the Fed and forcing CFPB to rely on congressional appropriations for its
budget.139
In addition, Republican Senators voted to block confirmation of any
Director of CFPB until the Senate and the President accepted the
changes to CFPB’s governance and funding proposed by House
Republicans.140 President Obama sought to overcome this confirmation
obstacle by using a recess appointment to install Richard Cordray as the
first Director of CFPB in January 2012. However, the validity of Mr.
Cordray’s appointment was challenged in a lawsuit filed by a Texas
bank in June 2012 and was called into further question by a D.C. Circuit
decision that struck down similar recess appointments issued to three
members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).141
Legislative allies of the financial industry introduced legislation to
weaken several key derivatives reforms in Title VII of Dodd–Frank. For
example, Rep. Jim Hines (D-CT), whose district in southwestern

136. Id. at 890.
137. See, e.g., Cheyenne Hopkins, House GOP Oversight Likely to Shape Reform Rules, AM.
BANKER (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_214/house-republicans-doddfrank-1028295-1.html?CMP=OTC-RSS; Stacy Kaper, Review 2010/Preview 2011: Redrawing the
Battle Lines on Reform, AM. BANKER (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1245499160.html; Phil Mattingly, Derivatives, ‘Volcker’ Rule Might Be Targets of House Republican
Tactics, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-19/derivativesvolcker-rules-may-be-house-republican-targets.html.
138. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 886–90.
139. Id. at 891–92, 901–04, 919–25.
140. Id. at 892–93, 895–96.
141. Kevin Wack, CFPB Suit Faces Long Odds, But May Still Have Impact, AM. BANKER (June
25, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_121/cfpb-suit-faces-long-odds-but-may-stillhave-impact-1050373-1.html (reporting on lawsuit challenging the validity of Mr. Cordray’s recess
appointment). In Noel Canning v, NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), petition for cert. granted, 81
U.S.L.W. 3695 (June 25, 2013), the D.C. Circuit invalidated President Obama’s recess appointments for
three members of the NLRB. Those recess appointments were made on January 4, 2012, the same day
that Mr. Cordray received his recess appointment. For a critical assessment of the Canning decision and
its negative implications for Mr. Cordray’s recess appointment, see Peter M. Shane, The Future of
Recess Appointments in Light of Noel Canning v. NLRB, 81 U.S.L.W. 1750 (June 4, 2013).
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Connecticut is the home of many financial executives and hedge funds,
sponsored a bill that would exempt foreign affiliates of U.S. swaps
dealers from most of Title VII’s provisions.142 If enacted, Rep. Hines’
bill could exempt half or more of the derivatives activities conducted by
five major U.S. banks from regulation under Dodd–Frank.143
Republican leaders also introduced bills to repeal FSOC’s authority to
designate nonbank financial firms as SIFIs under Title I of Dodd–
Frank.144 The Republican bills would also prohibit the Fed from
regulating nonbank SIFIs and would thereby prevent the Fed from
acting to stop excessive risk-taking by large nonbank financial firms
similar to AIG and Lehman.145 Republicans asserted that designating
nonbanks as SIFIs would give them “an advantage in the marketplace,”
but that claim is unpersuasive.146 Indeed, large nonbank firms have
strongly opposed being designated as SIFIs because they want to avoid
the FRB’s oversight as well as the higher capital requirements and other
prudential standards that Dodd–Frank imposes on nonbank SIFIs.147 As
Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) observed, being designated as a SIFI “is a
gift that no one wants.”148
House Republicans also sponsored legislation to repeal the “orderly
liquidation authority” (OLA) created by Title II of Dodd–Frank.149 The
142. See Cohan, supra note 7 (criticizing H.R. 3283, sponsored by Rep. Hines); Taibbi, supra
note 7, at 9 (same, and also criticizing H.R. 3336, which would grant broad exemptions from Title VII
to any company that makes “extensions of credit” to customers).
143. See Brush, supra note 80 (reporting that overseas branches or affiliates accounted for the
following shares of derivatives activities at five major U.S. banks: 62% at Goldman, 77% at Morgan
Stanley, 59% at JPMorgan, 53% at Citigroup, and half at BofA). Although the financial industry’s allies
on Capitol Hill did not succeed in enacting any of the proposed bills to weaken Title VII in 2012, they
introduced a new set of similar bills in 2013. See infra notes 404-05 and accompanying text.
144. Systemic Risk: Bicameral Bill Takes Aim at FSOC SIFI Designations, 99 BNA’S BANKING
REPORT 266, Aug. 7, 2012, available at 2012 WL 3164880 (discussing H.R. 6317 and S. 3497
introduced by Rep. Scott Garrett (R-NJ) and Sen. David Vitter (R-LA)) [hereinafter Systemic Risk].
145. Id.; see also supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why Congress
authorized FSOC to designate nonbank SIFIs and the importance of Fed regulatory authority over those
institutions); Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 993–95 (same).
146. Kevin Wack, GOP Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Repeal Systemic Designations, AM.
BANKER (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_149/gop-lawmakers-introducebill-repeal-systemic-designations-1051541-1.html; see also Donna Borak, Is TBTF Over? Only One
Way to Find Out, AM. BANKER (June 15, 2011), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_114/toobig-to-fail-dodd-frank-1038950-1.html (describing Rep. Barney Frank’s critique of efforts by House
Republicans to repeal FSOC’s authority to designate nonbank SIFIs).
147. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 994–95; Alistair Gray, Insurers Warn on ‘Too Big to Fail’
Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a528bd0e-460f-11e2-ae8d00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JO5Q0JMM; Borak, supra note 146.
148. Borak, supra note 146 (quoting Rep. Frank).
149. Kevin Wack, House Committee Votes to Repeal Bank Liquidation Authority, AM. BANKER
(Apr.
18,
2012),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_75/liquidation-authority-Houserepublicans-dodd-frank-cfpb-1048541-1.html (reporting on vote to repeal the OLA by the House
Financial Services Committee).
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OLA authorizes the FDIC to liquidate a bank or nonbank SIFI that is
placed in receivership by the Treasury Secretary.150 Regulators and
some commentators have supported the OLA as a preferable alternative
to the “Hobson’s choice of bailout or disorderly bankruptcy” that
confronted federal officials during the peak of the financial crisis.151 A
repeal of the OLA would put regulators back in the position they
occupied when Lehman and AIG teetered on the brink of failure in
September 2008. As one commentator explained:
If the FDIC cannot seize a failing firm [under the OLA], regulators are
left with two choices: let a firm go bankrupt, a la Lehman Brothers, or try
finding a way of bailing it out.
Both choices are equally bad. Lehman’s bankruptcy nearly caused
the entire financial system to melt down and directly led to government
bailouts of [AIG and] the largest banks.152

Lehman’s bankruptcy severely disrupted the global financial system,
and regulators in the U.S. and Europe quickly decided that they would
not allow a disorderly failure of another SIFI.153 Additionally, it took
nearly four years and $1.8 billion of expenses before Lehman emerged
from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2012, and Lehman is expected to
pay less than one-fifth of the $300 billion it owes to creditors.154 The
snail’s pace and high costs of Lehman’s bankruptcy create serious
150. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 993, 996–1000 (discussing the OLA).
151. Id. at 993, 996 (quoting speech on Feb. 26, 2010, by FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo); see also
Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, U. CIN. L. REV., 2–3
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037915 (describing the potential advantages and
possible shortcomings of the OLA procedure in resolving the failure of a large global bank like Bank of
America, and explaining why it would be very difficult to amend the Bankruptcy Code to deal
successfully with such a failure). For a detailed analysis of the strong support expressed by regulators
and some commentators for the OLA and the opposition voiced by other commentators , see Paul L.
Lee, The Dodd–Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A Preliminary Analysis and Critique—Part I,
128 BANKING L.J. 771, 782–97 (2011) [hereinafter Lee Part I]; Paul L. Lee, The Dodd–Frank Act
Orderly Liquidation Authority: A Preliminary Analysis and Critique—Part II, 128 BANKING L.J. 867,
868–71, 901–03 (2011).
152. Rob Blackwell, House Banking Panel Cynically Uses Scare Tactics, Symbolic Votes, AM.
BANKER (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/House-Financial-ServicesCommittee-Big-Brother-1048584-1.html.
153. See, e.g., FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 335–43, 353–60, 373–86; see also Wolfgang
Schäuble, How to Protect EU Taxpayers Against Bank Failures, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d270a89e-f213-11e1-8973-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JO5Q0JMM
(stating that Lehman’s bankruptcy “tipp[ed] the world into a financial and economic crisis of nearly
unprecedented magnitude” and “[a]fter Lehman Brother’s collapse, the international community agreed
not to let another systemically relevant bank fail”).
154. Linda Sandler, Lehman’s Year-End Fees, Filings Match Up With Biggest Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-21/lehman-s-year-end-feesfilings-match-up-with-biggest-bankruptcy.html; Linda Sandler, Lehman Comes Back From the Dead,
BUSINESSWEEK,
July
12,
2012,
at
34,
available
at
BLOOMBERG
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-12/lehman-comes-back-from-the-dead.
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doubts whether Chapter 11—even if amended to deal with failing
SIFIs—could successfully resolve the failure of a megabank like BofA,
which is far larger and more complex than Lehman.155 In any event,
when House Republicans voted in committee to repeal the OLA they did
not vote to amend Chapter 11 to address any of the special challenges
posed by failing SIFIs.156
House Republicans and several Senators, including Senator Mark
Warner (D-VA), also pushed legislation that would require more
stringent CBA for all regulations issued by the CFTC and SEC.157 As
described above, the financial industry has already invoked existing
statutory references to cost–benefit studies as a basis for challenging
regulations issued by the SEC and CFTC.158 Imposing even stricter
cost–benefit requirements would create a further obstacle to the
adoption of rules under Dodd–Frank.159
As an additional method for slowing down Dodd–Frank’s
implementation, Republicans blocked any significant increases in the
budgets of the CFTC and SEC during 2010, 2011 and 2012.160 CFTC
155. See Lubben, supra note 151, at 33–35 (explaining that a resolution of BofA would be much
more complicated and difficult than Lehman’s Chapter 11 proceeding).
156. See Blackwell, supra note 152 (“Republicans have now voted to repeal [the OLA] and
replace it with . . . nothing.”) (ellipse in original); see also Lee Part I, supra note 151, at 792–97
(describing (i) significant shortcomings in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that make it very difficult
for Chapter 11 to deal effectively with the potential failure of a SIFI, and (ii) legislation that House
Republicans introduced in 2009 to address those flaws but failed to pass).
157. Maria Lokshin, Securities and Exchange Commission: House Passes Omnibus Bill That
Would Tighten Cost–Benefit Analysis for SEC, CFTC, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1438 (July 30,
2012) (discussing House passage of H.R. 4078); Maria Lokshin, Securities and Exchange Commission:
Senate Bill Targets Cost–Benefit Analysis of Independent Agencies’ Rulemaking, 44 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 1529 (Aug. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Lokshin, Senate Bill Targets Cost–Benefit Analysis]
(discussing introduction of S. 3468, which would require stricter cost–benefit studies by the CFTC, SEC
and other independent agencies). The proposed legislation to require CBA for all CFTC and SEC rules
was not enacted in 2012, but the financial industry’s allies on Capitol Hill introduced similar legislation
in 2013. See infra note 405 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Part II(B)(1) (describing litigation brought by financial industry groups to
invalidate SEC and CFTC regulations for allegedly inadequate cost–benefit studies).
159. John Kemp, Wall St and Republicans Team up to Curb CFTC, REUTERS (June 7, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/column-kemp-cftc-idUSL5E8H76GF20120607;
Lokshin,
Senate Bill Targets Cost–Benefit Analysis, supra note 157 (citing arguments by House Democrats that
“requiring [independent agencies] to ramp up their economic assessments would effectively paralyze
their rulemaking”).
160. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 952–53 (describing the Republicans’ success in blocking
increased funding for the CFTC and SEC during 2011); Silla Brush, House Republicans Seek Cuts in
Financial Dodd–Frank Agencies, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201206-05/house-republicans-seek-cuts-in-dodd-frank-regulatory-agencies.html (discussing Republican
efforts to cut the CFTC’s budget and to freeze the SEC’s budget during 2012); Robert Schmidt et al.,
The Great Regulatory Holdup, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 14–20, 2011, at 24 (reporting that
Congress froze the CFTC’s and SEC’s budgets for 2011 at their 2010 levels); Kelsey Snell, Industry
Looks to Derail Dodd–Frank Enforcement, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/industry-looks-to-derail-dodd-frank-enforcement-

1322

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

chairman Gary Gensler and SEC chairman Mary Schapiro warned that
budget constraints imposed by Congress jeopardized the ability of both
agencies to adopt and enforce the new regulations mandated by Dodd–
Frank.161 Mr. Gensler (along with critics of the financial industry) also
alleged that the Republicans’ budgetary actions were consciously
designed to help Wall Street by undermining Dodd–Frank.162
2. The Financial Industry and Its Legislative Allies Have Persisted in
Their Efforts to Weaken Dodd–Frank Despite Recent Financial Scandals
The financial industry and its congressional allies have maintained
their legislative campaign to weaken Dodd–Frank despite a series of
recent scandals involving major Wall Street firms and leading foreign
banks. Those scandals further damaged the reputations of large
financial institutions, which already had plummeted due to public anger
over abusive financial practices and excessive risk-taking that led to the
financial crisis.163 The financial industry’s recent embarrassments have
included the following revelations:
•

MF Global, a large commodities broker led by Jon Corzine—a
former co-head of Goldman Sachs who later served as New
Jersey’s Governor and a United States Senator—filed for
bankruptcy in late 2011 after suffering heavy trading losses.
After becoming chairman of MF Global in 2010, Corzine pushed
the firm to take highly aggressive trading positions, including
bets on more than $6 billion of sovereign bonds issued by high-

20110215?mrefid=site_search (describing Republican plans to cut the CFTC’s and SEC’s budgets, and
reporting that Republicans “make no bones about their goal: to defang Dodd–Frank”).
161. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 952–53; Stephen Joyce, Derivatives: Gensler Criticizes Vote on
CFTC Budget: Says Dodd–Frank Requires More Funding, 98 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 1030, June 12,
2012, available at 2012 WL 2092519; Kevin Wack, Reform Implementation and Budget Crunch
Collide, AM. BANKER (July 22, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-261990109.html.
162. Joyce, supra note 161 (quoting Mr. Gensler’s statement that Republican attempts to cut the
CFTC’s budget would “effectively put the interests of Wall Street ahead of those of the American
public”); Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 952–53 (criticizing industry-backed efforts by Republicans to cut
the CFTC’s and SEC’s budgets); Kemp, supra note 159 (contending that it would be reasonable to
describe Republican efforts to cut the CFTC’s and SEC’s budgets, while demanding “smarter regulation
and more cost benefit analysis, . . . as deeply cynical”); Snell, supra note 160 (reporting that Mr.
Gensler’s “worries” about the adverse impact of congressional budget cuts “are music to the industry”).
163. See, e.g., Dawn Kopecki, Wall Street Leaderless in Rules Fight as Dimon Diminished,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/wall-street-leaderless-inrules-fight-as-dimon-diminished.html; Floyd Norris, Scandals May Cost The Banks Their Clout, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2012, at B1; The LIBOR Affair: Banksters, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21558260; see also Financial Crisis Costs, supra note 108, at 10
(declaring that “Wall Street deserves to be at the top of any list of those responsible for causing the
[financial and economic] crises”); supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text (discussing public anger
over the central role of big banks in triggering the financial crisis).
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risk European countries.164 After investigating MF Global’s
collapse, the company’s bankruptcy trustee sued Corzine and
two other senior executives for pursuing high-risk trading
strategies that “severely strained the company’s liquidity” and
“ultimately contributed to [the company’s] downfall.”165
•

JP Morgan disclosed in July 2012 that it had lost almost $6
billion—and faced the threat of additional losses—from massive
trading in derivatives by a London unit within the bank’s chief
investment office (CIO).166 JPMorgan created CIO to invest
excess deposits that the bank did not use to fund its loans, and
the bank’s senior management (including chairman Jamie
Dimon) encouraged CIO to take aggressive trading risks.167
CIO’s huge trading positions generated substantial profits in
2010 and 2011, but produced massive losses in 2012.168
JPMorgan’s trading losses triggered a congressional
investigation and severely embarrassed Mr. Dimon, who was
widely praised for steering JPMorgan through the financial crisis
without reporting a quarterly loss.169 In addition, JPMorgan and
its senior executives faced a variety of potential legal claims
after a Senate committee “accused [JPMorgan] of hiding losses,
deceiving regulators and misinforming investors.”170

•

In June 2012, Barclays paid $450 million to U.S. and U.K.
regulators to settle charges that it conspired with other banks to
manipulate the London interbank offered rate (Libor”) and the

164. Azam Ahmed et al., A Romance With Risk That Brought On a Panic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2011, at A1; Roben Farzad & Matthew Leising, “MF Global’s Jon Corzine Runs Out of Luck,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/mf-globals-joncorzine-runs-out-of-luck-11022011.html.
165. Richard Hill, Futures Trading: Trustee Freeh Sues Corzine, Deputies, Alleging They Led MF
Global Into Ruin, 100 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 805 (April 30, 2013) (quoting complaint filed by
Louis Freeh, bankruptcy trustee for MF Global Holdings Ltd., against Jon Corzine, Bradley Abelow and
Henri Steenkamp).
166. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New Fraud Inquiry as JPMorgan’s Loss Mounts, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 2012, at A1 (reporting JPMorgan’s disclosure of $5.8 billion in trading losses and additional
potential losses of $1.7 billion).
167. Dawn Kopecki & Michael J. Moore, Whale of a Trade Revealed at Biggest U.S. Bank With
Best Control, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-03/whale-of-atrade-revealed-at-biggest-u-s-bank-with-best-control.html; see also infra Part IV(C)(2) (discussing the
investigation of JPMorgan’s “London Whale” trading scandal by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations).
168. Kopecki & Moore, supra note 167; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, JPMorgan
Trade Loss May Reach $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at B1.
169. Rob Blackwell, Dimon’s ‘Blood-on-the-Leaf Moment’: How JPM Losses Have Helped the
BANKER
(May
21,
2012),
Industry’s
Opponents,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_92/jpmorgan-chase-Dimon-trading-loss-Volcker-RuleDodd–Frank-1049261-1.html; Kopecki, supra note 163.
170. Kopecki & Moore, supra note 167; see also infra Part IV(C)(2) (discussing the report issued
by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations).
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euro interbank rate for several years beginning in 2005.
Barclays’ top two officers (Robert Diamond and Jerry del
Missier) resigned under pressure from U.K. regulators and
politicians.171 Officials investigating the Libor scandal targeted
more than a dozen major foreign banks—including UBS and
RBS, which subsequently entered into settlements similar to
Barclay’s—along with BofA, Citigroup and JP Morgan.172 The
Libor-rigging scandal included efforts by bank employees to
earn illegitimate trading profits as well as attempts by banks to
disguise their precarious financial condition during the peak of
the financial crisis in 2008.173 The banks under investigation
faced potentially massive liabilities from official penalties and
investor lawsuits, because Libor determines the pricing for more
than $300 trillion in global financial instruments, including
derivatives, corporate bonds, mortgages and student loans.174 A
leading financial journal remarked that the Libor scandal
“corrodes further what little remains of public trust in banks and
those who run them.”175
•

A Senate committee report issued in July 2012 revealed that
HSBC, a leading global bank, engaged in illegal money
laundering for Mexican drug cartels, terrorists, and rogue states
(including Iran) between 2003 and 2010. HSBC subsequently
paid $1.9 billion to settle criminal money laundering charges
filed by federal prosecutors.176 In August 2012, New York’s

171. Josh Gallu et al., The Libor Scandal Claims Its First CEO, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
July 3, 2012, at 9–16, available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-03/the-libor-scandalclaims-its-first-ceo.
172. Id.; Caroline Salas Gage, What’s Fed to Do as 15 of 18 Banks Fixing Libor Aren’t American,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/what-s-fed-to-do-as-15-of18-banks-fixing-libor-aren-t-american.html; see also infra notes 441-43 and accompanying text
(discussing UBS’s agreement to pay $1.5 billion in December 2012, and RBS’s agreement to pay $612
million in February 2013, in order to settle Libor-rigging charges).
173. Gary Gensler, CFTC Chairman, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Agriculture
(July
17,
2012),
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-118; see also Libor’s Trillion-Dollar
Question, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-27/libor-s-trilliondollar-question.html; The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, at 3.
174. Gallu et al., supra note 171; Andrew Harris et al., Wall Street Bank Investors in Dark on
Libor Liability, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-05/wall-streetbank-investors-in-dark-on-libor-liability.html; see also Libor’s Trillion-Dollar Question, supra note
173.
175. The Libor Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 173, at 2; see also The Worst
Banking Scandal Yet?, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-12/theworst-banking-scandal-yet-.html (“The Libor scandal offers a sad illustration of the moral bankruptcy
that has infected some corners of finance.”).
176. Joe Adler, HSBC: A Study in Anti-Laundering Blunders, AM. BANKER (July 18, 2012),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_137/hsbc-a-study-in-anti-laundering-blunders-10509981.html; Jeff Day, Money Laundering: Senate Probe Finds Major AML Problems at HSBC 2003-2010;
Blasts OCC AML Policy, 99 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 153 (July 24, 2012), available at 2012 WL
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banking regulator charged Standard Chartered, another major
foreign bank, with illegally laundering $250 billion of funds for
Iran from 2001 to 2007.177 Standard Chartered ultimately paid
$670 million to settle New York’s allegations as well as separate
federal claims.178

The foregoing scandals further marred the already bruised credibility
of major U.S. and foreign banks.179 However, the scandals’ negative
impact on Wall Street’s reputation did not deter the financial industry
and its Capitol Hill allies from pursuing their anti-reform agenda.180
Instead, the industry and its legislative allies redoubled their efforts to
roll back Dodd–Frank’s reforms.181
During the 2012 political campaign, Republican leaders and industry
representatives announced that they would seek to repeal or cut back
several key provisions of Dodd–Frank if Republicans gained control of
the White House and both houses of Congress in the November
elections. Top Republicans and industry groups particularly focused on
(i) weakening the CFPB’s authority and independence, (ii) repealing or
watering down the Volcker Rule and many of the derivatives reforms in
Article VII of Dodd–Frank, and (iii) requiring all financial regulators to
perform stringent cost–benefit studies before adopting any new rules.182
2995498; see also infra notes 434-38 and accompanying text (discussing HSBC’s settlement of federal
criminal charges in December 2012).
177. Greg Farrell & Tiffany Kary, Standard Chartered Still Faces Fed Probes After N.Y. Deal,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/standard-chartered-facesfed-probes-after-n-y-deal.html; Stephen Joyce & Len Bracken, Money Laundering: Standard Chartered
Bank Hid $250 Billion In Iran Dealings, New York Regulator Says, 99 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 294
(Aug. 14, 2012), available at 2012 WL 3279507.
178. Farrell & Kary, supra note 177 (reporting that Standard Chartered paid $340 million to settle
New York’s claims); Standard Chartered to pay $327 million to resolve U.S. case, REUTERS (Dec. 10,
2012) (reporting on Standard Chartered’s agreement to pay $327 million to settle claims by federal
agencies), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/10/us-stanchart-settlement-idUSBRE8B90OT2012
1210.
179. Kopecki, supra note 163; Norris, supra note 163, at B1.
180. Phil Mattingly, Wall Street Supporters in Congress Unmoved by Libor Probe, BLOOMBERG
(July 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/wall-street-supporters-in-congressunmoved-by-libor-probe.html (“Wall Street’s defenders in Congress are sticking by the industry,
undaunted by the Barclays fine or trading losses . . . at JPMorgan Chase & Co.”); Alan Zibel, Even After
(Sept. 10, 2012),
‘Whale’ Losses, Bankers
Hammer
Volcker,
WALL ST. J.
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/09/10/even-after-whale-losses-bankers-hammervolcker/?mod=wsj_streaming_stream (reporting that top financial trade associations continued to
express strong opposition to the Volcker Rule despite the embarrassment caused by JPMorgan’s trading
losses).
181. Zibel, supra note 180; see also Chris Bruce, Securities: Volcker Rule Needs Major Rewrite,
Trade Associations Tell House Committee, 99 BNA’s BANKING REPORT 444 (Sept. 18, 2012), available
at 2012 WL 4067935 (describing letters written by five leading financial trade associations to the House
Financial Services Committee, calling for major cutbacks or an outright repeal of the Volcker Rule).
182. Phil Mattingly, Why Romney Won’t Kill Dodd–Frank, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 6,
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-06/why-romney-wont-kill-dodd-frank (reporting
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The financial industry supported Republicans even more strongly in
2012 than it did in 2010. The industry gave two-thirds of its political
contributions to Republican candidates during the 2012 election cycle.183
The financial industry’s overwhelming support for Republican
Presidential candidate Mitt Romney in 2012 represented a sharp
departure from 2008, when the industry gave a significant majority of its
contributions to Barack Obama.184 The obvious reason for this shift was
Wall Street’s gratitude for Mr. Romney’s strong opposition to Dodd–
Frank and Wall Street’s anger over President Obama’s sponsorship of
the legislation.185
Wall Street’s lopsided support for Republican candidates did not
cause Democratic leaders to move aggressively against the financial
industry. Indeed, many observers criticized the Obama administration

that Republicans, even if victorious, probably could not repeal Dodd–Frank but would be likely to “try
to give the financial industry something it wants more: a diluted financial reform law that would relax
restrictions on some of its most profitable—and riskiest—investments”); Kevin Wack, What Romney
BANKER
(Aug.
31,
2012),
Victory
Would
Mean
for
Banks,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_169/what-romney-victory-would-mean-for-banks-10522891.html (reporting that Mitt Romney’s “stated goal” to repeal Dodd–Frank would probably not happen if
he won the Presidential election, but Republicans would seek to “chip away at what they see as the
worst parts of Dodd–Frank, continuing a legislative strategy they began in 2011”); Yin Wilczek,
Regulatory Reform: Shelby Vows to Pursue ‘Real’ Reform If Republicans Regain Control of Senate, 99
BNA’s BANKING REP. 210 (July 31, 2012), available at 2012 WL 3067216 (reporting that Sen. Richard
Shelby (R-AL) announced plans to push for legislation that “would require all financial regulators to
conduct rigorous cost–benefit analysis before promulgating any regulations,” amend “flawed”
provisions of Dodd–Frank, and make major changes to the CFPB).
183. CRP Political Contribution Report, supra note 133 (showing that the finance, insurance and
real estate sector gave 68% of its $658 million of political contributions to Republican candidates during
the 2012 election cycle); see also Jason Kelly & Katherine Burton, Wall Street Wins Neither With
(June
27,
2012),
Obama
Nor
Romney
Amid
Glare,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-27/wall-street-wins-neither-with-obama-nor-romney-amidglare.html (reporting that Mitt Romney had collected $9.4 million from the securities and investment
industry, compared to only $3.4 million for President Obama); Kevin Wack, ‘It Can’t Get Any Worse’—
Why Banks Are Making a One-Sided Political Bet, AM. BANKER (May 7, 2012),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_87/Mitt-Romney-Obama-bank-industry-campaigncontributions-1049066-1.html (reporting that the banking industry “is backing Mitt Romney and the
Republican National Committee by a nearly 2-to-1 margin through political donations in the 2012
campaign”); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (showing that the financial industry gave
53% of its campaign contributions to Republican candidates during the 2010 election cycle).
184. Wack, supra note 183, at 1–2 (reporting that “[t]he banking industry’s strong backing of
Romney in 2012 marks a sharp reversal from four years ago,” when the industry gave $42 million to the
Obama campaign and only $31 million to John McCain’s campaign); Jonathan D. Salant, Goldman
Sachs Leads Split With Obama, as GE Jilts Him Too, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/goldman-sachs-leads-split-with-obama-as-ge-jilts-himtoo.html (reporting that employees at six major banks—Bof A, Citigroup, Goldman, JPMorgan, Morgan
Stanley and UBS—gave most of their contributions to Romney in 2012 after supporting Obama in
2008).
185. Jonathan D. Salant, Goldman Sachs to Fund Romney Over Obama, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1,
2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/romney-sees-surge-in-wall-street-donations-asobama-s-decline.html; Wack, supra note 183, at 1.
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for failing to take strong enforcement actions against large financial
institutions at the center of the financial crisis or their top executives,
and for not pushing for a vigorous implementation of Dodd–Frank.186
At the Democratic national convention in August 2012, only one
primetime speaker—Senate candidate Elizabeth Warren—spoke out
strongly against Wall Street, while President Obama’s address included
just a single mild criticism of large banks.187
Republican leaders’ eager embrace of Wall Street and Democratic
leaders’ acquiescent attitude toward Wall Street stood in sharp contrast
to the hostile attitudes of many delegates at both parties’ national
conventions. One journalist found widespread support among delegates
at both conventions for proposals that would mandate a breakup of the
largest banks.188 However, leaders in both parties showed no interest in
attacking big banks.189
Perhaps the disjunct between party leaders and rank-and-file
delegates was not surprising, after all. As one critic astutely observed,
“Why would [party leaders] put pressure on the banks? Just look at
who’s funding the conventions and the parties.”190
186. See, e.g., Barofsky, supra note 7; Simon Johnson, Why Does Wall Street Always Win?,
BASELINE SCENARIO (Aug. 23, 2012), http://baselinescenario.com/2012/08/23/why-does-wall-streetalways-win/#more-10297; Taibbi, supra note 7, at 2; see also Frank Rich, The Betrayal, OBSERVER,
Aug. 14, 2011, at 24 (criticizing the Obama Administration for “the stunning lack of accountability for
the greed and misdeeds that brought America to its gravest financial crisis since the Great Depression.
There has been no legal, moral, or financial reckoning for the most powerful wrongdoers. Nor have
there been meaningful reforms that might prevent a repeat catastrophe.”); infra Part IV(A)(2)
(discussing the lack of effective enforcement efforts against large institutions that played major roles in
the financial crisis or their corporate leaders).
187. Lisa Lerer & Julie Bykowicz, Bankers Erect Fences to Deflect Attacks That Don’t Come,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-07/bankers-erect-fencesto-deflect-attacks-that-don-t-come.html (reporting that Elizabeth Warren, the Democratic candidate for
U.S. Senate in Massachusetts, declared in her convention speech that Wall Street bankers “wrecked” the
economy and “destroyed millions of jobs,” while President Obama said only that “we don’t want
bailouts for banks that break the rules”); see also id. (noting that Democratic leaders like Rep. Joe
Crowley (D-CT), Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel maintained
friendly relationships with Wall Street); Kevin Roose, Can Wall Street Tame Elizabeth Warren?, NEW
YORK MAGAZINE, Nov. 30, 2012 (providing a more detailed account of Sen. Warren’s speech at the
Democratic national convention, in which she declared, “The system is rigged” against ordinary people,
while “Wall Street CEOs—the same ones who wrecked our economy and destroyed millions of jobs—
still strut around Congress, no shame, demanding favors, and acting like we should thank them.”),
available at http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/11/can-wall-street-tame-elizabeth-warren.htm.
188. Kevin Wack, Big-Bank Breakup Popular with Rank and File of Both Parties, AM. BANKER
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_172/big-bank-breakup-popular-with-rankand-file-1052378-1.html.
189. Id.
190. Lerer & Bykowicz, supra note 187 (quoting Ben Carroll); see also Rivlin, supra note 7
(stating that, during the 2012 campaign, “President Obama chose not to trumpet Dodd–Frank so as not
to alienate deep-pocketed backers on Wall Street”); Wack, supra note 188 (reporting that the idea of
breaking up the big banks “enjoys broad bipartisan support,” but congressional leaders from both parties
would not allow a floor vote on any such proposal due to “the reliance of members of Congress on
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As discussed below in Part IV(A)(1), the financial industry did not
succeed in its efforts to defeat President Obama and capture the Senate
for the Republicans in November 2012. However, the industry’s strong
support helped Republicans to retain control of the House. As soon as
the new Congress convened in 2013, House Republican leaders and the
financial industry renewed their efforts to enact legislation that would
repeal or weaken key Dodd–Frank reforms. In addition, as explained in
Part IV(B)(3)(a), President Obama appointed a new Treasury Secretary
(Jacob Lew) and a new SEC chairman (Mary Jo White) who had
extensive Wall Street connections and were widely viewed as
sympathetic to Wall Street’s interests. Thus, the financial industry’s
electoral defeats in 2012 did not derail the industry’s long-term
campaign to undermine Dodd–Frank.
III. FEDERAL REGULATORS AND CONGRESS FOLLOWED DEREGULATORY
POLICIES PROMOTED BY THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY THAT ENCOURAGED
RECKLESS LENDING AND LED TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The financial industry’s ability to obstruct Dodd–Frank’s reforms is,
unfortunately, consistent with the industry’s past record of success in
promoting a deregulatory agenda that set the stage for the financial
crisis. Federal agencies and Congress adopted a long series of measures
between 1992 and 2007 that encouraged reckless lending and high-risk
securitization, thereby fueling an enormous credit boom and an
unsustainable housing bubble in the U.S. The financial industry eagerly
supported those actions and helped to spur the greatest expansion of
private-sector debt since the 1920s.191 The industry also encouraged
federal regulators to preempt efforts by state officials to stop abusive
and predatory lending practices. Thus, major banks and their trade
associations were deeply implicated in regulatory and legislative policy
mistakes that paved the way for the financial crisis.
A. Federal Regulators Permitted Financial Institutions to Engage in
Unsound and Predatory Lending Practices That Produced an
Unsustainable Credit Boom
With the financial industry’s enthusiastic support, federal banking
agencies adopted deeply flawed policies that enabled large financial
institutions to originate trillions of dollars of high-risk mortgages and to
spread the risks of those mortgages to far-flung investors through
campaign contributions from large banks”).
191. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 963-67, 971–79 (discussing causes of the credit boom and
housing bubble that occurred between 1991 and 2007); Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1002–43 (same).
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hazardous securitization. This section highlights key policy errors that
helped to inflate the nonprime lending boom, which in turn led to the
financial crisis.
1. Federal Regulators Issued Weak “Guidelines” That Allowed Banks
and Thrifts to Engage in High-Risk Mortgage Lending
In 1991, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) in response to a severe financial crisis that
resulted in the failures of almost 3,000 banks and thrifts during the
1980s and early 1990s.192 One of FDICIA’s provisions required the
federal banking agencies to adopt “uniform regulations” imposing strict
new standards for real estate lending.193 Congress expected that the new
lending standards would be much stronger than the “flexible approach”
followed by the OCC and other agencies during the 1980s.194 The lax
regulatory standards of the 1980s allowed banks and thrifts to make
“imprudent” and “abusive” real estate loans that inflicted massive losses
on depository institutions and the deposit insurance funds during the
second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s.195
However, when federal banking agencies issued a proposed joint
regulation to implement the 1991 statute, the financial industry strongly
urged the agencies to adopt “flexible guidelines rather than
regulations.”196 The industry also argued that regulators should avoid

192. History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., at 10–11, 102–05,
186–88, 452–54 (Dec. 1997) (discussing the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and early 1990s and
the enactment of FDICIA) [hereinafter FDIC History Lessons]; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 34–37
(same).
193. Michael Frachioni, Leveraging the Land: The Changing Loan to Value Ratio for Real Estate
Lending by National Banks, 112 BANKING L.J. 41, 56 (1995) (discussing the enactment of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828o in 1991); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 301 (2004) (same) [hereinafter OCC’s Preemption Rules].
194. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 301; see also Real Estate Lending
Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 62890 (Dec. 31, 1992) (“The legislative history of [12 U.S.C. § 1828o]
indicates that Congress wanted to curtail abusive real estate lending practices in order to reduce risk to
the deposit insurance fund and enhance the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions.”)
[hereinafter 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards].
195. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 301. For descriptions of the losses
suffered by banks and thrifts due to unsound real estate lending during the 1980s, see Frachioni, supra
note 193, at 53–56; FDIC History Lessons, supra note 192, at 9–10, 137–62, 301–378; L. WILLIAM
SEIDMAN, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE GREAT S&L DEBACLE AND OTHER WASHINGTON SAGAS 138–
64 (1993).
196. 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards, supra note 194 (summarizing comments submitted in
response to the proposed regulation); see also Barbara A. Rehm, Regulators Agree to Ease Limits On
BANKER
(Oct.
14,
1992),
Realty
Loans
by
Banks,
Thrifts,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/157_106/-18380-1.html (reporting that “[b]anks and thrifts
deluged regulators with 1,500 comment letters, arguing that [the original proposal for binding rules]
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any “rigid application” of loan-to-value (LTV) limits for real estate
loans, because such limits “would constrict credit, impose additional
lending costs, reduce ending flexibility, [and] impede economic
growth.”197 Despite the industry’s lobbying efforts, the FDIC pushed
for binding regulations that would impose strict LTV limits on real
estate loans. However, the Treasury Department and the other three
federal banking agencies (the FRB, OCC and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS)) agreed with the industry, and they ultimately
persuaded the FDIC to accept “general guidelines that [would] give
banks more leeway” in making real estate loans.198
The four banking agencies issued joint guidelines on real estate
lending at the end of 1992. The interagency guidelines did not specify a
maximum LTV limit for owner-occupied 1-to-4-family residences and
allowed banks to make loans (including second mortgages and home
equity loans) that exceeded 90% of a home’s appraised value.199 The
guidelines specified maximum LTV ratios for other types of real estate
loans, but the guidelines permitted banks to make loans that exceeded
those limits if “credit is justifiable under the specific circumstances.”200
More generally, the interagency guidelines allowed banks to make loans
that did not conform to the guidelines as long as the bank could justify
such loans as “prudently underwritten exceptions to its lending
policies.”201
In addition to the inclusion of generous exemptions, the 1992
interagency guidelines did not impose “mandatory” restrictions; instead,
banks were required only to “consider the guidelines in establishing
their own real estate lending policies.”202 The 1992 guidelines marked
the beginning of a fifteen-year trend in which federal bank regulators
repeatedly issued nonbinding statements of guidance with respect to
high-risk mortgage lending instead of adopting binding rules with

would curtail lending”).
197. 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards, supra note 194 (summarizing comments submitted in
response to the proposed regulation).
198. Barbara A. Rehm, FDIC Eases Tough Plan to Limit Realty Lending, AM. BANKER (Oct. 9,
1992), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/157_103/-18294-1.html (reporting that the FDIC’s
concession represented “a big victory” for banks and thrifts); see also Rehm, supra note 196 (reporting
that Treasury officials persuaded three of the four banking agencies to accept more flexible guidelines
rather than regulations, and the FDIC finally gave in to the other agencies).
199. 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards, supra note 194 (requiring borrowers for residential
mortgages with an LTV ratio above 90% to provide “appropriate credit enhancement in the form of
mortgage insurance or readily marketable collateral”).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 54 (2012) (emphasis added).
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clearly enforceable limits on such lending.203 Between 1999 and 2001,
the federal banking agencies issued three guidances dealing with
subprime mortgages and high LTV real estate lending. The three
guidances warned banks about the risks of “abusive lending practices,”
including making loans without regard to the borrower’s ability to
repay, but the guidances “did not prohibit the abusive practices.”204 In
2003, the OCC issued two similar “advisory letters” that provided
“supervisory guidance” rather than binding rules.205
The agencies’ reliance on precatory guidance created a permissive
environment in which subprime mortgage originations grew rapidly
from $40 billion in 1993 to $240 billion in 2002.206 During the same
period, several studies by federal agencies found growing evidence of
predatory lending abuses, including “(i) loan flipping (i.e., frequent
refinancing of high-cost home loans); (ii) equity stripping (i.e., the loss
of equity resulting from repeated refinancing that requires the borrower
to pay high fees and closing costs), (iii) asset-based lending (i.e., the
extension of credit based primarily on the residual value of the
borrower’s home and other personal assets without regard to the
borrower’s income), (iv) excessive fees and penalty charges, (v) highpressure sales tactics accompanied by inadequate or misleading
disclosures, and (vi) aggressive foreclosure policies.”207
The statements of guidance issued by federal bank regulators between
1999 and 2003 warned banks against engaging in the foregoing abuses
but did very little to stop them.208 After reviewing these regulatory
warnings, an OCC staff economist recently observed that “regulators
knew the risks of subprime lending well and accurately,” and he asked,

203. Id. at 54–62; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 165–66, 196–97 (describing
decisions by federal banking agencies to issue nonbinding guidance instead of mandatory regulations
between the late 1990s and 2008).
204. Di Lorenzo, supra note 202, at 57–58.
205. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 309–310.
206. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 165–66 (stating that agency guidances “allowed for
slack regulation and permitted lenders to argue that compliance was optional,” resulting in a “downward
spiral in lending standards”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 393
n.766 (providing 1993 figure for subprime mortgage originations); Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules,
supra note 193, at 308 (providing 2002 figure).
207. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 308–09 (summarizing findings made
by government studies of predatory subprime lending practices); see also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia
A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1260, 1260–70 (2002) (same); FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 76–77, 93, 95 (same).
208. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 309–10 (noting that one of the
OCC’s 2003 advisory letters “condemned ‘abusive’ lending practices that . . . ’involve unfair and
deceptive conduct’” but did not define unlawful conduct with any specificity) (quoting OCC Advisory
Letter 2003-2).
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“[H]ow could the subprime crisis happen?”209 The unfortunate answer
is that federal regulators utterly failed to take effective action in
response to problems they clearly identified.210 For example, the OCC
and the FRB issued only three binding rules to address predatory
lending problems in the early 2000s, and all three rules were weak and
ineffective.211
While federal regulators dithered, several FDIC-insured institutions
that engaged heavily in subprime lending and securitization failed
between 1997 and 2002, resulting in losses to the FDIC of nearly $2
billion.212 The most spectacular of those failures involved Superior
Bank, FSB, a federal savings association with more than $2 billion of
assets, which specialized in making and securitizing subprime
mortgages and auto loans. Superior Bank failed due to high rates of
delinquencies and defaults on its subprime loans as well as massive
writedowns that it was forced to take on residual (equity or first loss)
interests that it retained from its securitizations of those loans.213

209. Douglas Robertson, So That’s Operational Risk!,16 (Off. Comptroller Curr. Econ., Working
Paper 2011-1); see also id. at 15 (pointing out that the 1999 interagency guidance on subprime lending
“reads like a prophecy from Cassandra” in describing the risks of making and securitizing subprime
loans).
210. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 88–96, 177–78; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note
19, at 167–205.
211. The OCC issued two rules in early 2004. The first rule prohibited national banks from
making real estate loans based primarily on the “foreclosure or liquidation value” of the borrower’s
home and “without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.” Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption
Rules, supra note 193, at 306 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 34.3(b)). However, that rule was relatively weak
because it allowed national banks to make subprime mortgages based on the borrower’s credit history,
thereby allowing national banks to rely on the borrower’s credit score (which frequently proved to be
unreliable during the housing boom). ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 168. The second rule
prohibited national banks from making real estate loans by using unfair and deceptive practices, but that
rule was vague and had little force because the OCC declared that it lacked “authority to specify by
regulation that particular practices, such as loan ‘flipping’ or ‘equity stripping’ are unfair or deceptive.”
OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 307 (quoting Bank Activities and Operations: Real Estate
Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1911 n.55 (2004)). The FRB issued a regulation in 2001
that slightly expanded the definition of “high-cost” loans that were subject to the protections provided
by the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). However, that rule had “little if any
effect” because it “only covered 1 percent of all subprime loans.” ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at
194–95; Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd–Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers
of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 898 (2011) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act].
212. Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption Rules, supra note 193, at 312–13.
213. Id. at 314. For discussions of the failure of Superior Bank, see Christian A. Johnson, The
Failure of Superior Bank, FSB: Regulatory Lessons Learned, 121 BANKING L.J. 47 (2004); Bank
Regulation: Analysis of the Failure of Superior Bank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois, GAO-02-419T (Feb. 7,
2002) (Statement of Thomas J. McCool).
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2. Federal Agencies Adopted Weak Capital Rules That Encouraged
Banks and Thrifts to Expand Their Involvement with High-Risk
Mortgage Lending and Securitization
Unfortunately, federal regulators failed to heed the clear lessons from
Superior Bank’s failure about the dangers inherent in subprime lending
and securitization. Federal banking agencies did issue a joint regulation
in late 2001, which imposed much higher capital requirements on banks
that retained unrated residual interests from securitizations.214 However,
banks that packaged subprime loans into residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) avoided the impact of the 2001 rule by selling the
residual interests in RMBS to hedge funds and other institutional
investors, including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).215 Some
major banks (including Goldman and JPMorgan) allegedly permitted
hedge funds that purchased residual interests in subprime CDOs to use
credit default swaps (CDS) in order to bet against the CDOs’ underlying
portfolio of RMBS.216
In addition, the 2001 interagency capital rule contained a major flaw
that helped to inflate the subprime lending boom. The regulation stated
that tranches of subprime RMBS and CDOs would qualify for a 20%
risk weight under the agencies’ risk-based capital rules (with a resulting
capital charge of only 1.6% instead of 8%) if the tranches were backed
by credit enhancements, like CDS, issued by a company rated AAA or
AA by credit rating agencies (CRAs).217 Thus, the 2001 rule gave
214. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 155; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Capital Treatment
of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations, 66 Fed. Reg.
59615, 59616–21, 59625–26 (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Interagency Capital Rule] (requiring
lenders to satisfy a “dollar-for-dollar” capital charge by holding capital equal to 100% of retained
residual interests that did not receive an investment-grade rating from a credit rating agency).
215. Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 2065–68. Large banks that securitized subprime loans
frequently provided credit (as prime brokers) to hedge funds in order to enable those funds to purchase
residual interests in RMBS and CDOs. In some cases, the lending banks suffered large losses when
their hedge fund borrowers collapsed during the financial crisis. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1026,
1030; CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 113–23 (2008).
216. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1026–27 (discussing Goldman’s payment of $550 million to
settle SEC charges that Goldman defrauded institutional investors by selling them interests in a 2007
CDO without disclosing that “a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co., had helped to select the CDO’s
portfolio of RMBS while intending to short the CDO by purchasing CDS from Goldman”); Hugh Son et
al., JPMorgan’s $153.6 Million Settlement with SEC Recalls Case Against Goldman Sachs,
BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-21/jpmorgan-to-pay-153-6million-to-settle-sec-allegations-over-housing-cdos.html (reporting that JPMorgan paid $154 million to
settle SEC charges that JPMorgan “failed to tell investors in 2007 that a hedge fund [called Magnetar
Capital LLC (Magnetar)] helped pick, and bet against, underlying securities” in a CDO that JPMorgan
sponsored and sold to investors); FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 191–93 (reporting on Goldman’s
settlement and also stating that Magnetar and other hedge funds purchased residual interests in CDOs
while purchasing CDS to short other tranches in the CDOs).
217. 2001 Interagency Capital Rule, supra note 214, at 59,625–27. In the late 1990s, federal bank
regulators allowed JPMorgan and other leading banks to reduce their risk-based capital requirements
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tranches of subprime RMBS or CDOs highly-favorable risk-based
capital treatment that was equal to the treatment given to much less risky
RMBS issued by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), like Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, as long as the subprime tranches were supported
by an AAA-rated or AA-rated company.218
Federal banking agencies adopted the 2001 regulation even though (i)
Fannie and Freddie pointed out that the rule would allow banks to
reduce dramatically the capital they were required to hold against
subprime-related mortgage assets, and (ii) a leading group of economists
warned that CRAs were subject to a dangerous conflict of interest that
was likely to produce inflated credit ratings, because banks that issued
RMBS and CDOs paid CRAs for their credit ratings.219 The 2001 rule
allowed Wall Street banks to reduce their capital requirements
significantly by obtaining CDS from AIG or monoline insurance
companies, and the business of issuing CDS ultimately brought AIG and
several monoline insurers (including Ambac and MBIA) to the brink of
collapse in 2008.220 In addition, the 2001 rule “created the incentive for
[CRAs] to provide overly optimistic assessment of the risk in mortgage
pools” and also pushed the GSEs to reduce their own lending standards
“in order to maintain a presence in the [residential mortgage] market.”221
Federal regulators also permitted Wall Street banks to sponsor
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and other off-balance-sheet (OBS)
conduits, which were frequently used as receptacles for RMBS and
CDOs that banks were unable to sell to arms-length investors. The
sponsored conduits sold asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) to
investors and used the proceeds to buy structured-finance securities
underwritten by the sponsoring banks. The conduits faced a dangerous
funding mismatch between their longer-term, structured-finance assets
and their shorter-term, ABCP liabilities. The sponsoring LCFIs covered
that mismatch (in whole or in part) by providing explicit credit

from 8% to 1.6% by pooling CDS on corporate loans to create synthetic CDOs and by obtaining CDS
from AIG to backstop tranches of those CDOs. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM
OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A
CATASTROPHE 48–56, 60–66 (2009). JPMorgan called its CDO structure “BISTRO,” and “some
bankers started to joke that ‘BISTRO’ really stood for ‘BIS Total Rip Off,’” because JPMorgan used
CDS from AIG to reduce drastically its risk-based capital requirements established by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) through the Basel international capital accord. Id. at 60-64 (quote at 64).
218. Arnold Kling, Not What They Had in Mind: A History of Policies That Produced the
Financial Crisis of 2008, 25 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474430.
219. 2001 Interagency Capital Rule, supra note 214, at 59,625 (discussing critical comments on
the 2001 rule); Kling, supra note 218, at 25–26 (same); see also Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 967–70
(discussing problems created by conflicts of interest at CRAs).
220. See, e.g., FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 139–42, 200–02, 276–78, 300–02, 347–51, 376–79.
221. Kling, supra note 218, at 26; see also FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 120–24, 131–33, 146–
50.
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enhancements (including lines of credit) or implicit commitments to
ensure the availability of liquidity if the sponsored conduits could not
roll over their ABCP.222
Federal banking agencies adopted risk-based capital rules that
encouraged the use of OBS conduits. Those rules did not assess any
capital charges against LCFIs for transferring securitized assets to
sponsored conduits if banks provided only implicit (reputational)
recourse. Instead, the rules required LCFIs to post capital only if they
provided explicit credit enhancements to their conduits.223 Moreover,
federal regulators issued a joint regulation in 2004, which approved a
very low capital charge for sponsors’ lines of credit, equal to only onetenth of the usual 8% capital charge, as long as the lines of credit had
maturities of one year or less.224
The 2004 joint capital rule was deeply flawed because it allowed
banks to obtain highly advantageous OBS treatment for ABCP conduits
under the agencies’ risk-based capital rules, even though the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had issued a 2003 interpretation
requiring consolidated accounting treatment for many conduits.225 The
federal banking agencies declined to follow FASB’s approach. The
agencies concluded that bank sponsors for ABCP programs had only
“limited risk exposure” and, therefore, consolidated risk-based capital
treatment for ABCP conduits would “not appropriately reflect” the
sponsors’ actual risks.”226
The agencies’ optimistic assessment of the risks of ABCP conduits
proved to be tragically mistaken. After the financial crisis began in
222. For discussion of the risk exposures of major banks to SIVs and other sponsored conduits,
see TETT, supra note 217, at 97–98, 127–28, 136, 196–98; Viral V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, How
Banks Played the Leverage Game, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED
SYSTEM 83, 88–94 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009); Wilmarth, supra note 15, at
1033.
223. Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 222, at 89.
224. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,908, 44,910–11 (July 28, 2004) [hereinafter
2004 Joint Capital Rule]. See also Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 222, at 89 (noting that capital
requirements for short-term “liquidity enhancements” were “only 0.8 percent of asset value”).
225. 2004 Joint Capital Rule, supra note 221, at 44,909 (explaining that FASB Interpretation No.
46-R “requires the consolidation of many ABCP programs onto the balance sheets of banking
organizations”).
226. Id. As Carolyn Sissoko has pointed out, the banking agencies issued “guidance” in August
2005 that further weakened the already lax terms of the 2004 capital rule. The 2005 “guidance” allowed
sponsoring banks to provide lines of credit (as well as implicit recourse) to support mortgage-related
assets held by ABCP conduits that were seriously delinquent, in default or below investment grade. In
contrast, lines of credit supporting such doubtful assets would not have qualified for favorable treatment
under the original 2004 capital rule. By expanding the ability of major banks to support low-quality
assets held their sponsored conduits, the 2005 “guidance” helped ABCP conduits to secure top credit
ratings and also greatly increased the risk exposures of the sponsoring banks. Carolyn Sissoko, Is
Financial Regulation Structurally Biased to Favor Deregulation? 11-22 (USC CLEO Res. Paper C12-4,
April 13, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2039490.

1336

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

August 2007, several leading banks felt obliged, for reputational
reasons, either to bring the assets of sponsored conduits back onto their
balance sheets or to provide financial support that enabled their conduits
to remain in business.227 By allowing banks to disregard FASB’s 2003
interpretation in calculating their risk-based capital, the 2004 joint
capital rule encouraged banks to engage in abusive and misleading OBS
transactions similar to those that banks had helped Enron to engineer—
and that FASB had specifically tried to stop.228
As a result of their risk exposures to ABCP conduits and other OBS
commitments, many of the largest banks were much more highly
leveraged than their balance sheets indicated.229 In addition, regulators
failed to prevent large banks from creating “daisy chains” of CDOs that
served as additional dumping grounds for the banks’ hard-to-sell CDO
tranches.230 Ultimately, major banks (including Citigroup, HSBC,
Merrill and UBS) suffered devastating losses due to their exposures to
sponsored OBS conduits and CDOs, and those losses were a “significant
reason why [Citigroup, Merrill and UBS] “needed extensive
governmental assistance to avoid failure.”231
3. Federal Regulators Allowed Banks and Thrifts to Increase Their
Exposure to High-Risk Loans by Acquiring Nonbank Mortgage Lenders
Regulators also permitted leading banks to become deeply enmeshed
in the subprime mortgage markets by acquiring nonbank subprime
lenders. For example, National City (a large Midwestern bank)
purchased First Franklin in 1999, and WaMu (the nation’s largest thrift)
227. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 975.
228. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From
Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 46, 59 (Aug. 13, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126778. Several major banks—including Citigroup, Merrill and JPMorgan—
played leading roles in helping Enron to structure abusive OBS transactions that “enabled Enron to
overstate its cash flow and disguise its [true] debt.” Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 999.
229. TETT, supra note 217, at 97–98; James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial
Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON 563, 570
(2009); see also HENRY KAUFMAN, THE ROAD TO FINANCIAL REFORMATION: WARNINGS,
CONSEQUENCES, REFORMS 104, 105 (exh. 8.4) (2009) (showing that the 15 largest U.S. financial
institutions had total assets of $13.6 trillion and OBS exposures of $5.8 billion at the end of 2007).
230. Jake Bernstein & Jesse Eisinger, Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis,
PROPUBLICA, (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/banks-self-dealing-super-chargedfinancial-crisis (reporting that Merrill, Citigroup, UBS and other large banks created “fake demand” for
their subprime CDOs by creating a “daisy chain” in which CDOs sponsored by each bank purchased
hard-to-sell mezzanine tranches of CDOs sponsored by the other banks); Jake Bernstein & Jesse
Eisinger, Which CDOs and Banks Had Deals With the Most Cross-ownership?, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 22,
2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/who-was-self-dealing-cdos (reporting that “the most crossownership [of CDO tranches] occurred in the CDOs built by the top CDO banks: Merrill, Citigroup and
UBS”).
231. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 973 (quotes); Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1033.
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bought Long Beach in the same year. Citigroup bought Associates First
Capital (Associates) in 2000 and also acquired Argent (the parent
company of Ameriquest) in 2007. JPMorgan bought Advanta in 2001,
and HSBC purchased Household in 2002. Countrywide, the nation’s
largest mortgage lender, acquired a national bank and became a BHC in
2001. Countrywide thereafter established a securitization unit and
expanded aggressively into subprime and Alt-A lending.232
The acquiring banks in the foregoing transactions “wagered that they
could squeeze more fees and profits out of the subprime lending
business . . . by taking over the direct lending function as well as the
securitization process for nonprime loans.”233 Federal regulators
approved the transactions despite the fact that (i) Associates was the
subject of a federal investigation when it was acquired by Citigroup (and
Citigroup ultimately paid a large penalty to settle predatory lending
charges against Associates), (ii) HSBC acquired Household after the
latter company paid almost $500 million to settle predatory lending
charges filed by numerous states, and (iii) Citigroup acquired Argent
after Ameriquest paid $325 million to settle predatory lending charges
filed by another group of states.234
Following their aggressive expansion into subprime lending, large
banking and thrift companies controlled twelve of the 20 biggest
subprime lenders between 2005 and 2007.235 Banks, thrifts and
nondepository lenders originated more than $3 trillion of subprime and
Alt-A mortgages between 2004 and 2007.236 Wall Street banks
securitized about $2.7 trillion of those nonprime loans to create RMBS
during the same period.237 In addition to their roles as direct subprime
lenders, major banks added more fuel to the subprime bonfire by
funding and securitizing many of the loans originated by nondepository
lenders.238
Federal regulators “discovered alarming concentrations of
nontraditional mortgages at major national banks and federal thrifts” in
232. For discussions of the foregoing acquisitions of nonprime mortgage lenders by BHCs, see
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 199–203; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1017–18; FCIC Report,
supra note 36, at 75, 92–93, 105.
233. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1018.
234. Id. at 1017–18; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 199–203; see also FCIC Report, supra
note 36, at 92–93, 96–97.
235. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 211, at 917–18; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 19, at 205 (tbl.10.1) (showing that banking and thrift companies regulated by federal banking
agencies accounted for 12 of the 15 top subprime lenders in 2006).
236. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1016–20.
237. Kenneth E. Scott, The Financial Crisis: Causes and Lessons, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 3, 22,
23 (2010) (Subprime and Alt-A mortgages are frequently referred to collectively as “nonprime”
mortgages); Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1015–16.
238. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1017–20.
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2005.239 The agencies responded by issuing two more statements of
precatory “guidance” in 2006 and 2007, which dealt with high-risk
mortgages such as (i) option adjustable-rate mortgages (option ARMs),
(ii) mortgages with little or no documentation of the borrower’s ability
to pay, and (iii) “hybrid” subprime mortgages that featured low
introductory “teaser” rates followed by sharply higher payments after
two or three years.240 Both statements of guidance “were presented
merely as advice on good practices” and “were not directly enforceable”
by the federal banking agencies.241
The FRB did not issue binding rules under HOEPA that required
lenders to verify borrowers’ ability to repay high-cost mortgages until
July 2008, “a year after the subprime market had shut down.”242
Moreover, those rules did not take effect until October 2009 and were
therefore too late to play any effective role in stopping the predatory
nonprime lending that led to the financial crisis.243 Thus, federal
regulatory failures played a major role in allowing the largest banks and
thrifts to become “the primary private-sector catalysts for the destructive
credit boom that led to the subprime financial crisis.”244
B. Federal Regulators Failed to Take Effective Enforcement Measures
to Stop Predatory Lending and Preempted State Efforts to Do So
In addition to the very weak “guidance” on nonprime lending issued
by federal banking agencies, the agencies failed to take effective
supervisory or enforcement actions to prevent predatory lending. In
January 1998, the FRB announced that it would not conduct consumer
compliance examinations of nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs, even though
several large BHCs owned nonbank subsidiaries that were significantly
engaged in nonprime mortgage lending.245 The FRB previously

239. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 211, at 901–02.
240. Di Lorenzo, supra note 202, at 60–61, 64–72 (discussing 2006 and 2007 guidance and the
high risks inherent in nontraditional mortgages); Engel & McCoy, supra note 19, at 33–37, 174, 176,
196 (same); Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 211, at 901–02 (same).
241. Wilmarth, Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 211, at 902.
242. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 22, 95–96.
243. Di Lorenzo, supra note 202, at 62; Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 899.
244. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 977 (quoting Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1046); Wilmarth,
Dodd–Frank Act, supra note 211, at 897–98, 917–18; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 204
(“As the collapse of the financial system unfolded in 2008, what had started as the subprime crisis
became known as the ‘banking crisis.’ One major bank failure came to light that year after another,
making painfully obvious that the largest commercial banking companies—all of which were supervised
by federal banking regulators—were deeply implicated in the origination and securitization of bad
mortgage loans.”).
245. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 198–203; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 94–95;
Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 900–01.
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declined (in 1992) to apply the interagency real estate lending standards
to nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs.246
The FRB maintained its no-supervision policy for nonbank
subsidiaries of BHCs despite strong criticism of that policy in two
reports issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 1999
and 2004.247 FRB Chairman Greenspan rejected proposals in 2000 by
FRB Governor Edward Gramlich and members of the FRB’s consumer
division staff to launch a pilot program to investigate whether nonbank
mortgage lending subsidiaries of certain BHCs were engaging in
predatory lending.
The FRB imposed a $70 million fine on
CitiFinancial (a subprime lending subsidiary of Citigroup) for numerous
consumer law violations in 2004, but the FRB did not take any other
public enforcement action against a nonbank subsidiary of a BHC until
after the financial crisis broke out in 2007.248
In July 2007, the FRB finally launched the pilot program that
Gramlich had proposed seven years earlier to examine subprime
mortgage lending by nonbank subsidiaries of several BHCs. Two years
later, the FRB officially reversed its 1998 no-supervision policy and
began to examine all nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs for compliance with
consumer laws. However, the FRB’s change in policy “came far too
late” to prevent widespread predatory lending by nonbank subsidiaries
of several large BHCs, including Citigroup, Countrywide and HSBC.249
Similarly, the OTS and OCC compiled very weak records in terms of
enforcing consumer protection laws against the institutions they
regulated.
In a previous article, I summarized the lamentable
enforcement records of those agencies as follows:
[T]he OTS brought only ‘five to six’ formal enforcement actions against
federal thrifts for ‘unfair and deceptive practices’ between 2000 and
2008.

....
Between 1995 and the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, the
OCC issued only 13 public enforcement orders against national banks for
violations of consumer protection laws. Most of the OCC’s orders were
issued against small national banks, and none of the orders were issued
against the top eight national banks, even though large banks were the
subject of most of the consumer complaints filed with the OCC.250

246. 1992 Real Estate Lending Standards, supra note 194, at 62,894; see also supra notes 192–99
and accompanying text (discussing interagency real estate lending standards).
247. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 77, 94–95.
248. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 901.
249. Id.; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 198–203; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 94–95.
250. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 905–06 (footnotes omitted).
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Even worse, the OTS and OCC aggressively preempted efforts by
many states to enforce their anti-predatory lending (APL) laws against
federal thrifts and national banks. Between 1999 and 2007, 30 states
and the District of Columbia adopted APL laws that prohibited various
types of unfair and deceptive mortgage lending practices.251 State
officials also launched aggressive enforcement efforts to clamp down on
abusive lending practices, “including more than 3600 enforcement
actions in both 2003 and 2006.”252 State investigations produced
settlements that required large, state-licensed lenders (including
Household, Ameriquest, First Alliance and Countrywide) to pay more
than $1 billion in penalties and restitution.253
The OTS and OCC severely undermined the effectiveness of state
efforts by declaring that federal law preempted states from applying
their APL laws to federal thrifts and national banks and their respective
operating subsidiaries and agents. The OTS and OCC also filed amicus
briefs to support lawsuits brought by federal thrifts and national banks to
block the enforcement of state APL laws based on preemption claims.
The preemption initiatives launched by the OTS and OCC received
enthusiastic support from large federal thrifts and national banks.254
Federal agency preemption significantly weakened state APL laws
because preemption (i) encouraged subprime lenders that were targets of
state investigations to sell themselves to federally-chartered banks to
avoid state enforcement, and (ii) discouraged state legislatures from
passing additional APL laws that would constrain state-licensed lenders
but would not bind federally-chartered competitors.255
C. The Financial Industry Strongly Resisted Attempts by Federal
Regulators to Impose Tighter Supervision during the Credit Boom
On the rare occasions when federal banking agencies attempted to
impose stronger regulations during the credit boom, their efforts
triggered intense resistance from the financial services industry. During
a congressional hearing in March 2008, FRB Vice Chairman Donald
Kohn admitted that encouraging banks to follow more conservative
lending policies was “a very hard sell” during the credit boom that led
up to the financial crisis.256 Similarly, Roger Cole, who served as the

251. Id. at 909.
252. Id. at 910.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 910–14; Wilmarth, supra note 193, at 233–36, 276–77, 282–97.
255. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 913–15.
256. “Banking—Mortgages: Senators Grill Financial Regulators on Failure to Supervise Banks
During Mortgage Crisis,” 90 BANKING REPORT (BNA) 435 (Mar. 10, 2008) (quoting Mr. Kohn’s
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FRB’s Director of Bank Supervision from 2006 to 2009, told the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) that FRB officials
encountered significant “pushback” whenever they urged bank
executives to follow more conservative risk management policies.257
Banks, thrifts and nondepository mortgage lenders strongly opposed
even the weak and nonbinding regulatory guidance that federal
regulators issued in 2006 and 2007 with regard to nontraditional
mortgages and hybrid subprime ARMs.258 When the FRB and other
federal regulators proposed interagency guidance for nontraditional
mortgages in late 2005, FRB officials “got tremendous pushback from
the industry as well as Congress as well as . . . internally . . . [b]ecause it
was stifling innovation, potentially, and it was denying the American
dream [of homeownership] to many people.”259 The American Bankers
Association (ABA) asserted that the proposed guidance “overstate[d] the
risk of nontraditional mortgages,”260 while the Financial Services
Roundtable declared that it was “not aware of any empirical evidence
that supports the need for further consumer protection standards.”261
The OTS actively supported the industry by blocking the issuance of the
interagency guidance for nontraditional mortgages until September
2006.262
Similarly, when federal regulators issued their proposed guidance on
hybrid subprime ARMs in early 2007, trade associations representing
banks, thrifts and nondepository mortgage lenders vehemently opposed
the guidance. The Mortgage Bankers Association asserted that the
proposed guidance would “restrict credit to many consumers in highcost areas and deny credit to many deserving low-income, minority, and
first-time homebuyers.”263 Similarly, the ABA claimed that the
testimony during a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee on Mar. 4, 2008).
257. Mr. Cole noted that “a lot of that pushback was given credence . . . by the fact that [firms]
like Citigroup were earning $4 to $5 billion per quarter . . . . When that kind of money is flowing [in]
quarter after quarter, and their capital ratios are way above the minimums, it’s very hard to challenge.”
FCIC Report, supra note 26, at 307 (quoting from interview with Mr. Cole).
258. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text (discussing the 2006 and 2007 statements of
guidance).
259. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 173 (quoting from interview with Richard Siddique, former
head of credit risk for the FRB’s Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation); see also id. at 21
(quoting from interview with former FRB Governor Susan Bies, and also quoting Mr. Siddique’s
statement that “[t]he ideological turf war [over the proposed nontraditional guidance] lasted more than a
year, while the number of nontraditional loans kept growing and growing”).
260. Id. (quoting the ABA’s letter of Mar. 29, 2006).
261. Id. (quoting the Financial Services Roundtable’s letter of Mar. 29, 2006).
262. Id. at 172–73; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 176. When the nontraditional guidance
was finally issued, OTS Director John Reich “refused to defend it. He even described the guidance as
‘extremely controversial’ and not something that OTS ‘would have issued on [its] own.’” Id. (quoting
from speech by Mr. Reich in Oct. 2006).
263. Joe Adler, Agencies Propose Hybrid Clampdown: Critics Fret over Credit Access, AM.
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proposed subprime guidance would deny “credit options to creditworthy
borrowers who otherwise would benefit from the flexibility afforded by
the products covered by the proposed statement.”264 Due in part to the
industry’s strong opposition, the 2006 and 2007 statements of guidance
“were phrased merely as advice on good practices, were not directly
enforceable by the agencies, and did not give injured borrowers any
right to file lawsuits if lenders failed to follow the guidance.”265
Federal bank regulators and the SEC also encountered “strong
resistance” when they tried to issue guidelines to prevent banks from
engaging in deceptive transactions involving “complex structuredfinance transactions (CSFTs).”266 The agencies issued their first
proposed statement of guidance on CSFTs in May 2004, after taking
enforcement actions against financial institutions for arranging CSFTs
that Enron Corp. used “to shield the company’s true financial health
from the public.”267 For example, Citigroup and JPMorgan arranged
more than $8.3 billion of “prepaid commodity swaps” (prepays) for
Enron that “were functionally equivalent to loans” but were structured in
a way that “enabled Enron to inflate its reported cash flow [from
operations] and disguise its actual debt obligations.”268 Officials at
Citigroup and JPMorgan “plainly recognized the deceptive nature of the
structured-finance deals that their banks arranged for Enron.”269
BANKER, Mar. 5, 2007, at 1 (quoting press release from the Mortgage Bankers Ass’n).
264. Cheyenne Hopkins, Bankers Find Plenty Not to Like in Loan Guidance, AM. BANKER, May
10, 2007, at 5 (quoting comment letter from the ABA). When federal regulators issued their final
guidance on hybrid subprime mortgages in July 2007, they acknowledged that “many financial
institution commenters expressed concern that certain aspects of the proposed statement . . . could
unduly restrict subprime borrowers’ access to credit.” Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72
Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,570 (July 10, 2007).
265. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 902 (quote), 907–08; see also Di Lorenzo, supra note 202, at
60–61 (noting that the 2006 and 2007 statements of guidance “continued to rely on disclosure, rather
than regulation, in order to protect consumers”).
266. David M. Katz, Feds Soften Structured-Finance Stance, CFO.COM, Jan. 5, 2007 (available
on Lexis).
267. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex Structured Finance
Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,980, 28981–82, 28,982 n.1 (May 19, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Proposed
Interagency Statement on CSFTs]. For the SEC’s enforcement orders entered against Citigroup and
JPMorgan with regard to their involvement with Enron, see In re Citigroup, SEC Administrative
Proceeding No. 3-11192 (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3448230.htm (requiring Citigroup to pay disgorgement and penalties for its Enron-related misconduct);
SEC
Litigation
Release
No.
18252
(July
28,
2003),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm (requiring JPMorgan to pay disgorgement and
penalties for its Enron-related misconduct),
268. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at
Universal Banks during the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases of Enron and WorldCom,
(Geo. Wash. Univ. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Leg. Theory Working Paper No. 234, Nov. 20, 2006), at 12,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952486.
269. Id. at 17. For example, “[a JPMorgan] Chase officer remarked that ‘Enron loves [prepay]
deals as they are able to hide funded debt from their equity analysts.’ Similarly, Citibank’s Capital
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The 2004 proposed guidance on CSFTs “called for banks to review
how companies planned, accounted for, and disclosed CSFTs in both
their financial and tax reporting.”270 Even though Citigroup, JP Morgan
and other banks had incurred heavy financial and reputational injuries
due to their involvement with Enron,271 financial industry trade groups
strongly attacked the 2004 guidance for “requiring that [banks] police
their corporate customers.”272 Banks and industry trade groups also
vigorously opposed the 2004 proposed guidance because its broad
definition of CSFTs appeared to include RMBS, CDOs and ABCP
conduits.273 In response to the industry’s determined opposition, federal
regulators withdrew the 2004 proposed guidance and issued a revised
and much weaker proposal in May 2006.274
Federal regulators did not issue final guidelines on CSFTs until
January 2007, and those guidelines represented a “considerable retreat”
from the 2004 proposal.275 Instead of warning banks to refrain from
engaging in CSFTs that “create significant legal or reputational risks,”
the final guidelines merely advised banks to “take appropriate steps to
address those risks,” including obtaining “representations or assurances
from the customer.”276 The final guidelines contained broad exemptions
and disclaimers that greatly diminished their impact. For example, the
guidelines stated that they did not apply to RMBS, CDOs, ABCP
Markets Approval Committee noted that a prepay swap requested by Enron was ‘effectively a loan,
[but] the form of the transaction would allow [Enron] to reflect its ‘liabilities from price risk
management activity’ on their [sic] balance sheet and also provide a favourable [sic] impact on reported
cash flow from operations.’” Id. at 17–18 (quoting from sources quoted in Third Interim Report of Neal
Batson, court-appointed bankruptcy examiner for Enron) (footnotes omitted).
270. Katz, supra note 266; see also 2004 Proposed Interagency Statement on CSFTs, supra note
267, at 28,983 (stating that a bank should refuse to participate in a CSFT if the bank determined that “a
proposed transaction may result in the customer filing materially misleading financial statements”).
271. Wilmarth, supra note 268, at 24 (stating that, as of September 2006, banks involved with
Enron “had paid more than $8 billion and had surrendered about $3 billion of their credit claims against
Enron, in order to settle various claims asserted by the SEC, Enron’s investors, and Enron itself”); Eric
Dash, Citigroup Resolves Claims That It Helped Enron Deceive Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2008,
at C3 (reporting that Citigroup agreed to pay $1.66 billion to Enron’s bankruptcy estate to settle claims
by Enron’s creditors, and that Citigroup was “the last of 11 financial institutions to resolve claims going
back to 2003”).
272. Tim Reason, Who’s Holding the Bag?, CFO MAG., Oct. 2005 (available on Lexis).
273. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured
Finance Activities, 71 Fed. Reg. 28, 326, 28, 328–29, 28,331 (May 16, 2006) [hereinafter 2006
Proposed Guidance on CSFTs].
274. Id. at 28,236; see also George M. Cohen et al., Have US Regulators Been Soft on Banks Over
Structured Products? Yes, (June 2, 2006), at 2–4 (criticizing the 2006 revised proposal, and maintaining
that “what began as a presumptive condemnation of deals with [deceptive structured] characteristics [in
the 2004 proposed guidance] morphed into what can (and we believe will) easily be read as permission”
in the 2006 revised proposal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523712.
275. Katz, supra note 266.
276. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured
Finance Activities,” 72 Fed. Reg. 1372, 1379 (Jan. 11, 2007).
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conduits, or “hedging-type transactions involving ‘plain-vanilla’
derivatives.”277 The final document also declared that it “does not, by
itself, establish any legally enforceable requirements or obligations” for
banks, including any duties or obligations to bank shareholders,
customers or other third parties.”278
Given the regulators’ long delay in issuing the 2007 guidelines on
CSFTs and the very weak tenor of those guidelines, it is not surprising
that the guidelines did not deter major banks from engaging in abusive
CDO transactions. Goldman and JPMorgan jointly paid over $700
million to settle SEC charges arising out of CDOs that the banks
structured and marketed to investors with inadequate disclosures. In
each case, the bank marketed a CDO’s securities without revealing to
investors that a hedge fund (i) would selectmortgage-related assets for
the CDO’s portfolio and (ii) intended to short those assets, thereby
creating a direct conflict of interest with other investors.279
Similarly, Citigroup agreed to pay $285 million to settle SEC charges
that Citigroup marketed $1 billion of CDO’s securities to investors
without disclosing the bank’s stunning conflict of interest. Citigroup
sold the CDO’s securities while secretly taking short positions so that it
could bet against about half of the CDO’s mortgage-related assets.280 In
addition, a major Japanese bank (Mizuho) agreed to pay $127 million to
settle charges that it structured and marketed a CDO’s securities to
investors while misrepresenting the type and quality of assets that were
actually held in the CDO’s portfolio.281
The SEC’s complaints against Goldman, JPMorgan, Citigroup and
277. Id. at 1374, 1377.
278. Id. at 1375.
279. SEC
Litigation
Release
No.
21592,
July
15,
2010,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21592.htm (describing Goldman’s agreement to pay
$550 million to settle SEC charges); SEC Litigation Release No. 22008, June 21, 2011, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22008.htm (describing JPMorgan’s agreement to pay
$154 million to settle SEC charges); supra note 216 (describing SEC charges that led to settlements
with Goldman and JPMorgan).
280. SEC
Litigation
Release
No.
22134,
Oct.
19,
2011,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22134.htm (describing Citigroup’s agreement to pay
$285 million to settle the SEC’s charges). A federal district court issued an order rejecting the SEC’s
proposed settlement with Citigroup, but the district court’s order was stayed by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, and the case is currently pending on appeal before the Second Circuit. Yin Wilczek,
Securities: Second Circuit Stays SEC, Citigroup Case; Slams Lower Court Rejection of Parties’ Pact,
98 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 502 (Mar. 20, 2012); SEC Enforcement: Rakoff Defends Rejection of
$285M Pact Between SEC, Citigroup in Brief to 2d Cir., 44 SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW REPORT
(BNA) 1560 (Aug. 17, 2012).
281. SEC
Litigation
Release
No.
22417,
July
19,
2012,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22417.htm (describing Mizuho’s agreement to pay
$127.5 million to settle SEC charges that Mizuho structured and marketed a CDO to investors with a
“portfolio containing millions of dollars in dummy assets that inaccurately reflected the [actual]
collateral held by [the CDO]”).
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Mizuho for structuring and marketing abusive CDOs were disturbingly
reminiscent of the charges that the SEC had previously leveled against
Citigroup, JPMorgan and other banks for arranging deceptive
transactions for Enron.282 Indeed, leading banks must have recognized
the risk that their structuring of RMBS, CDOs and ABCP conduits could
potentially lead to Enron-type problems, because they fought very hard
(as described above) to exempt those transactions from the agencies’
guidelines on CSFTs.
D. Bank Regulators and Congress Provided Massive Assistance to
Major Banks during the Financial Crisis
Federal officials provided huge amounts of financial assistance to
large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs) during the financial crisis.
The 19 largest U.S. banks (each with more than $100 billion of assets)
and AIG collectively received $290 billion of capital assistance from the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by Congress.
Federal regulators also authorized the same 19 banks and GE Capital (a
large finance company subsidiary of General Electric) to issue $290
billion of FDIC-guaranteed, low-interest debt. In contrast, banks
smaller than $100 billion received only $41 billion of TARP capital
assistance and issued only $11 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt.283
Additionally, the Federal Reserve System (Fed) provided enormous
amounts of liquidity assistance to financial institutions through a series
of emergency lending programs. The total outstanding amount of the
Fed’s emergency credit facilities reached a single-day peak of $1.2
trillion in December 2008. The Fed extended the vast majority of this
emergency credit to large U.S. and European banks and provided very
little help to smaller institutions.284
The Fed and the Treasury also provided extensive support to financial
institutions and the financial markets by making large-scale purchases of
debt obligations and RMBS that were issued or guaranteed by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.285 In combination, the federal government
282. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 59–60, 137–39, 142–46, 190–200, 247–48; see also supra
notes 228, 267-69 (discussing involvement of Citigroup, JPMorgan and other banks in Enron’s
fraudulent deals).
283. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail
Problem, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT’L LAW 707, 737–38 (2010).
284. The highest daily amount of the Fed’s emergency credit to the ten largest U.S. commercial
and investment banks reached $669 billion, representing more than half of the daily peak amount for all
Fed lending programs. Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Trillion in Secret
Fed Loans, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 22, 2011; Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed
Loans Helped Banks Net $13 Billion, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 27, 2011.
285. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP),
Quarterly Report to Congress, July 21, 2010, at 118–22, 135–38 [hereinafter SIGTARP July 2010
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provided more than $6 trillion of support to financial institutions
between 2008 and mid-2010, when such support is measured by the
peak amounts of outstanding assistance under the TARP capital
assistance programs, Fed emergency lending programs, FDIC debt
guarantees, and other asset purchase and guarantee programs.286 The
United Kingdom (U.K.) and European nations similarly provided more
than $4 trillion of financial support to their financial institutions by the
end of 2009.287
As discussed above, the federal government publicly guaranteed in
early 2009 that none of the 19 largest U.S. banks would be allowed to
fail.288 Regulators also stated that they would not impose regulatory
sanctions on the top 19 banks under the “prompt corrective action”
(PCA) regime established by Congress in 1991, notwithstanding the
non-discretionary nature of those sanctions. Instead of issuing public
enforcement orders, regulators entered into private and confidential
“memoranda of understanding” with BofA and Citigroup despite the
gravely weakened conditions of both banks.289 Federal regulators did
Report] (showing that the Fed and Treasury had purchased more than $1.6 trillion of GSE debt
securities
and
GSE-guaranteed
RMBS
by
mid-2010),
available
at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/July2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf. In 2009
and 2010, under its first quantitative easing (QE) program, the Fed purchased $1.45 billion of GSE debt
securities and GSE-guaranteed RMBS, along with $300 billion of Treasury securities, in order to reduce
short-term and long-term interest rates and thereby produce lower borrowing costs for banks and other
participants in the financial markets. Id. at 150–54; Michael D. Bauer, Fed Asset Buying and Private
Borrowing Rules, FRBSF Economic Letter 2012–16, May 21, 2012, at 1–3, available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2012/el2012-16.html. In order to provide additional
monetary stimulus to the struggling U.S. economy, the Fed announced a second QE program in late
2010 (resulting in the purchase of $600 billion of Treasury securities) and a third QE program in
September 2012 (authorizing the purchase each month of $40 billion of GSE-guaranteed RMBS and $45
billion of Treasury securities for an indefinite period). Bauer, supra; Aaron E. Lorenzo, Monetary
Policy: Fed’s Open-Ended QE3, Longer Window on Zero Rate Stronger Than Some Expected, 99
BNA’S BANKING REPORT 445 (Sept. 18, 2012). By May 2003, the Fed had purchased “more than $3
trillion in longer-term Treasury and mortgage related securities” under its combined QE programs. John
C. Williams, Economic Outlook: Moving in the Right Direction, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 2013-15, at
4 (May 20, 2013), available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economicletter/2013/may/economic-outlook-moving-right-direction/.
286. The “high-water mark” of the combined programs, based on the largest outstanding amount
of each program at any one time, was $6.3 trillion in mid-2010. The federal government’s maximum
potential commitment under those programs was $23.9 trillion. SIGTARP July 2010 Report, supra note
285, at 116–19, 118 tbl.3.1.
287. Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with What
Banks Do, in 2 ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. J., No. 2, at 1, 4–5, 14, 15 tbl.4, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/8/44357464.pdf (stating that the U.S. provided $6.4 trillion of
assistance to financial institutions through capital infusions, asset purchases, asset guarantees, and debt
guarantees as of October 2009, while the United Kingdom and European nations provided $4.3 trillion
of such assistance).
288. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
289. Wilmarth, supra note 283, at 744. A Federal Reserve staff economist determined that
Citigroup’s tangible common equity (TCE) ratio (common equity as a percentage of tangible assets) was
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not issue PCA orders or other formal capital enforcement orders against
any of the largest banks during the financial crisis, even though two very
large banks (Wachovia and WaMu) failed and two others (BofA and
Citigroup) needed extraordinary government assistance to avoid
failure.290 In contrast, regulators issued hundreds of PCA orders and
other formal capital enforcement orders against smaller banks from
between 2008 and 2010, and regulators allowed many of those banks to
fail.291
E. Federal Agencies Provided Extensive Forbearance to the Largest
Banks during the Financial Crisis
In addition to forgoing any use of PCA sanctions against major banks,
federal officials provided extensive accounting and regulatory
forbearance to large financial institutions. As described below, federal
officials enabled leading banks to avoid or postpone recognition of large
losses on troubled mortgage-related securities. Officials also allowed
“very low” (less than 2%) at the end of 2008. The TCE ratio is viewed by analysts and investors as a
“more conservative indicator of stability.” Sherrill Shaffer, Fair Value Accounting: Villain or Innocent
Victim—Exploring the Link Between Fair Value Accounting, Bank Regulatory Capital and the Recent
Financial Crisis, (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston Quant. Analysis Unit Working Paper No. 10-01, Jan. 31,
2010), at 19–21, 21 tbl.5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543210. A second analyst recently
reached a similar conclusion as to Citigroup and also found that BofA was in a vulnerable condition at
the end of 2008. Marc Jarsulic, Chief Economist, Better Markets, Inc., Written Testimony at a joint
hearing on “Examining the Impact of the Proposed Rules to Implement Basel III Capital Standards,”
before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Insurance,
Housing and Community Opportunity of the House Comm. on Financial Services, Nov. 29, 2012, at 5
(determining that Citigroup’s TCE ratio was 1.3% at the end of 2008, while BofA’s TCE ratio was
2.8%), available at http://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Better%20Markets%20Testimony%20FSC-%2011-29-12.pdf.
290. Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND.
L. J. 645, 690–993 (2012); see also supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing failures of
Wachovia and WaMu and rescues of BofA and Citigroup). In early 2009, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair
determined, based on findings by FDIC examiners, that “Citi[bank] was a troubled 4 by every
established standard used to measure bank health.” SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO
SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 168 (Free Press eds., 2012).
However, Chairman Bair ultimately decided not to insist on a “4” (problem bank) rating for Citibank
because she was concerned that Citibank’s foreign depositors would quickly withdraw their funds when
they learned that Citibank had been placed on the FDIC’s “troubled-bank list.” Id. at 168–69.
291. Hill, supra note 290, at 672–77, 690-93; Wilmarth, supra note 283, at 744, 744 n.145. More
than 400 banks failed during the four-year period ending December 31, 2011, and only one of those
institutions (WaMu) had more than $50 billion of assets. In sharp contrast to their unprecedented
measures to protect the 19 largest banks, the federal government did not take significant steps to prevent
smaller banks from failing. See Hill, supra note 290, at 668-77, 690-93; Wilmarth, supra note 283, at
744; 6 FDIC Quarterly No. 1, 4th Qtr. 2011, at 17 (tbl.II-B) (providing information about banks that
failed
between
2007
and
2011),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2012_vol6_1/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol6No1.pdf; 2 FDIC
Quarterly No. 4, 3d Qtr. 2008, at 14 (referring to the failure of WaMu, with $307 billion of assets, in
September
2008),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2012_vol6_1/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol6No1.pdf.

1348

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

the largest banks to defer recognition of major losses on second-lien
housing loans held on their balance sheets.
1. Federal Officials Demanded Changes in Accounting Rules That
Enabled Large Banks to Avoid Mark-to-Market Losses on Troubled
Mortgage-Related Assets
During the spring of 2009, political leaders, regulators and the
financial industry pressured the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) to relax fair value accounting rules that forced major banks to
recognize large losses on RMBS, CDOs and other mortgage-related
investments. Under the mark-to-market accounting practices that
prevailed before 2009, financial institutions were generally required (i)
to establish fair values for investment securities based on the most
recent available market transactions and (ii) to recognize mark-tomarket losses on those investments unless banks could demonstrate both
their intention and their ability to hold those investments to maturity.292
Mark-to-market accounting placed great pressure on banks to sell
their RMBS and CDOs as prices for mortgage-related assets plummeted
during the financial crisis, in order to avoid the possibility of even
greater losses if they continued to hold such investments. As a
consequence, some observers blamed fair value accounting for creating
“fire sale” conditions in already stressed markets, thereby forcing
financial institutions to recognize unwarranted, panic-driven losses.293
To mitigate the continuing mark-to-market losses that banks were
incurring, FRB Chairman Ben Bernanke, SEC Chairman Mary
Schapiro, and House Financial Services Committee chairman Barney
Frank urged FASB to make changes to its fair value rules.294 In
addition, the financial services industry launched an intense lobbying
campaign to force FASB to relax those rules. At a House committee
hearing on March 12, 2009, members of Congress threatened FASB
chairman Robert Herz that they would pass legislation to override
FASB’s fair value rules if FASB refused to make the requested
changes.295
292. Gauri Bhat et al., Panacea, Pandora’s Box, or Placebo: Feedback in Bank Mortgage-Backed
Security Holdings and Fair Value Accounting (June 2011), at 2–3, 6, 9–10, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856727; Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules
Matter? The Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 36 J. CORP. L. 513, 517–20 (2011).
293. Bhat et al., supra note 292, at 2–3, 6–10; Robert M. Bowen et al., The Economic
Consequences of Relaxing Fair Value Accounting and Impairment Rules on Banks during the Financial
Crisis of 2008–09 (Jan. 10, 2010), at 1, 1, 2 n.3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498912;Epstein
& Henderson, supra note 288, at 519–21, 534, 544–46.
294. Bowen et al., supra note 293, at 10–11, 34 (tbl.1).
295. Ian Katz & Jesse Westbrook, Mark-to-Market Lobby Buoys Bank Profits 20% as FASB May
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In response to the financial industry’s impressive display of political
clout, FASB issued interpretations that substantially eased mark-tomarket rules on April 2, 2009. Those interpretations allowed banks (i)
to use internal models (rather than recent market prices) to determine the
fair value of securities traded in illiquid or disorderly markets, (ii) to
reject “distress sale” prices as a reliable indicator of fair values, and (iii)
to avoid recognizing impairment losses on securities as long as banks
did not intend to sell the securities prior to maturity.296 In late 2008,
European politicians and banks forced the International Accounting
Standards Board to make similar emergency changes to mitigate markto-market losses by large European banks.297
According to event studies, FASB’s rule changes produced
significant gains in stock prices for U.S. banks, and the largest gains
occurred at banks that had (i) greater vulnerability to contagion from
Lehman’s failure, (ii) lower regulatory capital, (iii) larger amounts of
illiquid investments subject to treatment as “Level 2” or “Level 3”
assets, and (iv) higher exposures to potential mark-to-market losses on
impaired investments.298 The greatest beneficiaries of FASB’s rule
changes were Citigroup, BofA and other leading banks that were
burdened with large exposures to mortgage-related investments.299
2. Federal Regulators Postponed the Imposition of Consolidated Capital
Requirements for Assets Held by Off-Balance-Sheet Conduits
Regulators also provided accounting forbearance with regard to
ABCP conduits, SIVs and other OBS entities that major banks
sponsored and used as dumping grounds for tranches of RMBS and
CDOs that they could not easily sell to arms-length investors.300 By
Say Yes, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 30, 2009 (reporting that FASB was under “tremendous pressure” to change
its fair value rules due to aggressive lobbying efforts by the financial industry); Susan Pulliam & Tom
McGinty, USA Inc.: Congress Helped Banks Defang Key Rule, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2009, at A1
(describing the “multimillion dollar lobby campaign” mounted by financial firms and trade groups).
296. Bhat et al., supra note 292, at 7–8; Bowen et al., supra note 293, at 10–11, 28–29
(Appendix); Ian Katz, FASB Eases Fair-Value Rules Amid Lawmaker Pressure (Update 3),
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 2, 2009.
297. Bowen et al., supra note 293, at 8–9; Denise Lugo, Accounting: Former SEC Chief
Accountant Turner Fears IASB Actions May Slow U.S. Move to IFRS, 91 BNA’S BANKING REP. 779
(Nov. 3, 2008); Joe Kirwin, Accounting: European Union Quickly Approves Changes to Fair-Value
Accounting, 91 BNA’S BANKING REP. 683 (Oct. 20, 2008).
298. Bowen et al., supra note 293, at 3–4, 20–26; see also Bhat et al., supra note 292, at 4–5, 26–
27, 33–34 (finding that (i) the largest gains in stock prices after FASB’s rule changes occurred at U.S.
banks that held larger amounts of private label (non-GSE) RMBS and nonperforming loans, and (ii)
FASB’s revised rules significantly changed reduced the adverse impact of “feedback trading” on such
banks).
299. See authorities cited supra in note 298; Katz & Westbrook, supra note 295.
300. See supra notes 222–31 and accompanying text (discussing OBS conduits that were
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early 2008, FASB officials recognized that large banks had exploited
ambiguities in accounting rules to create OBS risk exposures that
resembled the abusive transactions created by Enron.301 For example,
Citigroup justified its transfer of $72 billion of assets to its sponsored
OBS conduits by arranging for outside investors to purchase just $77
million of “first-loss notes” issued by those conduits. Notwithstanding
the allegedly independent status of the conduits, Citigroup was later
obliged (due to reputational concerns as well as liquidity backstops) to
bring most of their assets back onto its balance sheet.302
In the summer of 2008, FASB proposed new accounting rules that
would force banks to bring many securitized assets back onto their
balance sheets.303
Major financial institutions launched another
aggressive lobbying campaign to delay the effective date of FASB’s
proposed new rules. Regulators and members of Congress again
strongly supported the industry because of their desire to “shore up
major financial institutions and keep their vulnerabilities from causing
near-term damage to the ailing economy.”304 In July 2008, FASB
agreed to defer the effective date for its new rules until January 2010,
although two of its five members “expressed discomfort with the
delay.”305
FASB issued final rules in July 2009 that required consolidated
accounting treatment (beginning in 2010) for securitized assets held by
most OBS conduits and many other “special purpose entities.”306 One
sponsored by large banks and later inflicted heavy losses on several of those banks).
301. David Reilly, Look Under the Banks’ Hoods: FASB to Re-Examine Whether Financing
Vehicles That Added to Woes Should Stay Off Books, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2008, at C1; Steve
Burkholder, Accounting: FASB Chief Blames Loss of U.S. Reporting System’s Global Credibility on
Subprime Woes, 89 BANKING REP.(BNA) 949 (2007).
302. Reilly, supra note 301; see also Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 973–75 (discussing Citigroup’s
decision to absorb $84 billion of assets from SIVs and other OBS conduits).
303. Harry Terris, FASB Rule Delay: Impact Goes Beyond GSEs, AM. BANKER (July 31, 2008),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/173_150/-358851-1.html; Denise Lugo, Financial Coalition
Wants FASB to Delay Proposals on Off-Balance-Sheet Activities, 40 SEC.REG. & L. REP. 1100 (2008).
304. David S. Hilzenrath, Potentially Disruptive Lender Rule Is Delayed, WASH. POST, July 31,
2008, at D1; see also Lugo, supra note 303 (describing lobbying efforts by a “Wall Street coalition” to
“delay accounting standards under study by [FASB] that would require companies to bring certain
securitized assets back on their balance sheets”). For example, a House Republican leader urged FASB
to postpone its rules while using “talking points” that had been prepared by the financial industry
coalition that was lobbying for the postponement. Hilzenrath, supra (quoting letter sent to FASB by
House Financial Services Committee ranking member Spencer Bachus (R-AL)).
305. Hilzenrath, supra note 304 (quoting FASB chairman Robert Herz, who stated that “[i]t does
pain me to allow something that has been . . . abused by certain folks, to let that go on another year,”
and FASB member Lawrence Smith, who stated that “[i]n my mind, things have been broken for a
while, and it’s about time we fixed the problem”); see also Steve Burkholder, Accounting: FASB Votes
to Defer Planned Changes on Securitizations, Consolidations to 2010, 91 BANKING REP. (BNA) 185
(Aug. 4, 2008) (reporting on FASB’s decision).
306. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Final rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 4636, 4636–37 (Jan 28, 2010)

2013]

TURNING A BLIND EYE

1351

analyst estimated that FASB’s consolidation rules would compel the
four largest U.S. banks to bring $550 billion of assets back onto their
balance sheets.307 The financial industry pressured regulators to grant a
further delay before imposing regulatory capital charges on securitized
assets that would be consolidated under the FASB’s new rules.308 As a
practical matter, consolidated regulatory capital treatment required
banks to post ten times as much capital as they previously held for OBS
conduits under the federal regulators’ 2004 capital rule.309 In response
to the industry’s entreaties, regulators provided a one-year phase-in
period for consolidated capital treatment, thereby permitting banks to
postpone full implementation of the much higher capital requirements
until 2011.310
3. Federal Officials Provided Forbearance for Second-Lien Loans Held
by Banks but Refused to Provide Meaningful Principal Relief for
“Underwater” Homeowners
Federal regulators granted additional leniency to major banks with
regard to their extensive holdings of second mortgage liens. During the
housing boom, many large banks and thrifts made first and second
mortgages simultaneously in order to permit borrowers to purchase
homes with little or no down payments. Lenders frequently securitized
the first mortgages while retaining the “piggyback” second mortgages

[hereinafter 2010 Capital Rule] (describing FASB’s adoption of Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards (FAS) 166 and 167 in June 2009); Accounting Principles: New FASB Rules for
Securitizations Portend Big Changes to Bank Ledgers, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1179 (June 22,
2009) (same); see also Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg.
47,138, 47,140–42 (Sept. 15, 2009) (explaining the accounting changes made by FAS 166 and 167, and
admitting that “the recent turmoil in the financial markets has demonstrated the extent to which the
credit risk exposure of the sponsoring banking organizations to [OBS conduit] structures (and their
related assets) has in fact been greater than the [federal banking] agencies had expected”).
307. David Reilly, Banks Need to End $1 Trillion Kick the Can Game, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3,
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=acPs3f5Wlny0 (citing report by
Barclays Capital analyst Jason Goldberg regarding the impact of the new FASB rules on Citigroup,
JPMorgan, BofA and Wells Fargo).
308. 2010 Capital Rule, supra note 306, at 4637–39 (stating that financial industry commenters
“overwhelmingly supported a delay and/or phase-in of the regulatory capital requirements associated
with the implementation of FAS 167 for a period of up to three years”).
309. Bradley Keoun, Citigroup’s Costly Gaurantees May Be Curbed, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16,
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-16/-liquidity-puts-that-cost-citigroup-may-be-curbedocc-s-bailey-says.html (reporting that consolidated treatment of conduit assets under regulatory capital
rules would force banks to provide “10 times as much capital support” for those assets compared to
prior rules); see also supra note 224 and accompanying text (describing 2004 capital rule that allowed
banks to provide liquidity support for OBS conduits while posting only one-tenth of the capital required
for on-balance-sheet assets).
310. 2010 Capital Rule, supra note 306, at 4638–39.
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on their balance sheets.311 In 2006, almost a third of subprime
mortgages and about one-half of Alt-A loans were made in tandem with
“piggyback” second mortgages.312
From 2001 to 2007, home purchase transactions that included
“piggyback” second mortgages typically resulted in combined LTV
ratios of 95% or more.313 Regulators allowed banks and thrifts to
provide “piggyback” second mortgages despite repeated complaints
from mortgage insurers that those mortgages did not comply with either
the agencies’ capital rules or their high-LTV lending standards.314
Banks and thrifts also extended home equity loans and home equity
lines of credit (HELOCs) that enabled homeowners to extract large
amounts of cash from their homes.315
At the peak of the mortgage lending boom in 2007, about $1 trillion
of second mortgage liens (including home equity loans and HELOCs)
were outstanding.316
The four largest banks—JPMorgan, BofA,
Citigroup and Wells Fargo—held $475 billion of second-lien loans at
the end of 2008,317 and they retained about $400 billion of those loans
311. Bernanke: Housing Will Stay Strong, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 18, 2005, at 6; Erick
Bergquist, New Radian CEO Predicts Piggybacks Will Wane, AM. BANKER, May 2, 2005, at 18; Eric
Bergquist & Marc Hochstein, For MGIC—Slower Growth, Tougher Rivals, AM. BANKER, July 15,
2004, at 1; see also Harry Terris, As Home Prices Fall, Banks Hold Home Equity Bag, AM. BANKER,
April 28, 2011 (stating that “[p]iggyback loans—or second liens underwritten simultaneously with first
liens—were standard substitutes for substantial down payments and mortgage insurance in subprime and
alternative-A lending, and the data suggests that bank balance sheets were a principal source for such
borrowing”); infra note 476 (describing the “piggyback” loans provided by Countrywide as part of their
“80/20” subprime lending program).
312. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1021 & n.289.
313. Donghoon Lee et al., A New Look at Second Liens, Fed. Res. Bank of NY, Staff Report No.
569, (Aug. 2012), at 14–15, 34 (fig. 13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130061.
314. Private mortgage insurers criticized “piggyback” second mortgages because they enabled
borrowers to avoid buying mortgage insurance, which generally had been required prior to the housing
boom for borrowers whose down payments were less than 20% of the purchase price for their homes.
Bergquist & Hochstein, supra note 311. In 2003 and again in 2005, mortgage insurers complained that
banks and thrifts were using “piggyback” second mortgages to circumvent regulatory standards for
high-LTV lending as well as agency rules requiring extra capital for banks and thrifts that retained
“recourse” exposures to securitized loans. The federal banking regulators refused to act on those
complaints, asserting that (i) second mortgages, even if originated simultaneously with first mortgages,
did not represent a “recourse arrangement” for securitized first mortgages, and (ii) regulators were
applying appropriate “scrutiny” to high LTV mortgage financing. See Off. of the Comptroller of
Currency,
Interpretive
Letter
1058
(April
20,
2005),
available
at
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/may06/int1058.pdf (joint letter from the
federal banking agencies to Suzanne Hutchinson of the Mortgage Insurance Cos. of Am.); Off. of the
Comptroller of Currency, Interpretive Letter 987 (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/apr04/int987.pdf (joint letter from the federal
banking agencies).
315. Lee et al., supra note 313, at 10; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 1009–10.
316. Lee et al., supra note 313, at 10.
317. The large holdings of second-lien loans by the top four banks were due in part to BofA’s
purchase of Countrywide, JPMorgan’s purchase of WaMu and Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia
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on March 31, 2012.318
The top four banks were also the largest servicers of first mortgages
(including securitized loans), and their extensive holdings of second
liens created a clear conflict of interest.319 The big bank servicers often
refused to approve principal reductions for homeowners on their first
mortgages, through either mortgage modifications or short sales,
because those transactions would have required the banks to write down
or write off their second liens on the same properties.320 Indeed, some
commentators claimed that bank servicers “encourage[ed] borrowers to
miss first lien payments while remaining current on their second liens,”
because banks could postpone writing down second-lien loans as long as
borrowers kept making payments on them.321
Analysts strongly criticized regulators for not forcing major banks to
recognize losses on their second-lien loans, especially for “underwater”
homes whose market values were less than their combined mortgage
liens.322 In 2011, BofA still carried second-lien loans on its books at
93% of their face value, even though investors typically discounted such
loans by 50%.323 The OCC supported BofA and other big banks by
declaring that they were “adequately reserved against losses on secondliens” in 2011, and the OCC also claimed that national banks did not
have to write down second-lien loans on “underwater” homes as long as
the borrowers continued to make payments.324 As indicated above, bank
during 2008. Kate Berry, Surprising Surge in Home Equity Loans, AM. BANKER, July 2, 2009, at 9.
318. Prashant Gopal & John Gittlesohn, Second Loans Keep Houses in Limbo, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, July 30–Aug. 5, 2012, at 40-1 (reporting that the four largest banks “held 48 percent of
the $849.5 billion in second liens as of March 31, [2012]”).
319. Kate Berry & Jeff Horwitz, Hamp Loan Mods Surge at Banks, Languish at Nonbanks, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 3, 2012 (reporting that the four largest banks and Ally Financial were the top five
mortgage servicers and controlled the servicing for 66% of all home loans); Lee et al., supra note 313, at
2 (describing conflict of interest faced by banks that serviced first mortgages and held second-lien loans
on the same properties); Alex Ulam, Why Second-Lien Loans Remain a Worry, AM. BANKER, May 2,
2011, at 7 (same).
320. Kate Berry, Why Writedowns on 2nd Mortgages Are So Scarce, AM. BANKER, Sept. 20,
2010, at 1; Ulam, supra note 319.
321. Lee et al., supra note 313, at 2; Ulam, supra note 319 (quoting comments by Josh Rosner).
322. Berry, supra note 320; Ulam, supra note 319; see also Kathleen Howley, Banks Win
Reprieve on Home Equity Loans in Settlement,” BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2012)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-27/banks-win-reprieve-on-home-equity-loans-in-settlementmortgages.html (reporting that 4.4 million of “underwater “ homes had second-lien loans totaling $180
billion in late 2011, representing about 20% of all second-lien loans).
323. Ulam, supra note 319 (reporting that “[e]xcluding impaired [second-lien] loans it acquired
with its purchase of Countrywide, BofA’s allowance for home equity losses was equal to 6.5% of its
portfolio at March 31, [2011,] suggesting a carrying value of more than 93 cents on the dollar.”); Jesse
Eisinger, In Proposed Mortgage Fraud Settlement, a Gift to Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, at
B11 (reporting that investors were “bidding about 50 cents on the dollar” for second-lien loans).
324. Ulam, supra note 319 (reporting on comments by Tim Long, senior deputy comptroller and
chief national bank examiner); see also Berry, supra note 320 (citing statement in September 2010 by
OCC spokesman Bryan Hubbard that a national bank “does not have to classify a home equity loan if
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servicers reportedly urged borrowers to continue making payments on
“underwater” second liens even after they defaulted on their first
mortgages.325
In February 2012, the four largest banks and Ally Financial agreed to
a nationwide settlement of state and federal charges that all five banks
had systematically engaged in unlawful and abusive practices while
foreclosing on mortgages they serviced. The national mortgage
settlement, which included 49 states and the federal banking agencies,
required the five banks to pay $5 billion in penalties and to earn $20
billion of credits by approving principal relief for borrowers through
mortgage modifications and short sales.326 The settlement allowed the
banks to receive substantial credits for writing down their second-lien
loans, even though many of those loans were already “underwater” and
presumably uncollectible.327 A prominent analyst argued that the
settlement credits for writing down second-lien loans represented “a gift
to the banks” because “[s]econd liens would typically be wiped out
before senior-mortgage investors take a loss.”328 The foreclosure
settlement also gave credits to the banks if they approved principal
reductions for first mortgages they serviced for others, thereby allowing
the banks to transfer some of the settlement’s costs to securitized
mortgages owned by investors.329
Shortly before the national settlement was announced, federal bank
the value of the property has dropped”). One analyst suggested that big national banks, which often
serviced first mortgages owned by investors while holding second liens on the same properties,
sometimes agreed to postpone foreclosures on the delinquent first mortgages if the borrowers were
willing to continue making payments on their second liens. Ulam, supra note 319 (quoting comments
by Josh Rosner).
325. See supra notes 321, 324 and accompanying text; see also Berry, supra note 320 (stating that
banks were postponing writedowns on “underwater” second liens because borrowers continued to make
payments on those loans; for example, in mid-2010 Citigroup reported that 47% of its second liens were
“underwater,” due to combined LTV ratios higher than 100%, but also reported that only 2.4% of its
second-lien loans were delinquent).
326. Kate Davidson, Kate Berry & Joe Adler, Cheat Sheet: Long-Awaited Final Terms of $25B
Mortgage Settlement, AM. BANKER, Mar. 13, 2012; see also Kate Berry, Too Many Short Sales Mar
Mortgage Settlement, Advocates Say, AM. BANKER, Feb. 22, 2013, 2013 WLNR 4457884 (reporting
that, under the settlement, “servicers get $1 of credit for each $1 of principal forgiveness [through a
first-lien mortgage modification], but only 45 cents of credit for each $1 in principal forgiven on a short
sale, and only 20 cents of it if the loan is owned by an investor.”).
327. Davidson, Berry & Adler, supra note 326 (reporting that banks would “receive 90 cents for
every $1 principal write-down for performing second loans. For seriously delinquent second loans, they
receive 50 cents of credit per $1 of write-down. For second liens that are 6 months delinquent, they
receive just 10 cents of credit for every $1 of write-down.”); Howley, supra note 322 (discussing the
settlement’s favorable treatment of the banks).
328. Howley, supra note 322 (quoting Laurie Goodman).
329. Id. (citing comments by Ms. Goodman and Scott Simon); Kate Berry, MBS Investors Cry
Foul Over National Mortgage Settlement, AM. BANKER, Mar. 20, 2012 (“The settlement allows [bank]
servicers to receive 45 cents of credit for every dollar of principal reductions paid for by investors” on
first-lien loans).
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regulators issued guidance advising banks to create larger loan loss
reserves for second-lien loans in circumstances where (i) borrowers had
defaulted on first-lien loans covering the same properties or (ii) market
values of those properties had fallen below the outstanding amounts of
the first and second liens.330 The national settlement and the interagency
guidance finally induced the top five bank servicers to begin approving
loan modifications and short sales due to (A) settlement credits they
could earn from approving such transactions,331 and (B) regulatory
pressure to recognize accrued losses on their second-lien loans.332
From March 2012 through March 2013, the five big bank servicers
provided $44.4 billion of principal relief to 475,000 borrowers.
However, servicers provided more than three-quarters of that principal
forgiveness through short sales ($20.1 billion) and second-lien
writedowns ($14.2 billion). Servicers provided a much smaller amount
of principal relief through first-mortgage modifications ($10.1
billion).333 Consumer and civil rights groups criticized the big bank
servicers for failing to comply with the “spirit of the settlement,”
because the banks gave “the bulk of relief through short sales and
forgiveness of second liens”—transactions that frequently did not enable
borrowers to “stay in their homes.”334
330. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. et al., Interagency Supervisory Guidance on Allowance
for Loan and Lease Losses Estimation Practices for Loans and Lines of Credit Secured by Junior Liens
on 1–4 Family Residential Properties, at 2–3 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20120131a1.pdf (advising banks holding
second liens to adjust their loss reserves for “high-risk junior lien” loans based on factors such as
“[d]elinquency and modification status of senior lien loans associated with an institution’s junior liens”
as well as the combined LTV ratios for first and second lien loans when compared to the property’s
current market value).
331. Berry & Horwitz, supra note 319 (explaining that the foreclosure settlement and other
federal incentives encouraged the top five bank servicers to approve mortgage modifications and other
transactions resulting in principal reductions); Kate Davidson, Banks Can Live with $25B Deal—If It
Gets Approved, AM. BANKER, Mar. 14, 2012.
332. See Gretchen Morgenson, Here Comes the Catch in Home Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2012, § BU, 1 (reporting that Wells Fargo “moved $1.7 billion of junior lien mortgages to nonaccrual
status as a result of the [interagency] guidance” in the first quarter of 2012). In June 2012, the OCC
ordered national banks to write down second-lien loans for borrowers who had completed Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceedings. JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo and Citigroup responded by collectively
charging off more than $2 billion of their second-lien loans during the third quarter of 2012. Kate
Berry, Third-Quarter Earnings Feature More Home Equity Losses, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 22,
2012. The fact that major banks had not previously written off such loans indicates the general laxity of
federal regulatory treatment for second-liens prior to 2012.
333. Office of Mortgage Settlement Oversight, Fact Sheet: Updated National Consumer Relief
Data
(May
21,
2013),
available
at
https://www.mortgageoversight.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Fact-Sheet_May-progress-reportFINAL.pdf; see also Kevin Wack, Mortgage
Relief Surpassing Estimates, Iowa AG Says, AM. BANKER, May 22, 2013, 2013 WLNR 12467907
(reporting on the types of principal relief provided by the five big banks servicers).
334. Kate Berry, Civil Rights Groups Call for More Disclosure in Mortgage Settlement, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 28, 2013, 2013 WLNR 4946771 (also noting that the national mortgage settlement
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Large holdings of impaired second liens by major banks appear to
have been a significant factor behind the Obama Administration’s
repeated refusals to adopt programs that could have provided significant
principal relief to homeowners threatened with foreclosure. As noted
above, seven million mortgage holders have lost their homes to
foreclosures or short sales since 2007, and an additional five million
delinquent borrowers could lose their homes during the next few
years.335 The FRB and private analysts have pointed to this massive
wave of foreclosures as a major problem that has prevented a sustained
recovery of the U.S. housing market and the general economy.336
In recently-published memoirs, former TARP Special Inspector
General Neil Barofsky and former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair strongly
criticized the Treasury Department for rejecting their proposals to create
federal programs offering substantial principal reductions to
“underwater” homeowners who could meet their mortgage obligations
with such assistance.337 As Barofsky, Bair and other analysts pointed
monitor, Joseph A. Smith, acknowledged that “[t]here is a fair amount of discretion that the servicers
have” in determining the types of principal relief they would offer to borrowers under the settlement);
see also Berry, supra note 326 (“A chief criticism of the $25 billion settlement has been that banks get
credit for completing short sales—which result in borrowers giving up the property—when the goal is to
[have] consumers keep their homes.”); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Despite Aid, Borrowers Still Face
Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at B1 (reporting that only 71,000 borrowers had received
principal relief through first-mortgage modifications under the settlement, and that other types of
principal relief—including writedowns of second mortgages—frequently did not allow borrowers to
stay in their homes).
335. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., Letter from Ben Bernanke, Fed. Res. Bd. Chairman, to Spencer Bachus, Chairman
of Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives and Barney Frank, Ranking Member of
Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2012), (with an attached
Federal Reserve staff study entitled “The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy
Considerations”) (stating that “continued weakness in the housing market poses a significant barrier to a
more vigorous economic recovery,” and noting that “the large inventory of foreclosed or surrendered
properties is contributing to excess supply in the for-sale market, placing downward pressure on house
prices and exacerbating the loss in aggregate housing wealth”), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf;
Binyamin Appelbaum, Cautious Moves on Foreclosures Haunting Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012,
at A1 (reporting that “housing, left to fester, had become Mr. Obama’s biggest economic problem”
because “millions of people lost their homes and the economic recovery stalled somewhere between
crisis and prosperity”); Peter Coy & Robert Farzad, A Long Way From Normal, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, July 30-Aug. 5, 2012, at 37 (describing continuing problems with delinquent
mortgages and foreclosures, and noting that “[h]ousing is most Americans’ biggest asset and crucial to
the health of the overall economy”); Clive Crook, U.S. Needs to Be Much More Forgiving on Home
Loans, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-07/u-s-needs-to-bemuch-more-forgiving-on-home-loans.html (“The housing market is where the Great Recession started.
It’s the main thing delaying recovery.”); Zachary Goldfarb, Why has the U.S. recovery sputtered?,
WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2012, at A1 (citing several senior economists who maintained that home
foreclosures and underwater borrowers represented “a persistent and largely unaddressed problem” that
caused “the slow economic recovery”).
337. NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN
STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 124–28, 156–57, 193–200, 226–28 (Free Press eds., 2012);
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out, Franklin Roosevelt’s administration created the Home Owners’
Loan Corporation (HOLC) in response to a similar foreclosure crisis
during the Great Depression. The HOLC restructured and refinanced a
fifth of U.S. home mortgages with significant principal reductions,
thereby saving a million families from losing their homes.338 In
contrast, the Obama Administration rejected proposals for programs that
could have provided significant principal reductions to large numbers of
underwater borrowers. The Administration also refused to support
legislation in early 2009 that would have given bankruptcy courts the
authority to reduce the principal balances of individual mortgages by
ordering “cramdowns” in consumer bankruptcy cases.339
Instead, the Treasury Department created the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP), which gave mortgage servicers
financial incentives to modify first-lien mortgages but did not provide
meaningful support for principal reductions. Barofsky, Bair and other
critics contend that HAMP was poorly designed and lacked cruciallyneeded incentives to persuade mortgage servicers to provide principal
relief to borrowers.340 As of March 31, 2013, Treasury had spent only
$7.3 billion on HAMP and other housing relief programs, and $38.5
billion of TARP-authorized funding for housing programs remained
unused.341 HAMP’s mortgage modification program produced only
863,000 permanent first-lien modifications by March 2013, and only
96,000 of those modifications included principal relief, while more than
a million modifications failed.342 In August 2009, Treasury established
a Second-Lien Modification Program, which offered incentive payments
to mortgage servicers and investors for writing down second-lien loans,
but that program disbursed less than $360 million and generated only
142,000 writedowns of second liens by February 2013.343
BAIR, supra note 290, at 128–29, 147–53, 248–51.
338. Appelbaum, supra note 336; BAIR, supra note 290, at 115, 155; see also Adam J. Levitin &
Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance 23–26 (Geo. Univ. Law Ctr. Pub. L. & Leg.
Theory Working Paper 12-051, Mar. 13, 2012) (describing the HOLC’s activities), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1966550.
339. See authorities cited supra in note 337; see also Appelbaum, supra note 336; Clara Benson,
Obama Housing Fix Faltered on Carrots-Not-Sticks Policy, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-11/obama-housing-fix-faltered-on-carrots-not-stickspolicy.html; Ezra Klein, The Best Case Against Obama’s Economic Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 21,
2012, at A10.
340. See authorities cited supra in notes 337 and 339.
341. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP),
Quarterly Report to Congress (April 24, 2013) at 49-50, 59. 60 (tbl.2.12), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_24_2013_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
342. Id. at 63 (including tbl.2.14), 64, 75–76.
343. Id. at 78–79. Moreover, HAMP’s very limited programs for principal forgiveness applied
only to mortgages that were not owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. The GSEs
refused to participate in any mortgage modification programs offering principal reductions to borrowers.
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According to Barofsky and Bair, the Treasury Department showed no
interest in providing meaningful principal relief for underwater
borrowers and instead pursued measures that served the interests of the
big bank servicers.344 In a hearing before the Congressional Oversight
Panel during the fall of 2010, Treasury Secretary Geithner stated that
HAMP would help “foam the runway” for the banks by enabling them
to “‘handle up to ‘10 million foreclosures,’ over time.”345 During a
meeting with President Obama and seven leading economists in October
2011, Geithner rejected the economists’ proposal for a plan to go
beyond HAMP and provide principal forgiveness to millions of
underwater homeowners.346
Similarly, Treasury assistant secretary Herbert Allison stated that he
wanted to help the banks “earn their way out of this,” and he opposed
principal reductions for underwater mortgages because they could create
“moral hazard” among borrowers.347 Barofsky concluded that bank
servicers had fee-based incentives that discouraged them from granting
principal reductions, and he also decided that Treasury would never
support a principal forgiveness program that could reduce bank
profits.348 Bair reached similar conclusions about the motivations of the
big banks and Treasury.349
Thus, it seems likely that a major factor behind Treasury’s opposition
to large-scale principal reductions for first mortgages was Treasury’s
recognition that such reductions would have forced the four largest
banks—which were also the four largest mortgage servicers—to
recognize significant losses on their $400 billion holdings of second-lien

Id. at 75; Marceline White, Not enough relief: Despite deal reached with banks, too many Md. families
are still losing their homes, BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 12, 2012), at 21A (reporting that Edward DeMarco,
acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Authority, would not allow Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
to include principal reductions in any modifications of mortgages that they owned or guaranteed).
344. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 125–28, 193–98; BAIR, supra note 290, at 141–53, 249–56.
345. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 156–57 (quoting testimony by Geithner).
346. Goldfarb, supra note 336 (reporting that Geithner rejected the proposal because “he didn’t
think anything of such ambition was possible”).
347. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 157, 197. Geithner similarly opposed a principal reduction
program for underwater mortgages because he feared “it could reward people who tapped home equity
to support lavish lifestyles.” Benson, supra note 339. Given the federal government’s massive
assistance programs for large banks, Barofsky found it “beyond ironic that Treasury was now
emphasizing moral hazard with respect to home owners. Though some home owners might try to take
advantage of [a principal reduction] program . . . that risk paled in comparison to that created by
Treasury by the way it had rescued the too-big-to-fail banks.” BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 197.
348. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 125–26, 196–97.
349. BAIR, supra note 290, at 131–53, 249–56; see also id. at 153 (“HAMP was a program
designed to look good in a press release, not to fix the housing market. Larry [Summers] and Tim
[Geithner] didn’t seem to care about the political beating the president took on the hundreds of billions
of dollars thrown at the big-bank bailouts . . . I don’t think helping home owners was ever a priority for
them.”).
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loans. In September 2010, a prominent analyst pointed out that if
regulators forced the big banks to write down their second liens, it
would probably compel the banks to “come back to the federal
government for additional bailout money.”350
The Obama Administration also declined to support bankruptcy
“cramdown” legislation in 2009 because it “feared the consequences for
the nation’s biggest banks, which had been rescued just months
earlier.”351 Similarly, Lawrence Summers (President Obama’s chief
economic adviser) rejected plans to provide extensive principal relief for
underwater homeowners because he believed those plans could have
“‘effects worse than the cure’ . . . , such as cratering the financial system
by forcing banks to absorb huge losses.”352 In short, the Obama
Administration—like its predecessor, the George W. Bush
Administration—assigned a much lower priority to solving the home
foreclosure crisis than it did to shoring up the largest banks (which bore
significant responsibility for causing the crisis in the first place).353
F. The Financial Industry Persuaded Congress to Pass a Series of
Measures That Facilitated the Subprime Credit Boom
In addition to the financial industry’s repeated successes in obtaining
favorable regulatory treatment, the industry achieved a series of
landmark legislative victories between 1994 and 2006. With the
industry’s fervent support, Congress enacted several key statutes
thatencouraged rapid growth in the size, revenues and influence of the
350. Berry, supra note 320 (quoting George Mason professor Anthony Sanders); see also supra
notes 317–18 and accompanying text (stating that JPMorgan, BofA, Wells Fargo and Citigroup held
$475 billion of second-lien loans at the end of 2008 and still held $400 billion of those loans at the end
of the first quarter of 2012).
351. Paul Kiel, The Great American Foreclosure Story: The Struggle for Justice and a Place to
Call Home, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-great-americanforeclosure-story-the-struggle-for-justice-and-a-place-t (discussion under heading entitled “Obama’s
options”); see also id. (stating that the Administration was concerned that “[i]f too many consumers
were lured into bankruptcy, they wouldn’t have only their mortgages reduced. They might very well
have other debts slashed, such as home-equity loans and credit-card debt. The cumulative effect could
devastate the banks, plunging the nation back into a financial crisis”); Benson, supra note 339 (quoting
former Obama housing finance policy coordinator Peter Swire, who confirmed that “[g]etting the
financial system to work was a huge priority [for the Obama Administration] . . . . The vote on cramdown happened in that context.”).
352. Goldfarb, supra note 336.
353. BAIR, supra note 290, at 131–53, 249–56; see also BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 124–28,
194–200, 226–28 (“Under Paulson, Treasury chose to bail out the largest banks without insisting that
they effect meaningful mortgage reform. Under Geithner, that original sin was compounded by a series
of further choices in program design (to ‘foam the runway’ for the banks) and execution (refusing to
penalize servicers) that always seemed to put home owners’ interests second. The simple truth is that
Geithner and Treasury chose to never treat the foreclosure crisis . . . with the same seriousness and
resolve that they applied to rescuing the banks.”).

1360

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

largest banks and also set the stage for the financial crisis:
•

In 1994, Congress adopted legislation that (i) authorized bank
holding companies to make interstate acquisitions of banks and
(ii) empowered national banks and state banks to establish
interstate branches. The 1994 statute made possible the
establishment of large nationwide banking organizations and
triggered a wave of bank mergers. As a consequence, the share
of U.S. banking assets held by the ten largest banks rose from
25% in 1990 to 55% in 2005.354

•

In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
(GLBA), which authorized banks to affiliate with securities firms
and insurance companies by establishing financial holding
companies. GLBA ratified and expanded a long series of
regulatory approvals that opened loopholes in the walls
separating banks from securities firms and insurance
companies—a trend that culminated in the FRB’s approval of the
merger of Citicorp and Travelers to form Citigroup in 1998.355
GLBA opened the door to the formation of large “universal
banks” (financial conglomerates). In turn, many of those
financial conglomerates became the “private-sector catalysts for
the credit boom that led to the [financial] crisis” as well as “the
epicenter of the world’s financial turmoil.”356

•

In 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act (CFMA), which largely exempted OTC derivatives from
federal regulation. CFMA’s deregulatory philosophy helped a
small group of major financial institutions to dominate national
and global markets for OTC derivatives.357 CFMA was a “huge
mistake” because it created a “regulatory void” that allowed
OTC derivatives markets (including the CDS market) to expand
rapidly and create dangerous concentrations of risk in leading
financial firms like AIG.358

•

In 2005, Congress enacted bankruptcy “reform” legislation that
“radically altered the policies underlying consumer
bankruptcy . . . in favor of creditors” by making it much more

354. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 975–76, 1012–13 (describing the significance of the 1994
interstate banking legislation); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 89 (same).
355. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 89, 91–92, 133–34 (discussing GLBA’s importance);
Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 972–75 (same); see also Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 306–07 (noting that
the financial industry spent more than $300 million on lobbying expenses and political contributions to
secure GLBA’s enactment).
356. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 968–97, 1008–20, 1027–46 (quotes at 1043).
357. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 7–11, 78–82, 121–26, 134–37; Wilmarth, supra note
15, at 980–81, 991–94.
358. BAIR, supra note 290, at 333; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 7–9, 92, 134–37,
169–70, 202 (discussing the impact of CFMA and AIG’s role in the financial crisis).
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difficult for consumers to use bankruptcy proceedings to obtain a
substantial or complete discharge of their debts.359 A recent
study found that the 2005 statute triggered a significant rise in
the subprime mortgage foreclosure rate by reducing the ability of
subprime borrowers to discharge their unsecured debts
(including credit card debts) and thereby free up more income to
pay their mortgages.360 The study concluded that the bankruptcy
“reform” law was one of several factors contributing to “the
destabilizing surge in subprime foreclosures” after 2005.361
•

BAPCPA also significantly expanded “safe harbors” in the
Bankruptcy Code that provided highly favorable treatment for
holders of derivatives and financial repurchase agreements
(repos).362 As amended by BAPCPA, the safe harbors confer
two very important rights on holders of derivatives and repos: (i)
the right to engage in “close-out” and “cross-product” netting
(i.e., the ability to terminate derivatives and repos immediately
after a counterparty files for bankruptcy, and to set off any
obligations the holder owes the counterparty against any
amounts the counterparty owes the holder under all such
contracts), and (ii) the right to seize collateral posted by a
counterparty for derivatives or repos either before or after the
counterparty files for bankruptcy.363 The safe harbors, as
enlarged by BAPCA, effectively give holders of derivatives and

359. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the ‘Sweat Box’ of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV., 375, 376–77 (2007) (discussing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)); see generally Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of
BAPCPA. 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31 (2007) (surveying the changes made by BAPCPA to consumer
bankruptcy statutes).
360. Donald P. Morgan et al., Subprime Foreclosures and the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform, FRBNY
ECON.
POL’Y
REV.,
(Mar.
2012),
at
47,
47–51,
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/12v18n1/1203morg.html. This study determined that, for a
state with average home equity exemptions and median home prices, the subprime foreclosure rate rose
by 11% during the seven quarters following the bankruptcy statute’s enactment in 2005. Id. at 48, 54–
55.
361. Id. at 48, 55.
362. Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Market Contracts and BAPCPA, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697,
701–09 (2005) (explaining BAPCPA’s expansion of the Bankruptcy Code’s favorable treatment for
derivatives and repurchase agreements); Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 319, 322–26 (2010) (same); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatves Market’s Payment Priorities as
Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 546 (2011) (explaining that a “financial repurchase
agreement—called “repo” in the market—is a sale of a financial instrument . . . with the seller promising
to buy that asset back, often the next day. The agreed repurchase price is a little higher than the sale
price, with the difference being the de facto interest. The instrument sold is usually called the collateral,
as the transaction is functionally a loan.”).
363. Campbell, supra note 362, at 702, 705–06 (explaining “cross-product netting” under
BAPCPA); Rober R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral,
and Closeout (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi. Working Paper 2005-03, May 10, 2005), at 4–7 (explaining
“close-out netting” permitted for holders of derivatives and repos), available at
http:/ssrn.com/abstract=730648.
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repos a “superpriority” over other types of creditors who are
barred under the Bankruptcy Code from taking similar self-help
measures against bankrupt counterparties.364 BAPCPA also
expanded the classes of repos that receive safe-harbor treatment
to include repos collateralized by mortgage-related assets
(including mortgage loans and RMBS).365
•

BAPCA’s enlarged safe harbors served the interests of large
financial institutions that were leading participants in the
derivatives and repo markets.366 Those institutions pushed hard
to create and expand the safe harbors, which in turn facilitated
the rapid growth of the derivatives and repo markets during the
period leading up to the financial crisis.367 Some experts
maintain that BAPCPA’s expanded safe harbors (i) weakened
market discipline and encouraged excessive risk-taking in the
derivatives and repo markets during the pre-crisis period, (ii)
played a significant role in the failures of AIG, Bear and
Lehman, and (iii) imposed greater risks on the U.S. government
as the implicit guarantor for TBTF financial institutions that
were heavily involved in the derivatives and repo markets.368

In addition to the foregoing legislative victories, the financial services
industry defeated numerous attempts by members of Congress to pass
anti-predatory lending bills prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis in
2007.369 The industry successfully lobbied to block more than a dozen
bills introduced in Congress between 2000 and 2007 that would have
imposed tighter restrictions on high-risk mortgage lending.370

364. Roe, supra note 362, at 546–49 (explaining that the amended “safe-harbor” provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code give holders of derivatives and repos, “exemptions, insulations and special treatment”
that amount to “a superpriority over disfavored creditors”).
365. Campbell, supra note 362, at 702–03 (explaining that, prior to BAPCPA, repos qualified for
“safe harbor” treatment only if they were collateralized by government securities, bank certificates of
deposit or bankers’ acceptances).
366. Lubben, supra note 362, at 326 (explaining that “the safe harbors are most likely to benefit
large financial institutions, as these institutions are more likely to have either demanded pre-bankruptcy
collateral . . . or have a variety of derivative positions with a single debtor”); see also Campbell, supra
note 362, at 712 (“A cynic might argue that the financial safe harbors are indeed a ‘bankruptcy opt-out
clause’ for a certain class of capitalists because their money is more important than anyone else’s . . . .
BAPCPA suggests that financial markets contracts . . . fall within the privileged class.”).
367. Lubben, supra note 362, at 326–28; Roe, supra note 362, at 543–44, 576–78; Michael
Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 253, 279–83 (2009).
368. Lubben, supra note 362, at 319–21, 318–32; Roe, supra note 362, at 549–72; Simkovic,
supra note 367, at 282–89.
369. See BAIR, supra note 290, at 50 (explaining that the financial services industry “successfully
stopped antipredatory lending proposals on Capitol Hill,” including bills proposed by Rep. Barney
Frank (D-MA), Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-FL) and Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD)).
370. Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the
Financial Crisis 10, 17–18, 25–26, 54–59 (Appendix) (Dec. 2009) (IMF Working Paper WP/09/87)
(Int’l Monetary Fund), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531520.
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IV. WHY DOES WALL STREET EXERCISE SO MUCH INFLUENCE OVER
WASHINGTON?
A. The Financial Industry Wields Enormous Political Influence through
Campaign Contributions and Lobbying
1. The Financial Industry’s Formidable Political Clout
The finance, insurance and real estate sector (financial sector or
financial industry) has become a dominant political force in Washington
over the past two decades by devoting massive resources to political
campaigns and lobbying.371 Between 1990 and 2012, the financial
sector spent more than $3.3 billion on political campaigns and was “far
and away the largest source of campaign contributions to federal
candidates and parties . . . .”372 The financial industry also spent more
than $5.3 billion on lobbying between 1998 and 2012 and ranked third
among all industry sectors in lobbying outlays.373 Indeed, the financial
industry accounted for 15% of lobbying expenditures by all industry
sectors between 1999 and 2006.374 The financial sector employed 3,000
lobbyists in 2007, and many of those lobbyists were former senior
371. See, e.g., BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 7, 38, 210 (observing that “financial
institutions spend enormous amounts of time and money on lobbying politicians both to enact
sympathetic laws and to pressure regulatory agencies to interpret and implement those laws in
sympathetic ways”); JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET ALWAYS WINS 19–24,
106–10, 144–57, 233–50 (2012) (memoir by former senior Senate aide and lobbyist, explaining that
“Washington has The Blob [, a term that] refers to the government entities that regulate the finance
industry . . . and the army of Wall Street representatives and lobbyists that continuously surrounds and
permeates them”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 4–11, 89–104, 118–19, 134–37, 55–57, 191–92
(“The Wall Street banks are the new American oligarchy—a group that gains political power because of
its economic power, and then uses that political power for its own benefit,” id. at 6); ESSENTIAL
INFORMATION & CONSUMER EDUCATION FOUNDATION, SOLD OUT: HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON BETRAYED AMERICA 15 (2009) [hereinafter SOLD OUT] (“The financial sector showered
campaign contributions on politicians from both parties [and] invested heavily in a legion of lobbyists,”
spending $1.7 billion on political contributions and $3.4 billion on lobbying between 1998 and 2008).
372. Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, CENTER PUB. INTEGRITY
(as of Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2012&ind=F; Kiersh,
Aaron, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Background, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (updated July
2009), http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/background.php?cycle=2012&ind=F; Interest Groups,
CENTER PUB. INTEGRITY (as of Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/index.php
(showing that the financial sector made $658 million of campaign contributions during the 2012 election
cycle, an amount that was more than $100 million larger than the contributions of any other industry
sector).
PUB.
INTEGRITY,
373. Lobbying:
Ranked
Sectors,
CENTER
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=c (last visited on Jan. 15, 2013) (showing that the
top three industry sectors for lobbying expenditures between 1998 and 2012 were “Miscellaneous
Business,” with $5.42 billion, “Health,” with $5.35 billion, and “Finance/Insurance/Real Estate,” with
$5.34 billion).
374. Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 370, at 18, 32 (tbl.1a).
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administration officials, members of Congress and congressional
staffers.375
The financial industry achieved true political dominance when major
banks, securities firms and insurance companies put aside many years of
conflict and joined forces to support GLBA’s passage in 1999.
Previously, divergent interests among the three groups had stymied
repeated efforts to remove statutory walls that separated banks from
securities firms and insurers.376 As previously noted, GLBA endorsed a
“universal banking” model that encouraged banks, securities firms and
insurers to affiliate by forming financial holding companies.377 After
GLBA’s enactment, the common interests of the largest financial
institutions coalesced to produce a “new financial oligarchy” that “used
its political power to protect its [business interests] from interference
and to clear away any remaining obstacles to its growth.”378
The financial sector received excellent returns from the huge political
investments it made during the period leading up to the financial crisis.
As described above in Part III(F), the financial industry achieved a
series of landmark legislative victories and also defeated numerous bills
that tried to impose tighter constraints on subprime and Alt-A mortgage
lending. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff study
concluded that lobbying by the financial industry between 1999 and
2006 significantly increased the likelihood of passage for bills favored
by the industry, and also enhanced the probability of defeat for bills
opposed by the industry.379
Unfortunately, the business judgment of leading financial firms did
not match their political acumen during the credit boom that led to the
financial crisis. According to a second IMF staff study, financial
institutions that were the most active lobbyists also pursued more risky
business strategies (including higher-risk mortgage lending and
securitization) and suffered above-average losses in their stock market
values during the financial crisis.380 By early 2010, eighteen global
375. SOLD OUT, supra note 371, at 100–01 (reporting that the financial sector employed 2,996
lobbyists in 2007, and lobbyists employed by 20 leading financial firms between 1998 and 2008
included 142 individuals who were formerly senior executive branch officials, members of Congress
and congressional staffers).
376. Sandra Suarez & Robin Kolodny, Paving the Road to ‘Too Big to Fail’: Business Interests
and the Politics of Financial Deregulation in the U.S., pt. II (June 15, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1625289; Charles C.Y. Yang & Yi David Wang, Explaining the Glass–Steagall
Act’s Long Life and Rapid Eventual Demise 24–36 (Dec. 8, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722373.
377. See supra note 355–56 and accompanying text.
378. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 89, 133–34.
379. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Three’s Company: Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street 4,
15–18 (IMF Working Paper, June 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915164.
380. Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 370, at 4–6, 19–20, 22, 24–27; see also Wilmarth, supra
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financial conglomerates had collectively suffered about $900 billion of
losses from defaulted loans and depreciated securities.381
Large financial institutions responded to the crisis by appealing for
and obtaining government bailouts.382 Political influence played a key
role in determining which firms received bailouts and how much help
they secured. Ryan Duchin and Denis Sosyura found that U.S. banks
were significantly more likely to receive TARP capital assistance if they
established political connections with government officials, including
connections based on political contributions and lobbying.383 In
addition, the preferential treatment given to politically connected banks
could not be explained by merit-based factors.
The financial
performance of politically connected banks and unconnected banks was
about the same before the TARP program was announced in October
2008. Moreover, politically connected banks performed significantly
worse than unconnected banks after receiving TARP assistance.384
The weaker post-TARP performance of politically influential banks
indicated that “political connections . . . benefit[ed] connected firms and
politicians at public expense.”385 Similarly, a study by Benjamin Blau
and others found that politically influential banks received significantly
larger amounts of TARP assistance, compared with banks that were not
actively involved in politics. Blau and his co-authors determined that
financial institutions which lobbied actively and hired lobbyists who
were former federal government employees “received between $3.73
billion and $6.18 billion more in TARP support than firms that did not
have both types of political ties.”386 For every dollar that financial
note 12, at 963–75 (explaining that large financial institutions played key roles in inflating the
unsustainable credit boom that precipitated the global financial crisis).
381. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 958–59, 977–78.
382. See id. at 957–59, 977–81 (discussing government bailout programs in the U.S., United
Kingdom and Europe).
383. Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, The Politics of Government Investment 3–4, 16–20 (Ross
School of Business, Working Paper No. 1127, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1426219.
The study treated a bank as “politically connected” if, during 2008 and 2009, the bank had any of the
following types of political ties: (i) one or more of the bank’s directors held a current or former position
with the Treasury, a banking agency or Congress, (ii) the bank maintained its headquarters in the
congressional district of a member of the House Financial Services Committee, (iii) the bank made
political contributions to one or more members of the House Financial Services Committee, or (iv) the
bank lobbied the Treasury, banking regulators or Congress on financial issues. Id. at 3, 11–14. The
study determined that each of those sources of political influence played a statistically significant role in
increasing the bank’s likelihood of receiving TARP Capital assistance. Id. at 4, 17–20.
384. Id. at 5, 25–28 (finding, based on accounting-based and stock-based measures, that
politically connected banks performed significantly worse than unconnected banks after receiving
TARP capital infusions).
385. Id. at 28.
386. Benjamin M. Blau, Tyler J. Brough, & Diana W. Thomas, Corporate Lobbying, Political
Connections, and the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program 4 (Sept. 30, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878653.
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companies spent on lobbying during the five years prior to TARP, the
same firms received about $500 of TARP support.387
Due to widespread public anger over Wall Street’s role in causing the
financial crisis and the federal government’s bailouts of large financial
firms, the financial industry could not prevent passage of the Dodd–
Frank Act.388 However, the financial sector used its political clout to
weaken Dodd–Frank’s reforms. In 2009 and 2010, the financial
industry retained more than 1,400 lobbyists who were former federal
employees, including 73 former members of Congress and two former
Comptrollers of the Currency.389 During the same period, the six largest
U.S. banks employed more than 240 lobbyists who were former
members of Congress, congressional staffers or senior executive branch
officials.390
During consideration of the Dodd–Frank Act by the Senate and
subsequently by the House-Senate conference committee, the financial
industry achieved several notable victories that significantly reduced
Dodd–Frank’s potential impact on the largest financial institutions. For
example, the industry and its congressional allies (i) defeated an
amendment offered by Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Ted
Kaufman (D-DE), which would have placed maximum size limits on
financial institutions and thereby forced a breakup of the six largest U.S.
banks;391 (ii) blocked proposals that would have required large financial
institutions to prefund the Orderly Liquidation Fund so that future
resolutions of failing financial giants would be paid for in the first
instance by Wall Street rather than by taxpayers;392 and (iii) inserted
numerous loopholes in the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment
that substantially undermined the effectiveness of both provisions.393
According to a recent study by Yu Gao and others, investors in the

387. Id. at 4, 22.
388. See Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 962, 1026–27.
389. Banking on Connections: Financial Services Sector Has Dispatched Nearly 1,500
“Revolving Door” Lobbyists Since 2009 3 (Center for Responsive Politics & Public Citizen, June 3,
2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FinancialRevolvingDoors.pdf (reporting that
financial industry lobbyists included former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL), former Senate
Majority Leaders Bob Dole (R-KN) and Trent Lott (R-MS), and former House Majority Leaders Dick
Armey (R-TX) and Dick Gephardt (D-MO)).
390. Kevin Connor, Big Bank Takeover: How Too-Big-To-Fail’s Army of Lobbyists Has Captured
FOR
AMERICA’S
FUTURE
(May
11,
2010),
Washington,
INSTITUTE
http://www.ourfuture.org/report/2010051911/big-bank-takeover.
391. CONNAUGHTON, supra note 371, at 227–31, 238–44; Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1055.
392. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1015–19; Taibbi, supra note 7.
393. Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 1028–35; Christine Harper, Out of Lehman’s Ashes Wall Street
Get Most of What It Wants, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201012-28/out-of-lehman-s-ashes-wall-street-gets-what-it-wants-as-government-obliges.html; Taibbi, supra
note 7.
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stock and bond markets assessed the financial industry’s legislative
victories as having significantly diminished the possibility that the top
six banks might lose their TBTF status —including their presumed
access to future government bailouts—after Dodd–Frank’s passage.394
Moreover, after the credit rating agencies evaluated Dodd–Frank’s
impact on the probability that banks would continue to receive
“systemic support” from the federal government, the ratings agencies
were more likely to maintain their bond ratings for the six largest banks
and to reduce their ratings for smaller banks. Thus, post-Dodd–Frank
bond ratings indicated that “[credit] rating agencies still assume some
level of systemic support from the US government for the [top six
banks]” despite Dodd–Frank’s enactment.395 Similarly, a July 2011
report by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) concluded that “under certain
circumstances and with selected systemically important financial
institutions, future extraordinary government support is still possible.”396
In addition to its success in diluting the strength of Dodd–Frank’s
reforms, the financial industry (as shown above) has used its formidable
lobbying and litigating resources to undermine the implementation of
those reforms.397 Since Dodd–Frank’s passage, the vast majority of
meetings held by Treasury officials and other federal financial
regulators to discuss Dodd–Frank’s implementation have been meetings
with the financial industry’s agents.
For example, industry
representatives held 351 meetings to lobby regulators on implementation
of the Volcker Rule between Dodd–Frank’s enactment in July 2010 and
the federal agencies’ issuance of proposed regulations in October 2011,
compared with only 31 similar meetings attended by advocates of
financial reform.398 Similarly, during the two years after Dodd–Frank’s
enactment, the twenty largest U.S. banks and their trade associations
held 1,298 meetings with regulators to discuss all aspects of Dodd–
Frank’s implementation, compared with only 242 similar meetings
attended by “groups favoring tighter regulations of the financial
markets.”399 Seven megabanks—Goldman, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley,
BofA, Citigroup, Barclays and Wells Fargo—accounted for more than

394. Yu Gao, Scott Liao, & Xue Wang, The Economic Impact of the Dodd–Frank Act on
Systemically Important Financial Firms: Evidence from Market Reactions 3–6, 22–27, 31 (May 21,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919630.
395. Id. at 6, 29–30.
396. Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 12 (quoting S&P report).
397. See supra Parts (II)(A)–(B).
398. Krawiec, supra note 12, at 29–32, 50 (tbl.8).
399. Lee Drutman, Big Banks Dominate Dodd–Frank Meetings with Regulators,
SUNLIGHTFOUNDATION.COM (July 19, 2012), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/07/19/doddfrank-two-years-later/ (describing results of study by Sunlight Foundation).
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900 of those meetings with regulators.400
The enactment of Dodd–Frank showed, and the 2012 elections
confirmed, that Wall Street is not omnipotent. President Obama won
reelection in 2012 despite the financial industry’s overwhelming support
for his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney.401 The financial sector
also invested heavily in two key Senatorial elections but failed to defeat
Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), who actively
campaigned as opponents of Wall Street.402
Even so, the 2012 elections hardly dethroned the financial industry as
a political heavyweight. President Obama promptly reached out to Wall
Street executives and other business leaders after the election, and he
eagerly invited their support for his economic policy (including his
budget and tax proposals).403 Undeterred by the election results,
financial industry representatives declared that they would continue to
push for legislation to weaken Dodd–Frank’s reforms, and would also
lobby regulators and file lawsuits to undermine Dodd–Frank’s
implementation.404 By June 2013, House Republicans (with support
from some Democrats) had advanced several bills that would punch
significant holes in Dodd–Frank’s regulatory regime for derivatives,
freeze the CFTC’s budget and require the SEC to perform a more

400. Id.
401. Susanne Craig & Nicholas Confessore, On Wall Street, Time to Mend Fences With Obama,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at B1; Sarah N. Lynch, Emily Stephenson, & Rick Rothacker, Wall Street
Left to Rebuild Obama Ties After Backing Romney, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-campaign-financialregulationidUSBRE8A60R620121107; David Weidner, Wall Street Took a Beating at the Polls, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324073504578105433706996720.ht
ml; see also supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text (explaining that the financial sector gave twothirds of its political contributions to Mr. Romney and other Republican candidates in 2012).
402. Robert Scheer, Op-Ed., Will Obama Stand up to Banking Industry and Wall Street in Second
Term?, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (CA) (Nov. 11, 2012) (available on Lexis); Katharine Q. Seelye, A
New Senator, Known Nationally and Sometimes Feared, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at A33; Deidre
Shesgreen, GOP Spent $40 Million in Unsuccessful Attempt to Unseat Brown in Ohio, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE (Nov. 8, 2012) (available on Lexis).
403. Dawn Kopecki & Margaret Talev, Obama Meets With Blankfein, Dimon and Moynihan
Today, BLOOMBERG (April 11, 2013) (reporting that President Obama would meet “with 15 heads of the
world’s largest banks,” including the CEOs of Goldman, JPMorgan, BofA, Citigroup and Wells Fargo,
and that Obama was “seeking to rebuild relationships with big business leaders as he struggles to create
more jobs”), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-11/obama-meets-with-blankfein-dimon-andmoynihan-today.html; Zeke Miller, Obama Makes Peace With Business, BUZZFEED.COM (Dec. 8,
2012), www.buzzfeed.com/zekejmiller/obama-makes-peace-with-business; Nelson D. Schwartz &
Jonathan Weisman, Unlikely Backers in a Battle Over Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at B1; Andrew
Tangel & Jim Puzzanghera, Wall St., Obama Healing Rift, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, at B1.
404. Cheyenne Hopkins, Technical Fixes Prompt Suspicion From Dodd–Frank Backers,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-10/technical-fixesprompt-suspicion-from-dodd-frank-backers.html; Victoria McGrane & Jean Eaglesham, Battle Plan
Shifts on Dodd–Frank, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2012, at C1.
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stringent cost-benefit analysis before issuing new rules.405
The significant benefits that the financial industry has achieved
through campaign contributions and lobbying are consistent with more
broadly-based evidence indicating that business firms exploit political
influence to secure important advantages. For example, studies have
shown that (i) from 1979 to 2004, publicly-traded U.S. firms that made
political contributions to larger numbers of political candidates also
produced significant “abnormal returns” for their shareholders;406 (ii)
from 1999 to 2006, publicly-traded U.S. nonfinancial firms that spent
larger amounts on lobbying also boosted their stock values
significantly;407 and (iii) from 1997 through 2002, publicly-traded
financial and nonfinancial companies in 35 countries significantly
increased their chances of securing government bailouts (including
bailouts supported by the IMF and World Bank) if the companies
maintained significant connections with leading politicians.408
405. Richard Hill & Stephen Joyce, Derivatives: House Easily Passes Bill Requiring SEC, CFTC
to Issue Joint Dodd–Frank Rule, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 1080 (June 18, 2013) (reporting that the
House passed H.R. 1256 by a vote of “301-124, with 73 Democrats voting in favor,” and explaining that
the bill “would require the CFTC and the SEC to issue joint rules that would exempt from Dodd–Frank
[any trading in swaps by] any ‘non-U.S. person’ who is in compliance with swaps requirements of any
Group of 20 member nation [that] are ‘broadly equivalent’ to U.S. requirements”); Marcy Gordon,
House passes bill that would exempt foreign trades, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 12, 2013)
(explaining that, under H.R. 1256, “trading in the nine biggest foreign markets for derivatives would be
exempt from U.S. regulation,” thereby negating the CFTC’s proposal for regulating cross-border swaps
trading), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-06-12/house-passes-bill-that-would-exempt-foreigntrades; Richard Hill, Derivatives: Appropriations Subcommittee Advances Bill That Would Freeze
CFTC Spending at $195M, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1098 (JUNE 10, 2013); Sarah N. Lynch,
House votes for more scrutiny of economic impact of SEC rules, REUTERS (May 17, 2013) (reporting
that House Republicans passed a bill (with the support of 17 Democrats) that would require the SEC, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to
perform more demanding cost-benefit studies before issuing any new regulations),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/17/us-congress-sec-costbill-idUSBRE94G0OD20130517;
Cheynne Hopkins & Silla Brush, Dodd–Frank Swaps Pushout Would Be Eased by Bipartisan Bills,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2013) (reporting that House and Senate members introduced bipartisan bills to
weaken Dodd–Frank’s Lincoln Amendment (Section 716) by allowing banking organizations to
continue to trade “[c]ommodity, equity and structured swaps tied to some asset-backed securities”
within their banks instead of forcing them to conduct such trades within separately capitalized affiliates
that would not have access to the federal safety net); see supra notes 72, 80-86 and accompanying text
(discussing the CFTC’s proposed guidance for cross-border swaps trading and the Lincoln Amendment,
which would be vitiated by the foregoing bills).
406. Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen, & Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, Corporate Political
Contributions and Stock Returns, 65 J. FIN. 687, 688–90, 718–19 (2010) (noting that firms which make
larger political contributions also tend to engage heavily in lobbying).
407. Matthew D. Hill et al., Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying 3–4, 13, 22–28 (Jan.
23, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420224.
408. Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis, & John J. McConnell, Political Connections and
Corporate Bailouts, 61 J. FIN. 2597, 2598–2602, 2627–29 (2006) (reporting on results of a study of 121
financial firms and 329 nonfinancial companies in 35 countries, and defining a company as “politically
connected” if at least one of its top corporate officers or large shareholders was either (i) a head of state,
government minister or member of the national parliament or (ii) a relative with the same last name as
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2. Does Wall Street’s Political Clout Help to Explain Why Federal
Officials Have Not Taken Strong Enforcement Actions Against Major
Financial Institutions and Their Top Executives?
An even darker side of corporate lobbying emerges when one
considers evidence that fraudulent and insolvent firms have frequently
used political influence to mask their unsound condition and to impede
enforcement measures. For example, between 1998 and 2005—a period
that witnessed massive accounting frauds at Enron, WorldCom,
Adelphia, Global Crossing and Tyco—publicly-traded U.S. companies
that engaged in fraud spent significantly more on lobbying, compared to
non-fraudulent firms.409 Moreover, in contrast to corrupt firms that did
not lobby, fraudulent companies that actively lobbied succeeded in
escaping detection for substantially longer periods of time, thereby
enabling their insiders to sell large amounts of their stock.410 Fraudulent
companies also used lobbying to reduce significantly the likelihood that
regulators would discover their frauds. Notably, however, lobbying did
not reduce the effectiveness of scrutiny by other types of corporate
monitors, such as analysts, company stakeholders or the media.411
Similarly, during the 1980s Charles Keating (owner of the notorious
Lincoln Savings) and owners of other fraudulent, insolvent thrifts made
large political contributions that induced Speaker of the House Jim
Wright (D-TX) and other members of Congress—including five
Senators known as the “Keating Five”—to obstruct regulatory and
enforcement efforts by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.412 Studies
also found that, during the same period, federal regulators acted much
more slowly in closing insolvent banks and thrifts if they were located in
congressional districts whose representatives served on congressional
committees with direct oversight over financial regulatory policies.413
such a politician).
409. Frank Yu & Xiaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection 3, 10–13, 30 (June 9,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=954368 (finding that “fraudulent firms spend 77% more on
lobbying expenses than non-fraudulent firms”); see also ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH:
THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS UNDOING 127–94, 200–01, 208–11 (2004) (describing scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia and Tyco); FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT
AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 297–373, 391–94 (2003) (same); Wilmarth, supra
note 268, at 6–10, 25–30 (discussing collapses of Enron and WorldCom).
410. Yu & Yu, supra note 409, at 2–3, 14–18, 16–28.
411. Id. at 2, 15–21, 50 (tbl.5, panel A).
412. WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 62–166, 184–92, 199–237 (2005); MARTIN
MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY
188–242 (1990).
413. Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 307, n.379 (citing Randall W. Bennett & Christine Loucks,
Politics and the Length of Time to Bank Failure: 1986–90, Contemp. Econ. Pol’y, Oct. 1996, at 29, 37–
38; Lin Guo, When and Why Did FSLIC Resolve Insolvent Thrifts?, 23 J Banking & Fin., 972–73, 980–
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As noted above, an IMF staff study determined that financial
institutions which were most active in lobbying prior to the recent
financial crisis also pursued more risky mortgage lending and
securitization strategies and suffered greater losses during the crisis.414
That study raises significant questions about the impact of recent
financial industry lobbying on financial regulatory and enforcement
policies. Indeed, many commentators have asked why federal officials
have failed to take vigorous enforcement actions against large financial
institutions that were at the center of the financial crisis and their top
executives.415
As the following discussion shows, the federal government’s
enforcement efforts related to the financial crisis were pathetically weak
when compared to the enormous damage inflicted by major financial
institutions and their senior officers. To date federal officials have not
secured any criminal convictions against major financial institutions or
their top executives. In addition, federal agencies have entered into only
83, 986–87).
414. Igan & Mishra, supra note 370, at 4, 15–18.
415. See, e.g., Gleen Greenwald, The Untouchables: How the Obama administration protected
Wall Street from prosecutions, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Jan. 23, 2013) (describing a PBS “Frontline” program
broadcast on January 22, 2013, which revealed “one of the greatest and most shameful failings of the
Obama administration, the lack of even a single arrest or prosecution of any senior Wall Street banker
for the systematic fraud that precipitated the 2008 financial crisis;” and quoting Harvard law professor
Larry Lessig’s remark that “we live in a world where the architects of the financial crisis regularly dine
at the White House”) (available on Lexis); John C. Coffee Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone
Wrong?, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 3, 2012) (“[T]he only senior executive at a truly major bank named as a
defendant by the SEC in a case growing out of the 2008 crisis appears to be Angelo Mozilo, the former
chief executive officer of Countrywide Financial Corp., who settled” civil charges without admitting or
denying liability); Danielle Douglas, RBS will pay $612 million to settle Libor case, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 2013, at A11 (reporting that “no senior bank executives have faced jail time”); Jonathan Weil, Eric
(Nov.
15,
2012),
Holder
Owes
America
Some
Answers,
BLOOMBERG.COM
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-15/banker-math-meets-the-justice-department-s-cooks.html
(“[T]here have been no criminal convictions of any top executives at the center of the 2008 financial
crisis.”); William D. Cohan, How to Crash an Economy and Escape the Scene, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct.
21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-22/how-to-crash-an-economy-and-escape-thescene.html (“No one—no one—on Wall Street has paid a serious price . . . Every bank has received its
slap on the wrist, [amounting to] the cost of doing business, don’t you know—and has moved on.”); Ben
Hallman, Federal Investigators Punt on Goldman Sachs Prosecutions, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Aug.
10,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/investigation-goldmansachs_n_1765368.html?view=print&comm_ref=false (quoting former TARP Special Inspector General
Neal Barofsky, who described the Justice Department’s decision not to prosecute Goldman as “a stark
reminder that no individual or institution has been held meaningfully accountable for their role in the
financial crisis.”); Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis With Little Guilt, N.Y.
TIMES, April 14, 2011, at A1 (“[S]everal years after the financial crisis, which was caused in large part
by reckless lending and excessive risk-taking by major financial institutions, no senior executives have
been charged or imprisoned.”); Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 3,
2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 (“Not a single
executive who ran the companies that cooked up and cashed in on the phony financial boom—an
industrywide scam that involved the mass sale of mismarked, fraudulent mortgage-backed securities—
has ever been convicted.”).
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a small number of relatively weak civil settlements with large banks and
a handful of their senior officers.
a. The Lack of Criminal Enforcement Against Leading Financial
Institutions and Their Senior Executives
As of mid-2013—nearly six years after the financial crisis began—
not one major financial institution or any senior executive has been
convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, a single criminal offense.416 In sharp
contrast, federal officials brought more than 1,100 criminal prosecutions
against financial executives arising out of bank and thrift failures during
the 1980s and early 1990s, and more than 800 of those executives
(including Charles Keating of Lincoln Savings and David Paul of
CenTrust Bank) were convicted and jailed.417 Similarly, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) successfully prosecuted and jailed senior executives of
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Rite Aid and Tyco following corporate
accounting scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s.418
Criminal referrals by bank regulators to DOJ fell sharply soon after
wave of bank and thrift failures ended in the early 1990s. Bank
regulators made over 1,800 criminal referrals in 1995 but made only
about 70 referrals per year between 2006 and 2010.419 OTS failed to
make a single criminal referral between 2000 and 2010, despite the
collapse of several of the largest institutions it regulated, while OCC
made only three referrals during the same period.420
Beginning in 2004, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assistant
director Chris Swecker issued public warnings about the growing
“epidemic” of mortgage fraud that threatened to undermine the U.S.
financial system.421 Swecker repeatedly asked for additional funding to
combat mortgage fraud, but senior FBI officials denied Swecker’s
requests and instead focused FBI’s available resources on fighting
terrorism.422 As a result, FBI assigned only 240 agents to investigate
mortgage fraud in 2007, compared with the 1,000 agents that

416. See authorities cited supra in note 415.
417. Morgenson & Story, supra note 415; see also Morgenson & Story, supra note 415 at B10,
B11 (“Two Financial Crises and Responses Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the
Mortgage Mess.”).
418. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Behind the Gentler Approach to Banks by U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A1.
419. Morgenson & Story, supra note 415, at B10, B11 (“Two Financial Crises and Responses
Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the Mortgage Mess.”).
420. Id.; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 157–86 (describing regulatory laxity by
OCC and OTS during the credit boom that led to the financial crisis).
421. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 15, 161.
422. Id. at 162–63.
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investigated crimes related to bank and thrift failures during the late
1980s and early 1990s.423 Although the Fraud and Enforcement
Recovery Act of 2009 authorized $165 million of additional funding to
investigate frauds connected to the financial crisis, Congress
subsequently appropriated only $30 million for that purpose.424
In addition to the problems created by a lack of adequate resources
for investigating complex financial frauds, FBI and DOJ chose to
investigate and prosecute borrowers and mortgage brokers instead of
pursuing large financial institutions that funded and securitized
fraudulent mortgages.425 By late 2012, DOJ had prosecuted more than
2,000 real estate agents, mortgage brokers and borrowers for criminal
fraud but had not indicted a single top financial executive or any of the
big financial institutions that financed the housing bubble.426 Analysts
criticized federal prosecutors for focusing on “easy targets—low-level
fraudsters—while going easy on Wall Street executives whose banks
packaged billions of dollars worth of toxic mortgage securities.”427
DOJ convicted executives of a midsized mortgage bank (Taylor Bean
& Whitaker) for defrauding Colonial Bank, but that one successful
prosecution occurred only after SIGTARP officials repeatedly urged
federal prosecutors to take action.428 Federal prosecutors failed to
convict two hedge fund managers of Bear Stearns on criminal fraud
charges, and they showed little interest thereafter in bringing criminal
charges against Wall Street bankers.429 DOJ ultimately decided not to
bring criminal charges against any top officials connected with AIG,
Bear, Countrywide, Lehman or other major financial institutions that
played key roles in precipitating the financial crisis.430
423. CONNAUGHTON, supra note 371, at 29–30.
424. Id. at 26–36.
425. William K. Black, Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Miami,
Florida
(Sept.
21,
2010)
(hereinafter
Black
FCIC
Testimony),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729344; see also CONNAUGHTON, supra note 371, at 71 (explaining that the
author and Senator Ted Kaufman (D-DE) learned in December 2009 that the FBI’s mortgage fraud
investigation “was targeted exclusively on small-fry mortgage brokers and bankers; we heard nothing
about investigations of the higher-level securitizations by major Wall Street firms.”).
426. Kara Scannell, US housing: After the Gold Rush, FT.COM (Oct. 29, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/11aa9914-1d36-11e2-abeb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2KXbF56fK.;
Joe
Nocera, The Mortgage Fraud Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2012, at A21.
427. Scannell, supra note 426; see also Nocera, supra note 426 (noting that “not a single top
executive at any of the firms that nearly brought down the financial system has spent so much as a day
in jail” and criticizing the Justice Department for going “after the smallest of small fry—and then
trumpet[ing] those prosecutions as proof of how tough it is on mortgage fraud. It is a shameful way for
the government to act.”).
428. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 104–08, 210.
429. Id. at 210, 228–29; CONNAUGHTON, supra note 367, at 65–95; Hallman, supra note 415.
430. CONNAUGHTON, supra note 371, at 75–80; Hallman, supra note 415; Morgenson & Story,
supra note 415; Michael Rapoport, Global Finance: Law’s Big Weapon Sits Idle—Sarbanes-Oxley’s
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By mid-2013, only one FDIC-insured bank—Abacus Federal Savings
Bank, a small New York City thrift that primarily served Chinese
immigrants—had been indicted for mortgage fraud.431 As one journalist
observed, “If the point [of indicting Abacus] was to send a message to
Wall Street, it was a curious choice . . . . Compared to the whales of
global finance, [Abacus is] plankton, with roughly one-ten-thousandth
the assets of JPMorgan Chase.”432
DOJ’s decisions not to indict leading banks or their senior executives
apparently reflected the Obama Administration’s reluctance to take any
action that might threaten the stability of systemically important
financial institutions or the financial markets.433 DOJ explicitly invoked
those concerns in December 2012, when it declined to file criminal
charges against two major foreign banks with substantial U.S.
operations. In early December, DOJ entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement that required U.K. megabank HSBC to pay $1.9 billion in
penalties for massive money laundering violations.434 HSBC’s illegal
money laundering activities continued for a decade and encompassed
billions of dollars of prohibited transactions involving nations linked
with terrorists (including Iran, Burma, Cuba, North Korea and Sudan)
and Latin American drug cartels.435
Jail-Time Threat Hasn’t Been Applied in Crisis-Related Cases, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2012, at C3;
Taibbi, supra note 415.
431. Drake Bennett, Small Enough to Fail, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 4-10, 2013, at 66,
67-68 (reporting on the indictment of Abacus Federal Savings Bank by the Manhattan District
Attorney’s office).
432. Id. at 68.
433. That is the conclusion reached by Jeff Connaughton, senior counsel to Senator Ted Kaufman
(D-DE), who made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to persuade the Justice Department to file criminal
charges against Wall Street bankers during 2009 and 2010. CONNAUGHTON, supra note 371, at 66–68,
84–85, 269–70. Neil Barofsky, the former Special Inspector General for TARP, has expressed a similar
view. Neil Barofsky, Geithner doctrine lives on in Libor affair, FT.COM (Feb. 7, 2013) (“The ‘Geithner
doctrine’ made the preservation of the largest banks, no matter the consequences, a top priority of the
US government. Aside from moral hazard, it has also meant the perversion of the U.S. criminal justice
system.”).
434. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of
Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (Dec. 10, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbcsaid-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-money-laundering/; Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to
Pay $1.9 billion U.S. Fine in Money-Laundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211; see also U.S.
Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs,
and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History (Majority and Minority Staff Report, July 2012), at 13,
available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/hsbc-exposed-us-financial-system-tomoney-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks [hereinafter Senate HSBC Report] (stating that “HSBC
Group is one of the largest financial institutions in the world, with $2.5 trillion in assets,” and its
subsidiary, HSBC North America Holdings Inc. is “one of the ten largest bank holding companies in the
United States” with $345 billion of assets).
435. Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 434; Viswanatha & Wolf, supra note 434; Senate
HSBC Report, supra note 434, at 2–12 (summarizing HSBC’s illegal money laundering activities

2013]

TURNING A BLIND EYE

1375

In announcing HSBC’s deferred prosecution agreement, Assistant
Attorney General Lanny Breuer (head of DOJ’s criminal division)
declared that the “record of dysfunction that prevailed at HSBC for
many years was simply astonishing,” and he confirmed that HSBC had
been a “vital player” in facilitating large-scale money laundering
involving drug cartels and terrorists.436 However, Mr. Breuer stated that
DOJ decided not to indict HSBC because of concerns about “collateral”
damage to the global financial system, and he emphasized that “[o]ur
goal here is not to bring HSBC down.”437 Commentators warned that
the HSBC settlement raised “questions about whether certain financial
institutions, having grown so large and interconnected, are too big to
indict.”438
In the fall of 2012—just a few months before the HSBC settlement—
DOJ obtained guilty pleas on criminal money laundering charges against
G&A Check Cashing, a small Los Angeles store, and two of its senior
officers. DOJ charged G&A and its officers with illegally laundering $8
million—a tiny fraction of the billions of dollars allegedly laundered by
HSBC. Both G&A officers were sentenced to prison following their
guilty pleas.439 The dramatically different treatment of HSBC and G&A
and their respective senior officers can hardly be squared with any
meaningful concept of “equal justice under the law.”440
A week after DOJ settled with HSBC, Swiss megabank UBS agreed
to pay $1.5 billion in penalties to U.S., U.K. and Swiss regulators to
settle charges that dozens of its managers and traders manipulated the
setting of Libor rates to generate fraudulent trading profits.441 The
stretching from 2001 through 2010).
436. Tom Braithwaite, DoJ Holds ‘Sword of Damocles’ over HSBC, FT.COM (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dc80fcf2-43cc-11e2-844c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2LmsP6yri (quoting Mr.
Breuer).
437. Id. (quoting Mr. Breuer).
438. Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 434; see also Barofsky, supra note 433 (contending
that the HSBC settlement showed that large global banks “are still too big to fail—and they are still to
big to jail”).
439. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, Los Angeles Check Cashing Store, Its Head Manager
and Compliance Office Sentenced for Violations of Anti-money Laundering Laws (Jan. 14. 2013)
(stating that G&A Check Cashing paid a $1 million fine, while its head manager and compliance officer
were sentenced to prison for five years and eight months, respectively), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-crm-059.html.
440. See Victoria Finkle, Are Some Banks ‘Too Big to Jail’?, AM. BANKER (Jan. 22, 2013), 2013
WLNR 1675707 (quoting my statement that “[c]oncerns about the ‘stability’ of the financial system do
not justify DOJ’s policy of leniency for TBTF banks and their executives, especially when DOJ
routinely indicts smaller institutions and sends their managers to jail for similar offenses.”); Jonathan
Weil, Why Didn’t Anyone Get Pinched at HSBC?, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-12-11/why-didn-t-anyone-get-pinched-at-hsbc-.html (“Too
big to fail has turned equal justice under the law into a mockery.”).
441. Lindsay Fortado, Gavin Finch, & Liam Vaughan, UBS Is Fined $1.5 Billion for
(Dec.
19,
2012),
Manipulating
Libor
Rates,
BLOOMBERG.COM
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charges against UBS “detailed a pattern of repeated, far-reaching and
brazen lawbreaking over a six-year period,” amounting to “a ‘simply
astonishing’ conspiracy to manipulate rates affecting trillions of dollars
of home loans, derivatives and other financial contracts around the
world.”442 UBS’s Libor settlement, like Barclays’s previous settlement
and RBS’s subsequent settlement, indicated widespread collusion
involving a dozen or more other global banks, including Deutsche,
HSBC, BofA, Citigroup and JPMorgan.443 The systematic rigging of
Libor likely imposed many billions of dollars of losses on parties
holding contracts with interest rates linked to Libor.444
UBS was in a particularly vulnerable position, because it had entered
into two previous agreements with DOJ to settle criminal charges that
the bank (i) enabled thousands of U.S. clients in to evade taxes and (ii)
conspired to rig auctions for municipal investment contracts.445
http://www,about.bloomberhlaw.com/legal-news/ubs-is-fined-1-5-billion-for-manipulating-libor-rates/.;
see also UBS’s ‘Captain Caos’ Breaks New Ground in Libor Scandal, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 19,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-19/ubs-s-captain-caos-breaks-new-ground-in-liborscandal.html (“What sets UBS apart [from other banks involved in the Libor scandal] is not only the
sheer extent of the behavior, but also the level of collusion with traders at other banks and the outright
bribery of brokers who helped coordinate the manipulation.”); Alison Frankel, After Libor, Arguments
Against Financial Regulation Are a Joke, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2012) (describing “the brazenness of the
misconduct” at UBS, and noting that “[t]he corruption was breathtakingly widespread” as UBS bribed
brokers at other institutions to cooperate in rigging Libor rates).
442. Jean Eaglesham & Evan Perez, Critics Say UBS Let Off Too Easy, WALL ST. J. ONLINE
(Dec. 21, 2012), http://www/online.wsj.com/article/SB100014242127887324731304578191801981
480008.html.
443. Ben Protess, Leniency Denied, UBS Unit Admits Guilt in Rate Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2012, at A1; Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch, Secret Libor Transcripts Expose Trader RateManipulation, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-13/riggedlibor-with-police-nearby-shows-flaw-of-light-touch.html; Carrick Mollenkamp, Jennifer Ablan &
Matthew Goldstein, Special Report: How Gaming Libor Became Business as Usual, REUTERS (Nov. 20,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-libor-fixing-origins-idUSBRE8AJ0MH20121120;
see also Gallu et al., supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing Barclays’ s settlement of Libor
manipulation charges in June 2012). In February 2013, RBS entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement with DOJ and paid $612 million to settle Libor-rigging charges by U.S. and U.K. authorities,
while RBS’s Japanese subsidiary pleaded guilty to one count of felony wire fraud. Mark Scott & Ben
Protess, R.B.S. to pay $612 million in rate-fixing settlement; Japanese subsidiary pleads guilty to charge
of felony wire fraud, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (Feb. 7, 2013), at 16 (reporting that the Libor investigation
“centered on R.B.S. and a dozen other banks, including Citigroup and HSBC,” and noting that
“government complaints against R.B.S. portray a permissive culture that allowed rate rigging to persist
for about four years”) (available on Lexis).
444. Peter Eavis, Making It Easier to Estimate Libor Losses, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (Dec. 20, 2102),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/making-it-easier-to-estimate-libor-losses/ (citing government
report estimating that Libor manipulation may have cost Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac than $3 billion);
Darrell Preston, Rigged Libor Hits States-Localities With $6 Billion: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG.COM
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-09/rigged-libor-hits-states-localities-with-6billion-muni-credit.html. (citing estimate by analyst Peter Shapiro that Libor manipulation inflicted $6
billion of losses on issuers of state and local municipal bonds).
445. Eaglesham & Perez, supra note 442; see also James B. Stewart, For UBS, A Record of
Averting Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2012, at B1 (“UBS obtained a deferred prosecution
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However, federal officials allowed UBS to avoid a criminal indictment
once again by accepting yet another deferred prosecution arrangement
(although DOJ did force UBS’s Japanese subsidiary to plead guilty to
criminal wire fraud and also indicted two former UBS traders).446
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer explained that DOJ “weighed
the consequences to market confidence” in deciding not to prosecute
UBS, a globally significant bank.447 Mr. Breuer also stated—in terms
virtually identical to what he had said about HSBC—that “[o]ur goal
here is not to destroy a major financial institution.”448 Senator Charles
Grassley (R-IA) criticized the DOJ’s settlement, declaring that the
“reluctance of U.S. prosecutors to file criminal charges over big-time
bank fraud is frustrating and hard to understand.”449
DOJ’s decisions to forgo indictments against HSBC and UBS provide
compelling evidence that federal officials are unwilling to impose
criminal sanctions against global SIFIs. It is perhaps not a coincidence
agreement in 2009 for conspiring to defraud the United States of tax revenue by creating more than
17,000 secret Swiss accounts for United States taxpayers who failed to declare income and committed
tax fraud . . . UBS agreed to pay $780 million in fines and penalties and disclose the identities of many
of its United States clients.”); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, UBS AG Admits to Anticompetitive
Conduct by Former Employees in the Municipal Bond Investments Market and Agrees to Pay $160
Million
to
Federal
and
State
Agencies
(May
4,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-at-567.html (announcing that UBS entered into a nonprosecution agreement and agreed to pay $160 million to settle charges that former UBS employees
“entered into unlawful agreements to manipulate the bidding process and rig bids on municipal
investment contracts”).
446. Eaglesham & Perez, supra note 442; Fortado et al., supra note 441.
447. Jonathan Weil, Let Justice Be Done, Though a Huge Bank Falls, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-20/let-justice-be-done-though-a-huge-bank-falls.html
(paraphrasing Mr. Breuer’s remarks to reporters).
448. Id. (quoting Mr. Breuer). In sharp contrast to its decision not to file criminal charges against
UBS, DOJ imposed harsh criminal sanctions on a small Swiss private bank, Wegelin & Co., for
engaging in tax evasion activities similar to UBS’s misconduct. Two weeks after announcing its
settlement of Libor-rigging charges against UBS, DOJ forced Wegelin to plead guilty to criminal
conspiracy with U.S. clients to evade U.S. taxes. Wegelin’s tax evasion work for U.S. clients was
comparable to the misconduct that resulted in UBS’s deferred prosecution agreement with DOJ on
similar tax evasion charges in 2009. In addition to Wegelin’s guilty plea, Wegelin paid fines and
forfeitures totaling $74 million, equal to almost one-tenth of the $780 million penalty paid by UBS
under its 2009 settlement. Bob Van Voris & David Voreacos, Swiss Bank Wegelin & Co. Pleads Guilty
in U.S. Tax Probe, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/swissbank-wegelin-co-to-plead-guilty-in-u-s-tax-case.html. Yet Wegelin, with $25 billion of assets, id., was
only one-sixtieth the size of UBS, which had $1.5 billion of assets at the end of 2011. Andrew
Cunningham, Annual Survey: World’s Biggest Banks: The Big Get Bigger, GLOBAL FIN. MAG., Oct.
2012, at 44. Like the stunningly disparate penalties assessed against HSBC and G&A Check Cashing
for money laundering (see supra notes 434-40 and accompanying text), the strikingly different sanctions
imposed on UBS and Wegelin for tax evasion show that DOJ has followed a much more lenient
enforcement policy for TBTF banks.
449. Eaglesham & Perez, supra note 442 (quoting Sen. Grassley); see also Barofsky, supra note
433 (criticizing DOJ’s settlement with UBS, and noting that “a significant amount of the illegal [Liborrigging] activity took place at the parent company level” within UBS); Weil, supra note 447 (“The
reality is UBS’s punishment was anything but strict.”).
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that DOJ adopted new guidelines encouraging the use of deferred
prosecution agreements, as a preferable alternative for dealing with
serious misconduct at large corporations, during the summer of 2008,
just as “the financial storm brewed . . . and [Wall Street] institutions
feared for their survival.”450 A major Wall Street law firm advised its
clients that DOJ’s 2008 guidelines represented “an important step away
from the more aggressive prosecutorial practices seen in some cases
under their predecessors.”451 Similarly, a former federal prosecutor
recently remarked that large companies facing criminal charges “are
happy to enter into these deferred prosecution agreements because it’s
become so commonplace now . . . . The stock markets don’t even seem
to punish them.”452
In defending the lack of criminal prosecutions against major banks
and their top executives, federal prosecutors and SEC enforcement
director Robert Khuzami asserted that such cases are difficult to prove
and the SEC has only limited funding to pursue such cases. The validity
of those assertions is impossible to evaluate in the absence of even a
single prosecution of a major financial institution or its senior managers
for misconduct during the financial crisis.453 It is noteworthy, however,
that federal prosecutors and SEC officials have sued more than 400
people and have won 70 criminal convictions for insider trading in the
past few years, while devoting extensive resources to those cases.454 A
top SEC enforcement official recently described insider-trading
investigations as “incredibly labor-intensive” efforts that require
“doggedness, creative thinking, and meticulous analysis of the
facts”455—a description that would apply equally well to complex
financial fraud cases.
The prosecutorial fervor that the SEC and DOJ have shown in
pursuing insider-trading cases is nowhere to be found when it comes to
financial misconduct by Wall Street firms, which involved the sale of
450. Morgenson & Story, supra note 418.
451. Id. (quoting memo to clients issued by Sullivan & Cromwell in Sept. 2008).
452. Douglas, supra note 415 ((quoting Michael Clark).
453. John J. Curran & Jesse Hamilton, Schapiro’s SEC Seen Ineffectual As Republicans Race to
Scuttle Dodd–Frank, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2011); Finkle, supra note 440; Joshua Gallo & Robert
Schmidt, Schapiro SEC Reign Nears End With Rescue Mission Not Done, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2012);
Taibbi, supra note 415.
454. William D. Cohan, Is This Big Fish Worth Catching?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 310, 2012, at 6; David Voreacos, Wall Street’s Insider Trading Tricks Spread Across U.S., BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 21, 2012) (reporting that more than 400 people were sued by the SEC or prosecuted by DOJ for
insider trading between 2009 and 2012, and describing the extensive personnel and other assets devoted
by the SEC, DOJ and FBI to those cases).
455. Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Dangling Man: On the Trail of SAC Capital’s Steven Cohen,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 14-20, 2013, at 46, 51 (quoting Sanjay Wadhwa, senior associate
director for enforcement in the SEC’s New York regional office).
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hundreds of billions of dollars of toxic mortgage-backed securities and
CDOs with inadequate or misleading disclosures.456 After examining
DOJ’s lack of criminal prosecutions against large financial institutions
and their senior officers, journalist Matt Taibbi concluded that “the
shocking pattern of nonenforcement with regard to Wall Street is so
deeply engrained in Washington that it raises a profound and difficult
question about the very nature of our society: whether we have created a
class of people whose misdeeds are no longer perceived as
crimes, . . . [a] nonjailable class.”457 Similarly, Senator Sherrod Brown
(D-OH) declared in January 2013 that “Wall Street megabanks aren’t
just too big to fail, they’re increasingly too big to jail.”458 Two months
later, as discussed below, Attorney General Eric Holder essentially
conceded during a Senate committee hearing that DOJ viewed global
SIFIs as too big to prosecute.459
b. Ineffective Civil Enforcement Measures Against Large Banks and
Their Senior Officers
The federal government’s record of civil enforcement against major
456. Cohan, supra note 454; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 169-70. Moreover, the SEC has
shown much less appetite for pursuing insider trading cases in recent years when those cases involved
major Wall Street firms or their executives. For example, in 2005 the SEC fired Gary Aguirre, an
agency enforcement lawyer, after he complained that his superiors refused to allow him to depose John
Mack for possible involvement in alleged insider trading by Pequot Capital Management, a large hedge
fund. At that time, Mack was being considered for appointment as chairman of Morgan Stanley, and
Morgan Stanley’s outside counsel, Mary Jo White, contacted SEC enforcement director Linda Thomsen
to discuss the SEC’s investigation of Mack. Two Senate committees reviewed that incident and strongly
criticized the SEC, stating that “[b]y allowing the perception that ‘going over the head’ of S.E.C. staff
attorneys yields results, the S.E.C. undermines public confidence in the integrity of its investigations and
exacerbates the problems associated with ‘regulatory capture.’” Gretchen Morgenson & Walt
Bogdanich, S.E.C. Erred On Pequot, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2007, at C1 (quoting joint report
issued by the Senate Finance and Judiciary Committees); Taibbi, supra note 415 (discussing the
circumstances surrounding Aguirre’s firing by the SEC). The SEC subsequently paid Aguirre $775,000
to settle his claim for wrongful termination. Phyllis Diamond, SEC, Whistleblower Aguirre Settle
Lawsuit Over His Termination for $775K, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1283 (July 5, 2010). In
addition, the SEC failed to take action after receiving information from Ted Parmigiani, a Lehman
analyst, indicating that Lehman’s research managers frequently gave advance tips to Lehman’s
proprietary trading desk and Lehman’s hedge fund customers about upcoming changes in stock ratings
by Lehman’s analysts. After reviewing Mr. Parmigiani’s evidence, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA)
declared that the SEC’s failure to take action against Lehman or its managers raised “serious questions
about the S.E.C.’s culture of deference to Wall Street and big players going back a long time.” Gretchen
Morgenson, Is Insider Trading Part of the Fabric?, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, § BU, at 1 (quoting Sen.
Grassley).
457. Taibbi, supra note 415.
458. Jeff Bater, Enforcement: Senators Question Justice Department’s Handling of Wrongdoing
by Big Banks, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 244 (Feb. 5, 2013); see also Barofsky, supra note 433
(contending that DOJ has adopted a “two-tiered system of justice” that treats major global banks as “still
too big to fail—and . . . still to big to jail”).
459. See infra notes 716-20 and accompanying text (reviewing Mr. Holder’s testimony).
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institutions and their top executives has been only marginally better than
the complete lack of criminal enforcement. The SEC has entered into
several settlements with major banks in which the banks paid relatively
modest penalties and neither admitted nor denied liability for the
violations alleged by the SEC. As indicated above, Goldman, JPMorgan
and Citigroup collectively agreed to pay about $1 billion to settle civil
fraud charges arising out of their marketing of three CDOs to
investors.460 However, the SEC did not attempt to hold Goldman and
Citigroup accountable for marketing additional CDOs under similar
circumstances nor did the SEC sue Deutsche, a major promoter of CDOs
during the credit boom.461
The SEC entered into two similar consent judgments based on alleged
securities disclosure violations by BofA and Citigroup. The SEC
alleged that BofA’s proxy statement soliciting shareholder approval for
BofA’s acquisition of Merrill in December 2008 did not disclose that (i)
BofA had agreed “to let Merrill pay its executives and certain other
employees $5.8 billion in bonuses at a time when Merrill was suffering
huge losses;” and (ii) “Merrill was suffering historically great losses
during the fourth quarter of 2008 (ultimately amounting to a net loss of
$15.3 billion, the largest quarterly loss in the firm’s history)
and . . . Merrill had nonetheless accelerated the payment to certain
executives and other employees of more than $3.6 billion in bonuses.”462
BofA agreed to pay $150 million to settle the SEC’s charges after
District Judge Jed Rakoff refused to approve the $33 million fine
originally proposed by the SEC.463 Judge Rakoff described the revised
$150 million fine as “paltry,” and he also observed that the fine
“penalizes the shareholders for what was, in effect if not in intent, a
460. See supra notes 279–80 and accompanying text.
461. Ben Hallman, Federal Investigators Punt on Goldman Sachs Prosecutions,
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/investigationgoldman-sachs_n_1765368.html; see also Yves Smith, Why Robert Khuzami Would Be a Terrible
Choice to Head the SEC (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/11/why-robertkhuzami-would-be-a-terrible-choice-to-head-the-sec/ (noting that SEC General Counsel Robert
Khuzami was General Counsel for the Americas for Deutsche from 2004 to 2009, when Deutsche was
actively engaged in packaging and marketing CDOs, and asserting that “Khuzami simply can’t afford to
dig too deeply in this toxic terrain; questions would be correctly raised as to why Deutsche was not
being scrutinized similarly.”); FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 129–33, 137–46, 192–99, 235–38, 256
(discussing major roles of Goldman and Citigroup in creating and marketing CDOs); U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and The Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a
Financial Collapse: Majority and Minority Staff Report 7–11, 318–625 (April 13, 2011), available at
http://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2011/PSI_WallStreetCrisis_041311.pdf
[hereinafter Senate Wall Street Crisis Report] (describing leading roles of Goldman and Deutsche in
creating and marketing CDOs).
462. SEC v. Bank of America Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010)
(summarizing the SEC’s charges against BofA).
463. Id. at 4.
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fraud by management on the shareholders.”464 Judge Rakoff further
criticized the consent judgment because it did not impose any sanctions
on “the specific individuals responsible for [BofA’s] nondisclosures,”
but he reluctantly approved the settlement while calling it “half-baked
justice at best.”465
Similarly, the SEC alleged that Citigroup misled investors on several
occasions between July and November 2007 by stating that its exposure
to subprime mortgage-related securities was $13 billion or less when in
fact its exposure exceeded $50 billion. Citigroup agreed to pay $75
million to settle the SEC’s charges.466 The SEC also charged former
Citigroup chief financial officer (CFO) Gary Crittenden and former
Citigroup head of investor relations Arthur Tildesley with participating
in Citigroup’s disclosure violations. Like Citigroup, Crittenden and
Tildesley entered into consent judgments (without admitting or denying
liability), and Crittenden paid $100,000 while Tildesley paid $80,000.467
As Judge Rakoff had done with regard to the BofA settlement,
journalist Andrew Ross Sorkin criticized the Citigroup consent
judgment for requiring Citigroup’s shareholders to bear the cost of a
corporate penalty even though they “were arguably defrauded by
[Citigroup’s] failure to disclose its exposure to subprime mortgages in
the first place.”468 Mr. Sorkin also pointed out that the $100,000 fine
paid by Mr. Crittenden paled in comparison with the $32 million of
compensation he received “during 2007 and 2008, even as [Citigroup]
was foundering.”469 Mr. Sorkin questioned the fairness of “a system that
is supposed to hold the financial industry accountable and instead seems

464. Id. at 4, 5. In contrast to the SEC’s decision not to sue any of BofA’s senior officers, Judge
Rakoff noted that New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed civil charges under New York law
against BofA’s former chief executive officer, Kenneth Lewis, and its former chief financial officer,
Joseph Price, “accusing them of masterminding a massive fraud and manipulation.” Id. at 2. In
September 2012, BofA paid $2.43 billion to settle a shareholder suit based on the same alleged proxy
disclosure violations, while New York’s charges against Lewis and Price remained outstanding. Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, Bank of America Settles Suit Over Merrill for $2.43 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, at A1.
465. Bank of America Corp., 2010 WL 624581 at 5; see also id. at 6 (stating that the Court would
have rejected the settlement as “inadequate and misguided” if it had reviewed the agreement “solely on
the merits,” but the Court felt obliged to accept the settlement based on considerations of “substantial
deference” and “judicial restraint”).
466. SEC
Litigation
Release
No.
21605,
July
29,
2010,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21605.htm.
467. SEC Administrative Release No. 34-62593, July 29, 2010, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-62593.pdf.
468. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Punishing Citi, or Its Shareholders?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at B1.
469. Id. In August 2012, Citigroup paid $590 million to settle a shareholder suit based on the
same alleged disclosure violations. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Citigroup in $590 Million Settlement of
Subprime Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012, at B4.
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to leave shareholders with the bill.”470 In John Coffee’s view, the SEC’s
enforcement actions against major banks indicated that the agency was
following a deliberate policy of seeking “quick, publicity-generating
settlements” from banks while forgoing “individual actions against
executives who would be unlikely to settle.”471
In 2011 and 2012, federal and state officials filed civil cases against
major banks alleging that the banks committed fraud while selling
mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities to Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac and federal agencies. Those cases have produced additional
settlements requiring payments by banks, but they have not resulted in
the assessment of penalties against any senior executives of those
banks.472 It is doubtful whether sanctions imposed on banks are
effective in deterring future misconduct by their senior executives,
because executives are likely to conclude that they can keep most of
their personal gains from financial fraud even if their companies are
ultimately forced to pay fines.473
Federal agencies did file civil lawsuits against top executives of
Countrywide and WaMu, two of the largest and most aggressive
nonprime lenders during the housing boom.474 However, both cases
demonstrate that federal regulators have not acted forcefully in pursuing
charges of serious misconduct against senior managers of major banks.
In 2009 the SEC filed a civil suit for securities fraud against former
Countrywide chairman Angelo Mozilo, former Countrywide president

470. Id.
471. Coffee, supra note 415 (explaining that the SEC “knows that suits against senior executives
will often drag on [and] consume considerable resources” while “major financial institutions almost
always settle with the SEC at an early point . . . to avoid reputational damage”); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate
Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 627, 654 (2007) (“It is easier to get a board of directors to accept a penalty against the company
than it is to get individuals to agree to painful personal sanctions . . . [C]ompany sanctions are the path
of least resistance; the SEC can claim its victory” by settling with the company and forgoing individual
claims against executives).
472. Rick Rothacker & Tanya Agrawal, BofA Reaches $11.6 Billion Settlement with Fannie Mae,
REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2013/01/07/bofa-reaches-116-billionsettlement-with-fannie-mae/; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Mortgage Crisis Presents a New Reckoning to
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012, at A1; David McLaughlin, JPMorgan Rivals Face Billions in
Damages After MBS Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1002/jpmorgan-rivals-face-billions-in-damages-after-mbs-case.html; see also Ben Protess, U.S. Accuses
Bank of America of a ‘Brazen’ Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2012, at A1 (reporting that “[f]ew
cases have taken aim at top executives” and “in the latest [civil] case [filed by federal prosecutors]
against Bank of America, no company officials were sued as part of the complaint.”).
473. See Langevoort, supra note 471, at 632, 635–36, 660–61 (questioning the effectiveness of
corporate penalties in deterring wrongdoing by senior officers).
474. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 178–79, 200–02 (describing the reckless lending
strategies pursued by WaMu and Countrywide).
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David Sambol, and former Countrywide CFO Eric Sieracki.475 Mozilo
caused Countrywide to become the largest U.S. mortgage lender in 2005
and 2006 by aggressively expanding the firm’s menu of mortgage
products to include high-risk subprime and “Pay-Option ARM”
mortgage loans.476 During the same period, Mozilo and Sieracki signed
Countrywide’s annual reports to shareholders, which stated that
Countrywide’s mortgage lending policies “ensure our ongoing access to
the secondary mortgage market by consistently producing quality
mortgages.”477 Moreover, at an investor conference in May 2006
Mozilo declared that “Countrywide views the [Pay-Option ARM]
product as a sound investment for our Bank and a sound financial
management tool for customers.”478
While giving these public assurances, Mozilo acknowledged in
internal email messages to Countrywide managers that Countrywide’s
subprime loans were “dangerous” and “toxic” and that Countrywide was
“flying blind” with respect to the risks posed by its Pay-Option
ARMs.479 In 2006 and early 2007, Mozilo exercised stock options and
executed trading plans to sell almost 7 million shares of Countrywide
stock, from which he realized trading profits of $140 million.480
After Countrywide suffered crippling losses due to its large exposure
475. SEC v. Mozilo, 2009 WL 3807124 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 3, 2009), at 1–2 [hereinafter Mozilo I]
(summarizing the SEC’s claims against Mozilo, Sambol, and Sieracki).
476. Id. at 2–3. For example, Countrywide offered an “80/20” piggyback subprime mortgage
program that enabled borrowers to finance 100% of the purchase price for their homes by taking out
simultaneous first and second lien subprime loans (which typically covered 80% and 20% of the
purchase price, respectively). Countrywide’s “Pay-Option ARM” loans allowed borrowers to make
very low minimum payments on their mortgages, which resulted in negative amortization until the
principal balance (including unpaid interest) reached 115% of the original principal amount, at which
point the borrowers would be required to make much larger payments for the remainder of the loan
term. Countrywide also originated many subprime or Pay-Option ARM loans with little or no
documentation of the borrowers’ income or net worth. Id. at 2–6.
477. SEC v. Mozilo, 2010 WL 3656068 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 2010), at 10 [hereinafter Mozilo II]
(quoting from Countrywide’s 2005 Form 10-K annual report and stating that “[a] nearly identical
representation appears in Countrywide’s 2006 Form 10-K”).
478. Id. at 12 (quoting Mozilo’s remark during an investor conference on May 31, 2006).
479. In a Mar. 2006 internal email, Mozilo acknowledged that Countrywide’s 80/20 subprime
mortgage was “the most dangerous product in existence and there can be nothing more toxic,” and in an
April 2006 internal e-mail he stated, “I consider that product line to be the poison of [our business].” Id.
at 17 (quoting emails sent by Mozilo on Mar. 27 and April 13, 2006). In a September 2006 internal
email, Mozilo admitted that “[w]e have no way, with any reasonable certainty, to assess the real risk of
holding [Pay-Option] loans on our balance sheet . . . [W]e are flying blind on how these loans will
perform in a stressed environment of higher unemployment, reduced values and slowing home sales.”
Id. at 13 (quoting Sept. 26, 2006 email).
480. Id. at 20. The SEC alleged that Mozilo violated SEC Rule 10b-5 by engaging in insider
trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information. Id. Countrywide president Sambol
exercised Countrywide stock options and sold the underlying shares for total profits of $40 million from
2005 through 2007. Mozilo I, supra note 475, at 1. However, the SEC did not sue Sambol for unlawful
insider trading.
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to high-risk loans, Mozilo arranged an emergency sale of Countrywide
to BofA in early 2008.481 The Countrywide deal later inflicted huge
losses on BofA and was a significant factor (along with BofA’s
subsequent acquisition of Merrill Lynch) in compelling BofA to seek a
costly federal bailout during the peak of the financial crisis.482
The SEC sought civil penalties and disgorgement from Mozilo,
Sambol and Sieracki. A federal district court denied motions to dismiss
and motions for summary judgment by the defendants.483 Despite its
success on those motions, the SEC entered into a settlement with Mozilo
in which he did not admit or deny liability but agreed to pay $67.5
million in penalties and disgorgement and to be permanently barred
from serving as a public company officer or director.484 Mozilo
personally paid only $22.5 million of that settlement, while
Countrywide’s insurance carriers and BofA paid the remaining $45
million. As a result, Mozilo was allowed to keep about $500 million of
the compensation he received from Countrywide between 2000 and
2008.485 Sambol and Sieracki also settled the SEC’s charges while
making combined out-of-pocket payments of only $650,000.486
The FDIC’s civil action against WaMu chairman Kerry Killinger

481. Gretchen Morgenson, How Countrywide Covered the Cracks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2010,
§ BU, at 1; Valerie Bauerlein & James R. Hagerty, Behind Bank of America’s Big Gamble, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 12, 2008, at A1.
482. Paul M. Barrett & Dawn Kopecki, Can Brian Moynihan Save Bank of America?,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 12–18, 2011, at 60, 62–64; Steve Mufson, A Fateful Step for a
Banking Giant, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at G1; see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig,
Bank of America Settles Suit Over Merrill for $2.43 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at A1
(reporting that BofA’s $2.43 billion settlement of a shareholder suit “underscores how two deals in
2008—the Merrill acquisition and the purchase of [Countrywide] earlier that year—have weighed on the
bank,” with the Countrywide deal costing BofA “more than $40 billion in losses on real estate, legal
costs and settlements”).
483. Mozilo I, supra note 475; Mozilo II, supra note 477. The district court did grant Mozilo’s
and Sieracki’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the SEC’s claim that they violated
SEC Rule 13a-14 by certifying Countrywide’s false and misleading public securities filings. See Mozilo
II, supra note 477, at 21 (holding that “a false Sarbanes–Oxley certification does not state an
independent violation of the securities laws”).
484. Antifraud: Countrywide’s Mozilo Agrees to Pay Record $22.5M Fine to Settle SEC Charges,
42 SECURITIES REGULATION & L. REP. (BNA) 2015 (Oct. 25, 2010); see also Gretchen Morgenson,
Lending Magnate Settles Charges For $67 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, at A1 (noting that “Mr.
Mozilo and his colleagues neither admitted nor denied the government’s charges” in their settlement
with the SEC).
485. Michael Hiltzik, Getting Tough on Crimes by Firms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at B1
(reporting that “$45 million [of Mozilo’s settlement] was covered by insurance companies and
Countrywide’s new owner, Bank of America”); Morgenson, supra note 484 (reporting Mozilo received
$521.5 million of compensation from Countrywide between 2000 and 2008).
486. Morgenson, supra note 484 (reporting that Sambol agreed to a lifetime ban on serving as a
public company office or director and to pay $5 million in disgorgement and a $520,000 million penalty,
but also explaining that “Countrywide is paying for all of Mr. Sambol’s disgorged funds,” while
Sieracki agreed to pay only a $130,000 penalty).
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produced similarly unimpressive results.
As Mozilo did with
Countrywide, Killinger caused WaMu to aggressively expand its
offerings of pay-option ARM, subprime and home equity loans.
Killinger initiated this high-risk strategy in mid-2004, declaring that he
wanted to increase WaMu’s assets “by at least 10% per year” while
achieving “average ROE [return on equity] of at least 18% and average
EPS [earnings per share] growth of at least 13%.”487 Killinger
proclaimed that “[i]t is important that [WaMu] focus on growth
initiatives and risk taking. Above average creation of shareholder value
requires significant risk taking.”488
Killinger pursued his high-risk strategy even though he acknowledged
in June 2005 that the U.S. was experiencing a “speculative” housing
boom:
We are currently experiencing the most speculative housing market we
have seen in many decades . . . . Whatever the exact outcome, it is highly
likely that housing will not be a stimulant to the economy and could
easily become a significant drag on consumer confidence and consumer
spending.489

In mid-2006 Killinger further admitted that “[t]he housing market is
now showing signs of slowing” and “[w]e expect the housing market to
be weak for quite some time as we unwind the speculative bubble . . . .
A collapse of the housing market would significantly increase our credit
costs.”490 Nevertheless, Killinger continued to press forward with
WaMu’s high-risk lending strategy.491 By the time WaMu collapsed in
September 2008—thereby becoming the largest bank failure in U.S.
history—WaMu had reported huge losses and held more than $100
487. Complaint ¶ 22, FDIC v. Killinger et al., 2011 WL 910099 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2011)
[hereinafter FDIC WaMu Complaint] (quoting Killinger’s June 2004 Strategic Direction memorandum).
488. Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Killinger’s June 2004 Strategic Direction memorandum).
489. Id. ¶ 40 (quoting Killinger’s June 1, 2005 Strategic Direction memorandum). Similarly, in
March 2005 Killinger told WaMu’s chief risk officer, “I have never seen such a high risk housing
market as market after market thinks they are unique and for whatever reason are not likely to
experience price declines. This typically signifies a bubble.” Id. ¶ 41 (quoting Mar. 2005 email from
Killinger).
490. Id. ¶ 53 (quoting Killinger’s June 12, 2006 Strategic Direction memorandum).
491. In mid-2007, Killinger conceded that the “bursting of the housing bubble” that he had
predicted for two years “has now turned into a reality.” Id. ¶ 64 (quoting Killinger’s June 18, 2007
Strategic Direction memorandum). Even so, in August 2007, Killinger told the American Banker that
WaMu would continue to expand its “non-conforming hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages, paymentoption ARMs, multifamily loans, and home equity loans.” The following month, he told the Seattle
Times that, despite the ongoing decline in the U.S. housing market, “this, frankly, may be one of the best
times I’ve ever seen for taking on new loans into our portfolio.” Id. ¶ 71 (quoting from Killinger’s
newspaper interviews). Large percentages of WaMu’s loans were concentrated in California, Florida
and other states with speculative housing markets, and many of WaMu’s loans contained additional
high-risk features like “no or low documentation and high loan-to-value (‘LTV’) and debt-to-income
(‘DTI’) ratios.” Id. ¶¶ 143 (quote), 157–62.
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billion of high-risk pay-option ARM and home equity loans on its
balance sheet.492
The FDIC alleged that Killinger—along with WaMu’s former chief
operating officer Stephen Rotella and former home loans president
David Schneider—caused WaMu “to take extreme and historically
unprecedented risks . . . . They focused on short term gains to increase
their own compensation, with reckless disregard for WaMu’s longer
term safety and soundness.”493 Nevertheless, the FDIC agreed to a
settlement in which Killinger paid just $275,000 in cash and surrendered
$7.5 million of dubious claims for retirement benefits against WaMu’s
bankrupt parent holding company.494 The FDIC obtained similar
settlements (including modest cash payments) from Rotella and
Schneider.495
In view of WaMu’s payment of $88 million of compensation to
Killinger between 2001 and 2007, the FDIC’s settlement was viewed as
“a pittance” by journalist Gretchen Morgenson496 and as “[p]retty soft”
by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI).497 Moreover, despite strong evidence
that Mozilo, Killinger and other top executives of Countrywide and
WaMu consciously pursued reckless lending strategies that inflicted
492. Id. ¶¶ 2–11, 137, 142, 150, 178.
493. Id. ¶ 1 (summarizing FDIC’s claims against Killinger, Rotella and Schneider). From 2005
through 2008, while WaMu pursued its high-risk lending strategy, Killinger received $65.9 million in
compensation, while Rotella and Schneider received $23.4 million and $5.9 million, respectively. Id. ¶¶
14–16. The FDIC, as receiver for WaMu, sued the three defendants under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) for gross
negligence, ordinary negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. ¶¶ 12, 181–95. The FDIC allegations
included claims that Killinger, Rotella and Schneider ignored repeated warnings in 2005 and 2006 from
WaMu’s risk managers that WaMu’s high-risk lending strategy exposed the bank to a high probability
of disastrous losses if housing markets weakened and housing prices began to decline. Id. ¶¶ 26–58,
119–35; see also KIRSTEN GRIND, THE LOST BANK: THE STORY OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL—THE
BIGGEST BANK FAILURE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 123–24, 133–35, 149–54, 161–63 (2012) (describing
how Killinger disregarded numerous warnings from colleagues about the dangers of WaMu’s high-risk
lending strategy).
494. Gretchen Morgenson, Slapped Wrists at WaMu, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, § BU, at 1.
495. Rotella paid $100,000 and gave up a doubtful bankruptcy claim against WaMu’s parent
holding company for $11.5 million in compensation, while Schneider paid $50,000 and surrendered a
similar bankruptcy claim for $5.8 million in compensation. The FDIC also received $39.6 million from
WaMu’s insurance carriers and $125 million from the bankruptcy estate of WaMu’s parent company.
See id.; FDIC Announces Settlement with Washington Mutual Directors and Officers (Dec. 15, 2011)
(including Settlement Summary—Fact Sheet) [hereinafter FDIC WaMu Press Release], available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11192.html. Thus, as was true for the SEC’s settlements
with BofA and Citigroup (see supra notes 462-70 and accompanying text), most of the payments
received by the FDIC in the WaMu case were extracted from the shareholders and creditors of WaMu’s
parent company, not from the senior executives responsible for WaMu’s failure.
496. Morgenson, supra note 494.
497. Id. (quoting Sen. Levin, and noting that his “dismay over the settlement probably arises from
his deep knowledge of WaMu and its practices” as a result of the extensive investigation of WaMu by
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which he chaired); see also Senate Wall Street
Crisis Report, supra note 461, at 48–242 (presenting results of the investigation of WaMu’s collapse by
Sen. Levin’s subcommittee).
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enormous harm on the banking industry and financial markets, federal
prosecutors decided not to bring criminal charges against any of those
individuals.498
The settlements described above with eight senior executives of
Citigroup, Countrywide and WaMu exhibit a disturbing pattern. All
eight officers avoided any admission of personal wrongdoing and
escaped further civil or criminal liability while paying amounts that
were a tiny fraction of the compensation they received.499 Even more
disturbing is the fact that those settlements evidently represent the only
public enforcement actions brought by federal authorities against senior
managers of major banks.
Perhaps most remarkably, federal officials have not brought any
criminal charges—and have filed only a “handful” of civil claims—
against senior officers of financial companies for falsely certifying their
companies’ public reports.500 Sections 302 and 906 of the SarbanesOxley Act impose civil and criminal penalties on senior officers for
false certifications of annual and quarterly reports.501 Sections 302 and
906 were key components of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act’s effort to hold
corporate executives accountable by ensuring that “their actions will be
scrutinized, with the threat of real penalties for violations of their legal
responsibilities.”502
The SEC adopted Rule 13a-14 to implement the civil-liability

498. Hiltzik, supra note 485; Morgenson, supra note 484; Morgenson, supra note 494. Peter S.
Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at A1.
499. See supra notes 466–69, 484–86, 493–98 (describing the SEC’s settlements with Citigroup
and Countrywide executives and the FDIC’s settlement with WaMu officers, and noting the lack of any
admission of liability and the relatively small penalties paid by those individuals in comparison with
their highly lucrative compensation). In settling with WaMu’s executives, the FDIC agreed not to bring
any enforcement actions against them or to make any “disparaging comments” about them. FDIC
WaMu Press Release (Settlement Summary, Part II), supra note 495.
500. Michael Rapoport, Global Finance: Law’s Big Weapon Sits Idle—Sarbanes–Oxley’s JailTime Threat Hasn’t Been Applied in Crisis-Related Cases, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2012, at C3 (reporting
that federal prosecutors “haven’t brought any criminal cases for false certification related to the crisis”
while “[t]he SEC says it has brought civil false-certification charges against . . . executives at companies
involved in the crisis like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Countrywide”).
501. Joris M. Hogan, The Enron Legacy: Corporate Governance Requirements for a New Era, 31
SEC. REG. LAW J. 142, 143–44 (2003) (discussing Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and SEC Rule
13a-14).
502. 148 CONG. REC. E1451 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (extension of remarks) (statement by Rep.
Sununu); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes–Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 955–56 (2003) (explaining that Sections 302 and 906
potentially provide “the sharpest governance teeth” in Sarbanes–Oxley because they “prevent CEOs and
CFOs from hiding behind the defense of ignorance”); Allison List, The Lax Enforcement of Section 304
of Sarbanes–Oxley: Why is the SEC Ignoring Its Greatest Asset in the Fight Against Corporate
Misconduct, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 198–99 (2009) (explaining that Sections 302 and 906 are intended to
protect investors by “attaching liability to company executives responsible for financial disclosure”).
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provisions of Section 302.503 However, the SEC filed civil claims
against bank officers for violating Rule 13a-14 in only two cases: the
SEC’s lawsuit against Angelo Mozilo and Eric Sieracki of Countrywide
and a similar suit against Alan Levan, chairman of BankAtlantic (a
relatively small Florida bank).504 Notably, the SEC has not brought
enforcement actions under Rule 13a-14 “against executives from any of
the major banks suspected of misleading the public about their finances
during the crisis,” despite evidence indicating that senior executives of
Bear, Citigroup and Lehman certified public reports containing material
misstatements.505
The SEC did file civil suits including Rule 13a-14 claims against
Daniel Mudd and Richard Syron, the former CEOs of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. The SEC’s complaints alleged that Mudd and Syron
signed public disclosure documents that materially understated the
exposures of the GSEs to subprime and Alt-A mortgages. The SEC’s

503. Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg.
57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002).
504. See supra note 483 (discussing the SEC’s claims under Rule 13a-14 against Mozilo and
Sieracki for falsely certifying Countrywide’s public reports); SEC v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 2012
WL 1936112 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2012) (discussing the SEC’s claim under Rule 13a-14 against Alan
Levan for falsely certifying BankAtlantic’s public reports); see also Rachel Witkowski, SEC Files
BANKER
(Jan.
19,
2012)
Lawsuit
Alleging
Fraud
at
BankAtlantic,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_12/bankatlantic-fraud-lawsuit-1045848-1.html (reporting
that BankAtlantic had $3.7 billion of assets). A federal district court dismissed the SEC’s claims under
Rule 13a-14 against Mozilo and Sieracki, concluding that “a false Sarbanes–Oxley certification does not
state an independent violation of the securities laws.” Mozilo II, supra note 477, at 21. However,
another federal district court upheld the validity of the SEC’s claim under Rule 13a-14 against Levan in
the BankAtlantic case, and most other recent decisions have similarly concluded that the SEC has
authority to bring civil enforcement actions for violations of Rule 13a-14. BankAtlantic, 2012 WL
1936112 supra, at 23 & n.5; see also, e.g., SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 & n.4 (D.D.C. July
19, 2012) (reviewing relevant decisions).
505. Rapoport, supra note 500 (reporting that former chairman James Cayne and other Bear
executives paid $275 million to settle shareholder litigation that included “allegations that Mr. Cayne
falsely certified Bear’s financial reports,” while a report by Lehman’s bankruptcy examiner concluded
“there was enough evidence to support claims that Richard Fuld failed to ensure the firm’s quarterly
reports were accurate”); see also William D. Cohan, Obama Keeps the SEC in Pocket of Wall Street,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-02/sec-trades-one-wall-streetlapdog-for-another.html (criticizing the SEC for not filing an enforcement action against Fuld “despite
the solid evidence of indictable offenses itemized in the post mortem done on [Lehman] by courtappointed examiner Anton Valukas”); William D. Cohan, Why Does the SEC Protect Banks’ Dirty
Secrets?, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-28/why-does-thesec-protect-banks-dirty-secrets-.html (criticizing the SEC for ignoring whistleblower claims filed by
former Citigroup executive Richard Bowen, including the fact that Bowen sent an “urgent” email
message in November 2007 to Citigroup CFO Gary Crittenden and Robert Rubin, chairman of
Citigroup’s executive committee, warning them about “breakdowns in internal controls and resulting
significant but possibly unrecognized financial losses existing within our organization”); Taibbi, supra
note 415 (criticizing the SEC for ignoring whistleblower complaints filed by Oliver Budde, a former
Lehman attorney, in which Budde alleged that Lehman significantly understated Fuld’s compensation in
Lehman’s public disclosure reports).
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Rule 13a-14 claims survived motions to dismiss and are still pending.506
Given the SEC’s success to date in pursuing Rule 13a-14 claims against
Mudd and Syron, the agency’s decision not to file similar claims against
senior executives of big Wall Street firms is more than puzzling
Unfortunately, the SEC’s decision to forgo Rule 13a-14 claims
against top Wall Street officials is consistent with the preferential
treatment given by the SEC to big Wall Street firms and their officials
who were accused of misconduct prior to the financial crisis. A recent
study of SEC enforcement actions in 1998 and from 2005 through early
2007 concluded that the SEC gave significantly more favorable
treatment to big broker-dealers and their staff compared to small brokerdealers and their employees.507 The SEC’s preferential treatment was
manifested in three ways: (i) “SEC actions against big firms were more
likely to involve corporate liability exclusively, with no individuals
subject to any regulatory action,” (ii) “big-firm defendants were more
likely to end up in administrative rather than court proceedings,
controlling for types of violation and levels of harm to investors,” and
(iii) “within administrative proceedings, big-firm employees were more
likely to receive lower sanctions.”508
The shocking inadequacy of federal enforcement efforts against major
banks was vividly illustrated at a Senate committee hearing in February
2013. During that hearing, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) asked
seven federal financial regulators to specify “the last few times you’ve
taken the biggest financial institutions all the way to trial.”509 She
observed that if major banks “can break the law and drag in billions in
profits, and then turn around and settle, paying out of those profits, they
don’t have much incentive to follow the law.”510 After the seven
regulators failed to cite even one instance in which they had taken a
major bank to trial, Senator Warren responded, “I’m really concerned

506. SEC v. Mudd, 885 F. Supp. 2d 654, 657-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Syron, 2013 WL
1285572, at *3–*18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013).
507. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAWYER 679, 692-94 (2012) (describing SEC enforcement actions included in
the study, and explaining that proceedings from 1998 were included in the study “to allow for variation
in SEC enforcement policies under Democratic and Republican administrations”).
508. Id. at 679 (abstract); see also id. at 728 (restating same conclusions).
509. David Uberti, Warren Rips Deals with Big Banks, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/02/14/senator-elizabeth-warren-grills-regulators-endingquiet-first-month-office/rWy4b0VnwoFozpkQhZ8mGM/story.html (quoting Sen. Warren’s remarks
during a Senate Banking Committee hearing on Feb. 14, 2013); see also Victoria Finkle, Warren Takes
Center Stage in Grilling Regulators on Bank Prosecutions, AM. BANKER (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_32/warren-takes-center-stage-in-grilling-regulators-onbank-prosecutions-1056811-1.html (reporting on Sen. Warren’s statements to regulators during the
hearing).
510. Finkle, supra note 509 (quoting Sen. Warren).
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that ‘too big to fail’ has become ‘too big for trial.’ That just seems
wrong to me.”511
B. Large Financial Institutions Have Used Regulatory Arbitrage and
Capture to Undermine Supervisory Restrictions on Their Activities
Large financial institutions have skillfully employed arbitrage and
capture techniques to weaken the effectiveness of regulation. Both
before and during the financial crisis, leading banks exploited flawed
incentives and governance structures in regulatory agencies to
encourage regulators to cater to their interests. The financial industry
also took advantage of “cultural capture”—fostered in part by the
“revolving door” between industry and government service—to
persuade regulators to adopt policies consistent with the industry’s
preferences.
1. Competition Among Domestic and Foreign Regulators Has
Encouraged Regulatory Arbitrage
Financial regulators competed aggressively during the 1990s and
2000s, both within and across national borders, to attract and retain the
allegiance of major financial institutions. Regulatory competition—
which the financial industry actively promoted—pushed agencies to
adopt policies that would please their existing constituents and attract
new ones. The result was regulatory arbitrage, in both domestic and
global arenas, which undermined the ability and willingness of
regulators to apply rigorous supervisory policies.
a. Domestic Competition for Regulatory Charters
During the 1990s and 2000s, the OCC and OTS actively competed for
charters by issuing rulings that aggressively preempted state consumer
protection laws. The OCC’s and OTS’s preemption rulings induced
many large state-chartered institutions to convert into national banks or
federal thrifts.512 Similarly, the FRB, OCC and OTS sought to persuade
511. Id. (quoting Sen. Warren, and noting that her statements triggered “an unusual smattering of
applause from the audience at the hearing”).
512. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text (discussing preemption initiatives by OCC
and OTS); BAIR, supra note 290, at 51 (explaining that “by expanding the scope of state preemption, the
OCC hoped that large, state-regulated banks such as JPMorgan Chase would ‘flip’ their charters and
become national banks,” and after the OCC issued sweeping preemption rules in 2004, “JPMorgan
Chase switched from being chartered by New York State to being OCC-regulated”); BETHANY MCLEAN
& JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 147
(2010) (describing how preemption became a “recruiting tool” that the OCC and OTS used “to expand
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leading financial institutions to operate within their respective
jurisdictions by approving new activities and reducing regulatory
requirements.513 In one particularly egregious example of regulatory
competition, OTS persuaded Countrywide to convert from a national
bank to a federal thrift in early 2007 by promising to give Countrywide
and its parent holding company more lenient supervisory treatment than
they were receiving at that time from the OCC and FRB.514
The OTS attracted the most severe criticism from Congress for its
regulatory lapses, and Congress decided to abolish OTS when it passed
Dodd–Frank.515 Congressional and Treasury investigators rebuked OTS
for lax and ineffective regulation that contributed to the collapse of
WaMu and three other large thrifts (IndyMac, Downey Federal and
BankUnited).516 Investigators also condemned OTS for allowing
IndyMac and BankUnited to backdate contributions of capital made by
their parent holding companies in 2008. Those backdated capital
contributions enabled IndyMac and BankUnited to report that they
remained “well capitalized” (and therefore eligible to continue
collecting high-cost brokered deposits)—a false representation that
delayed their subsequent failures and likely increased the FDIC’s
resolution costs.517 Investigators also blamed OTS for its very weak
their own empires”); Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 915–16 (explaining how OCC and OTS used their
preemptive rulings to encourage state-chartered institutions to switch to federal charters).
513. Wilmarth, supra note 193, at 265, 265 n.150, 276–77, 277 n.203; RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL,
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
61–67, 465–67, 490–94 (4th ed. 2009) (describing competition between OCC and FRB during the 1990s
to maintain the loyalty of the largest banks, which could choose between status as national banks or as
state Fed member banks); FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 151–54 (describing how OTS and SEC
competed to encourage the largest securities firms to organize nonbank holding companies under their
oversight rather than forming bank holding companies that would be subject to FRB supervision).
514. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 159–60, 201–02; Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic
Regulation: Regulating Credit Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 160 (2009).
515. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 25–26 (2010); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 157–84
(discussing regulatory failures by OTS); Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator
Played Advocate Over Enforcer: Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail, WASH. POST,
Nov. 23, 2008, at A1 (same).
516. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 176–81; Senate Wall Street Crisis Report, supra note
461, at 161–65, 209–35; Joe Adler, OTS Faulted in BankUnited Failure, AM. BANKER, June 25, 2010,
at 3; Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 515; Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, Finger-Pointing
Turns to Regulators, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at A1.
517. Adler, supra note 516; Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Regulator Let IndyMac
Bank Falsify Report, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2008, at A01; Story & Morgenson, supra note 516. The
Treasury Department’s inspector general reportedly made a criminal referral to the Justice Department
with respect to OTS regional director Darrel Dochow’s approval of IndyMac’s backdated capital
contribution. However, the Justice Department did not take any action against Mr. Dochow, and he
retired from OTS in 2009 with a full government pension. Story & Morgenson, supra note 516. Mr.
Dochow had previously been demoted by OTS in the early 1990s after “federal investigators found that
he had delayed and impeded proper regulation of Charles Keating’s failed Lincoln Savings and Loan.”
Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra; see also Black, supra note 412, at 188–205, 209–11 (describing
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oversight of thrift holding companies, which contributed to the collapse
of AIG and Lehman as well as Merrill’s near-failure.518
The FRB and OCC bore shared responsibility, along with OTS, for
the near-collapse of Countrywide.519 In addition, the FRB and OCC
were jointly at fault for not taking strong regulatory measures that might
have prevented (i) the near-failures and massive bailouts of Citigroup
and BofA, (ii) the failure and emergency sale of Wachovia to Wells
Fargo in a federally-assisted transaction, and (iii) the near-collapse and
forced sale of National City to PNC in another federally-assisted deal.520
The failures and bailouts of so many leading financial institutions made
it “painfully obvious” that the OTS, FRB and OCC had allowed the
largest thrifts and banks to become “deeply implicated in the origination
and securitization of bad mortgage loans.”521 The competition among
federal agencies for charters was an important factor that contributed to
those regulatory failures, because it encouraged agencies to offer “a
bigger menu of legally permissible banking activities and gentler
regulation” in order to meet the demand by financial institutions for “the
easiest regulators and laws.”522
Dochow’s role in obstructing attempts by other regulators to take strong measures against Keating and
Lincoln in the late 1980s). Dochow regained his regional director’s position in 2007 after he played “a
leading role in persuading Countrywide to move under OTS supervision, a major coup for the agency.”
Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra; see also Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 515 (reporting that
Dochow and other OTS officials offered to provide “more lenient” treatment to Countrywide than it was
currently receiving from the FRB and OCC) (quoting an unnamed Countrywide executive).
518. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 151–54, 177–78, 200–04, 346, 351–54; ENGEL & MCCOY,
supra note 19, at 221–23.
519. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 20, 105, 172, 248–50; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at
159–60, 200–02; MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 512, at 138–49, 214–16, 219–33, 300–05; Wilmarth,
supra note 15, at 1018, 1045.
520. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 20–23, 111–13, 170–74, 195–200, 263, 302–08, 366–71,
379–86; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 158–71, 200–03; Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 978 n.105,
984–85; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the
Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection (Geo. Wash. U. Pub. L. & Leg. Theory Working Paper No. 479, 2010), at 26–31, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499216; Binyamin Appelbaum & David Cho, Fed’s approach to regulation
left banks exposed to crisis, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 21, 2009, at A01. The Treasury Department
facilitated Wells Fargo’s emergency acquisition of Wachovia and PNC’s comparable takeover of
National City by issuing an extraordinary ruling, which declared that purchasing banks could use losses
from acquired banks to reduce taxes on their future income. That ruling reportedly provided tax benefits
worth $25 billion to Wells Fargo and $5 billion to PNC. Cheryl Block, Measuring the True Cost of
Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 218–19 (2010); Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall For
U.S. Banks, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 10, 2008, at A01; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 103–04
(stating that Wells Fargo CEO Dick Kovacevich referred to “a recent tax ruling that made the economics
of the [Wachovia] deal work better”). Congress repudiated the Treasury’s tax ruling in a subsequent
statute but “included a ‘grandfather’ clause, giving the benefit of the [ruling] to existing contracts—the
Wells Fargo transaction, in particular.” Block, supra, at 219.
521. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 204.
522. Id. at 158, 159; see also id. at 166 (contending that regulatory competition “encouraged
lenders to shop for legal regimes and charters,” resulting in a “downward spiral in lending standards”).
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b. International Regulatory Competition for the Allegiance of Large
Financial Institutions
A similar regulatory competition took place across national borders,
especially between the world’s two leading financial centers—New
York and London. During the global credit boom that preceded the
financial crisis, federal regulators worried that any attempt to impose
stricter supervision on large U.S. financial institutions might cause those
institutions to shift more of their operations to London or other foreign
locations that offered “light touch” regulation.523 Federal officials
therefore repeatedly offered regulatory accommodations in order to
persuade major banks to keep more of their activities in the U.S.524
Federal regulators were not mistaken in fearing that large financial
institutions might shift operations and assets to foreign jurisdictions with
more accommodating regulatory schemes. A recent study found that,
between 1996 and 2007, global banks headquartered in 26 developed
countries were more likely to open branches and subsidiaries in other
nations, and to transfer capital to their foreign operations, if the
destination countries (i) imposed fewer activity restrictions, lower
capital requirements, weaker disclosure rules and looser auditing
standards, and (ii) followed more lenient supervisory policies.525
523. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH
BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 9–10, 96, 192–95, 199 (2013); Dariusz Wójcik, The Dark Side of
NY-LON: Financial Centres and the Global Financial Crisis (University of Oxford Employment, Work
and Finance Working Paper No. 11-12, July 20, 2011), at 7, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890644; see also infra notes 526–43 (discussing the fierce competition
between New York and London). For discussions of international regulatory arbitrage and its impact on
supervisory policies, see Viral V. Acharya, Paul Wachtel & Ingo Walter, International Alignment of
Financial Sector Regulation, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM
365, 366–71 (Viral A. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009); HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER &
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 283–84, 292–93 (2010);
John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95
VA. L. REV. 707, 716–17, 721 (2009); Cristie L. Ford, Macro and Micro Level Effects on Responsive
Financial Regulation, 44 U.B.C. L. REV. 589, 608, 610–11 (2011).
524. Wójcik, supra note 523, at 7; Ford, supra note 523, at 608, 611. For example, during the
quarter century leading up to the financial crisis, U.S. banking regulators sought to avoid imposing
capital requirements on large U.S. banks that would place them at a competitive disadvantage compared
to foreign banks. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION 45–64, 84–85, 210–14 (2008); see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 31–33
(stating that the FRB and OCC strongly supported Basel II’s internal risk-based capital standards—
which would have allowed big banks to operate with lower capital levels—because the FRB and OCC
wanted to “maintain the competitiveness of the U.S. financial system” with Europe). Similarly, as
described above, in 2004 federal regulators adopted an interagency rule setting a very low capital charge
for banks that provided backup lines of credit to their sponsored off-balance-sheet conduits. See supra
notes 224–28 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of the 2004 interagency rule). In adopting
that very lenient rule, federal regulators rejected a proposed higher capital charge because that proposal
“would put U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign banks.” Risk-Based Capital
Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,908, 44,910 (July 28, 2004).
525. Joel F. Houston , Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows
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The U.K. has long been the most prominent and attractive foreign
destination for large U.S. financial institutions. For example, AIG
Financial Products—which sold massive volumes of credit default
swaps that destroyed its parent company—carried on most of its
activities in London.526 Similarly, JPMorgan’s Chief Investment Office
(CIO) conducted its “London Whale” trading operations—which
inflicted a $6 billion loss on the bank in 2012—from the CIO’s London
office.527
U.K. government leaders actively promoted London as the most
business-friendly venue for global financial institutions.
U.K.
politicians pressured the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to adopt
and follow “light touch” supervisory policies for major financial
firms.528 The financial industry applauded the U.K.’s embrace of “light
touch” and “principles-based regulation,” and the industry pushed
officials to maintain the U.K.’s lenient approach to supervision
throughout the credit boom of the 2000s.529
In October 2006, FSA enforcement director Margaret Cole boasted—
(J. FIN., forthcoming, Aug. 26, 2011), at 2–5, 17–19, 24–29, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525895.
526. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 221–23; FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 139–42, 200–
02; Wójcik, supra note 523, at 7.
FAIR
(Nov.
2012),
527. Jamie
Dimon
on
the
Line,
VANITY
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2012/11/jamie-dimon-tom-brady-hang-in-there (text under heading
“Killer Whale”).
528. U.K. Financial Services Authority, The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland § 3.1.3, ¶ 686,
at 261 [hereinafter FSA RBS Report], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf. In a
press release issued by the U.K. Treasury on May 24, 2005, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown
declared that he wanted “[n]ot just a light touch but a limited touch” from the FSA in order to improve
“London’s competitive position” as well as “the ‘competitiveness’ of the U.K. financial services sector.”
Id. at 261–62 (material quoted from the press release in italics). Similarly, in June 2006 a senior U.K.
Treasury official proclaimed that “we must keep the UK’s regulatory system at the cutting edge—the
best in the world . . . nothing should be done to put at risk a light-touch, risk-based regulatory regime.”
Id. at 262 n.746 (quoting speech on June 14, 2006, by Economic Secretary to the Treasury Ed Balls,
MP).
529. Gonzalo Vina & Robert Hutton, Brown Says He Was Wrong Not to Toughen Bank
Regulation as Finance Minister BLOOMBERG, April 14, 2010 (quoting U.K. Prime Minister Gordon
Brown, who stated that he was under “a huge amount of pressure” from the financial-services industry
to maintain “light touch” regulatory policies); Stephanie Baker et al., Brown’s “Churchill” Moment
(Nov.
26,
2008)
Masks
Failure
of
Regulator
He
Built,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=auS77akg6dq0 (explaining that Mr.
Brown, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, “created the FSA” in 1997 and “held up principles-based
regulation as a model” because he believed that “Britain needed to take measures to remain competitive
in an era of globalization”); see also Howard Davies, Comments on Ross Levine’s paper “The
Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis,” (BIS Working Papers
No. 329, Nov. 2010), at 15, 16–17 (comment by former FSA chairman, stating that “the political climate
in which [U.K.] regulators were operating . . . was highly unfavourable to tight regulation” before the
global financial crisis began in 2007, because “the City of London was seen as a goose that lays golden
eggs, which should on no account be frightened into flapping its wings and flying away”), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/work329.pdf.
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in a speech delivered in New York—that “London’s philosophy of ‘light
touch’ regulation has helped it in becoming the world’s leading centre
for mobile capital.”530 She declared that “[t]he FSA is firmly of the
view that regulators must be very wary of the damaging effects they can
have on creativity, innovation and competition.”531 She further claimed
that “[t]he benefits of this light touch approach to regulation are borne
out by the figures,” and she cited data showing that London was
attracting more stock offerings than New York.532
Two weeks later, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) and New York
Mayor Michael Bloomberg published an op-ed in the Wall Street
Journal and announced that they had commissioned a report by
McKinsey and Company on the competitiveness of U.S. financial
markets.533 Senator Schumer’s and Mayor Bloomberg’s op-ed warned
that “we risk allowing New York to lose its pre-eminence in the global
financial-services sector,” and they called for legal reforms to remedy
“overregulation” and “frivolous litigation” in the U.S.534 They criticized
U.S. regulators for “often competing to be the toughest cop on the
street,” while they praised the FSA for being “more collaborative and
solutions-oriented.”535 Shortly thereafter, Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson delivered a speech declaring that the op-ed by Senator Schumer
and Mayor Bloomberg was “right on target.”536
Senator Schumer and Mayor Bloomberg issued the McKinsey report
in January 2007, and they again warned that “New York could lose its
status as a global financial market” if U.S. financial markets continued
to be “stifled by stringent regulations and high litigation risks.”537 The

530. The UK FSA: Nobody does it better?, Speech by Margaret Cole, FSA Director of
Enforcement,
at
Fordham
Law
School,
Oct.
17,
2006,
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2006/1017_mc.shtml.
531. Id.
532. Id.; see also Vina & Hutton, supra note 529 (reporting that “[i]n 2005, London surpassed the
U.S. as the No. 1 choice for stock listings by foreign companies, especially those from emerging
markets such as India and Russia”).
533. Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London, Wall
St. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 37 (referring to the McKinsey study
commissioned by Sen. Schumer and Mayor Bloomberg).
534. Schumer & Bloomberg, supra note 533.
535. Id.
536. Remarks by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson before the Economic Club of New York,
“On the Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets” (Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Paulson Nov. 20, 2006
Speech], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp174.aspx. In the
same speech, Secretary Paulson criticized a “broken tort system [that] is an Achilles heel for our
economy,” as well as a regulatory enforcement approach that “can appear confusing and threatening” to
financial institutions and other business firms. Id.
537. Press Release, Bloomberg/Schumer Report, NY in Danger of Losing Status as World
Financial Center Within 10 Years Without Major Shift in Regulation and Policy, Jan. 22, 2007,
available at http://www.nyc.gov/cgi-bin/misc/pfprinter.cgi?action=print&sitename=OM&p=13621848
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McKinsey report called upon U.S. financial regulators to adopt a
“principles-based” system of regulation and a “measured approach to
enforcement” similar to the FSA’s policies, which senior financial
executives described as “easier to deal with” and “responsive to their
business needs.”538 The McKinsey report also urged U.S. regulators to
implement the Basel II international risk-based capital accord—and to
abandon a U.S. interagency proposal for tougher capital requirements—
in order to “place U.S. financial institutions on an equal footing with
their international competitors.”539
Similarly, Treasury Secretary Paulson’s speech in November 2006
endorsed a “principles-based system” of regulation that would be “more
agile and responsive” and thereby “maintain the competitiveness of our
capital markets.”540 The Bloomberg–Schumer report and the Paulson
speech reflected the intense political pressures exerted on U.S. financial
regulators to conform their policies to the FSA’s “light touch” approach
and to the more accommodating Basel II capital standards.541 Those
93000.
538. Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg & Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York’s and the
US’ Global Financial Services Leadership (Jan. 2007), at 17, 81, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.
As evidence of the FSA’s “measured”
enforcement approach, the report quoted an unnamed CEO of a U.S. securities firm, who stated, “The
FSA is open to discussing issues constructively and resolving problems quietly.” Id. at 84 (emphasis
added).
539. Id. at 88, 112 (quotes). The McKinsey report quoted unnamed “CEOs and other thought
leaders” who criticized the federal banking agencies for issuing a joint proposal for new capital
requirements that would (i) include “a leverage ratio, which could require banks to hold more capital
than would be required under a [Basel II] risk-based system,” (ii) require banks to hold more capital “if
the aggregate capital under the [Basel II] regime falls by 10 percent for the industry as a whole” and (iii)
reject provisions of Basel II that would allow capital requirements to “decline” in “a strong economic
environment.” Id. at 88. The McKinsey report noted that Citigroup, JPMorgan, Wachovia and WaMu
had formed a working group to recommend an “alternative” to the agencies’ proposal, and their
“alternative approach [was] endorsed” by the major banking trade associations. Id. at 88, 112. As
discussed above, Citigroup subsequently needed a huge federal bailout to avoid failure, while Wachovia
and WaMu both failed in 2008. See supra notes 110, 231, 290, 520 and accompanying text.
540. Paulson Nov. 20, 2006 Speech, supra note 536. The “principles-based” objectives set forth
in Secretary Paulson’s speech were subsequently incorporated in the Treasury Department’s Blueprint
for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (Mar. 2008), which he strongly advocated. Baker et
al., supra note 529; see also Damian Paeltta et al., Paulson Plan Begins Battle Over How to Police
Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2008, at A1 (describing Secretary Paulson’s support for proposals to
“streamline bureaucracy” contained in the Treasury’s Blueprint, and noting that the Bush
Administration “has long been working on reducing regulation that, it argues, has hurt U.S. financial
institutions in competition with overseas centers such as London and Hong Kong”). Due to the financial
crisis, Secretary Paulson’s Blueprint was never implemented and was superseded by the Obama
Administration’s proposals that provided the foundation for the Dodd–Frank Act. HAL S. SCOTT &
ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 335 (19th ed.
2012); Damian Paletta, U.S. to Toughen Finance Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at A1.
541. See, e.g., BAIR, supra note 290, at 24, 27 (explaining that, in 2006, most federal bank
regulators “were still moving in the direction of less regulation, at least for larger institutions,” and
noting that “[a]dding fuel to the fire was the fact that some of our foreign competitors, particularly in
Europe, were taking industry self-regulation to new extremes [through] ‘principles-based’ regulation,

2013]

TURNING A BLIND EYE

1397

pressures eased only when the global financial crisis revealed that the
Basel II standards were woefully inadequate,542 and when the FSA was
“thoroughly discredited” after U.K. authorities were forced to bail out
four of the nine largest U.K. banks.543
As the financial crisis has receded in the public’s memory, major U.S.
banks and their allies in Congress have once again invoked the need for
international “competitiveness” and “level playing fields” as a reason to
avoid rigorous implementation of Dodd–Frank’s financial reforms.544
For example, major bank trade associations attacked the FRB’s
proposals to adopt higher capital standards and other enhanced
prudential requirements for SIFIs because the proposed requirements
“may place U.S. banks at an unwarranted competitive disadvantage
compared to those countries that have not implemented a comparable
approach.”545 Similarly, big banks and their political allies have used
which, in my view, meant articulating high-level standards but then leaving it to the banks themselves to
interpret and enforce those standards”); id. at 30–39 (describing how FDIC chairman Bair successfully
resisted intense lobbying by the FRB, OCC and OTS, as well as Senators Schumer and Mike Crapo (RID), to abandon the U.S. leverage capital requirement and conform U.S. capital requirements to the
weaker Basel II standards as implemented by the U.K., Europe and Japan).
542. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 96 (describing how European banks and U.S.
investment banks “found many creative ways to have very high leverage and evade the [Basel II]
requirements by shifting risks to others or hiding them behind flawed risk models or misleading credit
ratings”); id. at 183 (“[T]he financial crisis showed that Basel II was flawed.”); BAIR, supra note 290, at
257 (“Europe was to pay dearly for its ill-advised implementation of Basel II and failure to impose a
leverage ratio.”); id. at 40 (explaining that, due to the financial crisis, “the weight of market opinion had
swung our way” by the end of 2007, and the Dodd–Frank Act “essentially killed Basel II as a means of
reducing big bank capital”).
543. BAIR, supra note 290, at 192 (describing the FSA as “weak and a captive of the industry it
regulated”); see also Eilis Ferran, The Break-Up of the Financial Services Authority (Univ. of
Cambridge Faculty of Law Res. Paper Ser. No. 10/04, Oct. 11, 2010), at 2–5 (discussing the “dramatic
fall from grace for the FSA” and its abolition by Parliament, but suggesting that “there was not a clearcut case for outright abolition of the FSA and . . . fixing it was a solid option”), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690523; Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Finance: London’s Precarious
Position, FT.COM, July 29, 2012 (reporting that the “FSA’s old reputation for light-touch regulation
comes in for blame repeatedly as enforcement cases lay bare the excesses of the past”); Kevin Crowley
& Ambereen Choudhury, Made-in-London Scandals Risk City Reputation as Money Center,
BLOOMBERG, July 6, 2012 (referring to the U.K.’s bailouts of four of its largest nine banks, “costing the
country more money than any other project in history outside of world wars”); Ali Quassim,
International Banking: U.K.’s Chancellor Osborne to Abolish ‘Failed’ Financial Services Authority
Started by Brown, 94 BNA’S BANKING REP. 1237 (June 22, 2010) (describing plans by the
Conservative-Liberal coalition government to abolish the “failed” FSA and replace it with three separate
agencies that would assume responsibility for regulating banks, protecting consumers and combating
serious economic crimes).
544. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 1–3, 10, 194–95, 199; Donna Boark, Three Years
On, Fears of Flight from U.S. Regs, AM. BANKER, June 17, 2011, at 1 (reporting that members of
Congress “appear consumed again with a very precisis topic: Is overregulation driving financial
institutions overseas?”; and quoting, as an example of that concern, a statement by Rep. Shelley Moore
Capito (R-WV) that “failing to examine the aggregate cost of compliance with Dodd–Frank could lead
to job losses and, in the worst case, a downgrade in the United States as a financial center”).
545. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 9; see also id. at 4 (warning that

1398

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

the same global “competitiveness” rationale to block efforts by federal
regulators to implement the Volcker Rule and Dodd–Frank’s derivatives
reforms.546
The financial industry’s repeated calls for international “level playing
fields” seek to reduce regulatory standards for global banks to the
“lowest common denominator” followed by any major financial
center.547 As a practical matter, that approach would “allow foreign
nations with the weakest systems of financial regulation to set the
maximum level of supervisory constraints on global SIFIs.”548 The
industry’s “level playing field” arguments must be rejected in view of
the disastrous role played by international regulatory arbitrage in
undermining financial supervision in the U.S., U.K. and Europe prior to
the financial crisis.549
2. Structural Flaws and Conflicts of Interest in U.S. Financial Agencies
Have Increased Their Vulnerability to Industry Influence and
Regulatory Arbitrage
Structural flaws and conflicts of interest within U.S. financial
agencies further weakened the effectiveness of financial regulation both
before and after the financial crisis. As shown above in Part
IV(B)(1)(a), the OCC, OTS and FRB actively competed to persuade
financial institutions to operate within their respective jurisdictions. The
OCC and OTS had particularly strong financial incentives to adopt lax
policies that would encourage large depository institutions to operate as
national banks or federal thrifts. Assessments paid by federallychartered banks and thrifts funded virtually all of the OCC’s and OTS’s
“excessive limitations on the ability of U.S. banks to take controlled risks will reduce the role of the
United States as a leader in the global financial system”).
546. Cheyenne Hopkins et al., U.S. Volcker Rule Faces Harsh Critics, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 14,
2012 (citing financial industry arguments that the Volcker Rule would hurt the “competitiveness” of
U.S. banks); Kevin Wack, Regulators: We Don’t Have all the Answers on Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 19, 2012, at 1 (reporting on claims by House Republicans that “the Volcker Rule will put the
United States at a disadvantage internationally”); Michael J. Moore, Citigroup Says Dodd–Frank Drives
Off Overseas Clients, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 1, 2013 (describing argument by Citigroup that new
derivatives rules mandated by Dodd–Frank could cause the bank to “lose clients to non-U.S. financial
institutions that are not subject to the same compliance regime”); Gregory Meyer & Aline van Duyn, US
Banks Plead to Limit Range of Swap Rules, REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2011 (citing arguments by BofA,
Citigroup and JPMorgan that proposed derivatives rules could “damage . . . their competitiveness in
foreign markets”).
547. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 10, 94–95; see also Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part
II), at 7 (referring to the financial industry’s argument that the U.S. “should not implement fundamental
financial reforms until all other major developed nations have agreed to do so”).
548. Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part II), at 7.
549. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 96, 177, 187; BAIR, supra note 290, at 27–38; 192,
257; Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part II), at 7.
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budgets.550
For example, the fees paid by WaMu covered about one-seventh of
the OTS’s total budget, and OTS Director John Reich referred to WaMu
as “my largest constitutent.”551 OTS examiners uncovered “more than
500 serious operational deficiencies” at WaMu between 2004 and 2008,
but the OTS continued to rate WaMu as “fundamentally sound” until
February 2008 and failed to take any public enforcement action before
WaMu failed in September 2008.552 A Senate investigation concluded
that the OTS’s forbearance toward WaMu “reflected an OTS culture of
deference to bank management” as well as the OTS’s likely “recognition
of [WaMu’s] unique importance to the agency’s finances.”553
Congress abolished OTS for its regulatory failings.554 However, the
OCC continues to have “strong budgetary incentives” to please large
national banks that fund most of the agency’s operations.555 The OCC is
“widely viewed as the most committed regulatory champion for the
interests of major banks,” and it has consistently acted to “retain [their]
allegiance.”556 In addition to its aggressive preemption of state
consumer protection laws, the OCC “issued dozens of rulings that
greatly expanded the permissible activities of national banks in areas
such as data processing, derivatives, equipment leasing, insurance sales,
real estate investments and securities activities.”557 In 2005, Acting
Comptroller of the Currency Julie Williams assured a group of bankers
that (i) the OCC’s supervisory approach provided “a spacious
framework, designed to accommodate change,” and (ii) the agency’s
personnel were “advocates on the national stage [for] measures designed
to make regulation more efficient, and less costly, less intrusive, less
complex, and less demanding on [bankers] and [their] resources.”558
During the debates over Dodd–Frank, the OCC joined major banks
550. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 158–61; Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, “Making
Credit Safer,” 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 81–83, 91–94 (2008); Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 915–16; see
also BAIR, supra note 290, at 41, 79, 192, 339–40 (criticizing the conflicts of interest created by the
OCC’s and OTS’s charter-based funding).
551. Senate Wall Street Crisis Report, supra note 461, at 165, 210 (quoting May 2, 2007 email
from Mr. Reich to an OTS colleague), 230.
552. Senate Wall Street Crisis Report, supra note 461, at 209, 161–62, 177, 228–30.
553. Id. at 209–11; see also supra notes 516-18 and accompanying text (citing additional OTS
missteps that contributed to the failures of IndyMac, Downey Federal , BankUnited and AIG).
554. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 918.
555. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 912.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 912–13 (quote); see also supra notes 251–551, 513 (discussing the OCC’s preemption
of state laws); Saule Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ‘Business of
Banking’, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1051–99 (2009) (describing how the OCC greatly expanded the
powers of national banks, especially with regard to derivatives activities, by issuing rulings that adopted
an ever-expanding definition of “the business of banking”).
558. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 905 (quoting speech by Ms. Williams on May 27, 2005).
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and their trade associations in opposing many of the statute’s key
reforms.559 After Dodd–Frank’s enactment, the OCC continued to align
itself with large financial institutions by resisting significant increases in
capital requirements for bank SIFIs, by opposing the Volcker Rule, and
by refusing to make significant reductions in the scope of the OCC’s
2004 preemption rules.560 In June 2011, Acting Comptroller of the
Currency John Walsh appeared to question the need for fundamental
financial reform when he warned that “in the frenzy of the moment, we
can overreact in response to crisis . . . [W]e are in danger of trying to
squeeze too much risk and complexity out of banking.”561
Democrats on Capitol Hill strongly criticized Mr. Walsh, and
President Obama replaced him with Thomas Curry, a former state
banking commissioner and FDIC board member.562 After taking office
in April 2012, Comptroller Curry declared that one of his “goals” was to
“eliminate [the] perception” that “the OCC is too cozy with the banks it
regulates.”563 He apologized for several OCC mistakes that were
revealed shortly after he took office, including the OCC’s failures to
prevent (i) widespread foreclosure abuses by national banks, (ii)
JPMorgan’s $6.2 billion loss from its “London Whale” trading
operation, and (iii) massive money laundering violations by HSBC.564
559. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 913 (discussing the OCC’s opposition during the drafting of
Dodd-Frank to reforms that would give greater protections to consumers, require national banks to
retain a substantial portion of the risk of loans they sell for securitization, and impose greater restrictions
on executive pay).
560. Id. at 913–15.
561. Id. at 914 (quoting speech by Mr. Walsh on June 21, 2011). Mr. Walsh did not change his
views after he was replaced by Thomas Curry in April 2012. In a subsequent interview, Mr. Walsh
repeated his concern that “policymakers are trying to wring too much risk and complexity out of the
financial system.” He also cautioned that “[w]e can go too far in the direction of safety” and thereby
restrict economic growth. Barbara A. Rehm, What Ex-Comptroller Walsh Really Thinks About the State
of Banking, AM. BANKER, Aug. 31, 2012, at 3 (summarizing and quoting Mr. Walsh’s views).
562. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 915–16; Kate Davidson, Curry’s Tricky Balancing Act at OCC,
POLITICO.COM, Feb. 27, 2013 (available on Lexis).
563. Victoria McGrane, Comptroller Got ‘Whale’ of an Intro, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2012, at C9
(quoting from an interview with Mr. Curry); see also Rob Blackwell & Rachel Witkowski, OCC’s
Curry on Big Bank Breakup, Basel and Preemption, AM. BANKER, Jan. 22, 2013, 2013 WLNR 1420945
(quoting Mr. Curry’s view that the OCC should act as “the cop on the beat” and should have “a good
dose of healthy skepticism” toward the banks it regulates).
564. Joe Adler, Watchdog Blames OCC Supervision for Failure to Catch ‘Robo-Signing’ Scandal,
AM. BANKER, June 4, 2012 (describing the Treasury inspector general’s criticism of the OCC for failing
to prevent abusive foreclosure practices by national banks, and reporting that Mr. Curry “generally
agreed with the watchdog’s recommendations”); Ben Protess, U.S. Regulator Concedes Oversight Lapse
in JPMorgan Loss, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at B5 (reporting that Mr. Curry “conceded . . . that his
agency stumbled” by failing to identify flawed risk management practices at JPMorgan that led to a
“multibillion dollar trading loss”); Joe Adler, Comptroller Curry Vows Tougher Enforcement, Higher
Ethics at OCC, AM. BANKER, July 18, 2012 (describing the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigation’s criticism of the OCC for “feeble enforcement” of anti-money laundering (AML) laws
against HSBC, and reporting that “Curry acknowledged his agency acted too slowly in addressing the
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Mr. Curry also developed a plan to “strengthen” the OCC by giving a
stronger voice to the agency’s examiners and by “diversifying funding
so the agency doesn’t have to rely solely on assessments from the banks
it regulates.”565 However, Mr. Curry’s efforts to change the OCC’s
culture—including his appointment of former FDIC colleagues to fill
leadership positions at the OCC—provoked criticism from bank
executives and OCC staff members. As a result, some analysts
expressed doubts whether Mr. Curry could successfully transform the
OCC into a strong and independent regulator.566
The Fed is not subject to the same budgetary pressures as the OCC,
because the Fed independently finances its operations by “drawing on
earnings from [its] portfolio of Treasury securities and other debt
instruments.”567 However, the banking industry exerts significant
influence over the Fed through the “unique governance structure” of the
Fed’s twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks).568
Member banks in each Fed district elect six of the nine directors of that
district’s Reserve Bank, and three of those bank-elected directors vote
(along with three additional directors appointed by the FRB) to select
the Reserve Bank’s president.569
bank’s problems”); see also Senate HSBC Report, supra note 434, at 8–11, 283–335 (criticizing the
OCC’s failure to enforce AML laws against HSBC, stating that “[d]espite the many AML problems
identified by its examiners, OCC supervisors took no formal or informal enforcement actions [from
2005 until 2010], allowing the bank’s AML problems to fester,” id. at 283); Jesse Hamilton, BankFriendly Regulator Shifts to Revamp Reputation, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 8, 2012 (reporting on initiatives
taken by Mr. Curry to make the OCC “a regulator for the public, not a regulator that views itself as
protecting banks”) (quoting former FDIC chairman Sheila Bair, who worked with Mr. Curry at the
FDIC).
565. Davidson, supra note 562.
566. Id.; Hamilton, supra note 564; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 341 (noting that Mr. Curry
would be “fighting an uphill battle” in trying to “change the regulatory culture of the OCC and refocus it
on protecting the public interest, not the banks” because “the OCC’s decline as a regulator has been
ongoing for many years”); Victoria Finkle, If CFPB Needs a Commission, Why Not OCC?, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 13, 2013 (reporting on a proposal by Sen. Mike Crapo (R-ID) to replace the OCC’s
single-director model of governance with a bipartisan commission, and citing analyst Edward Mills’
view that Senator Crapo’s proposal might “reflect dissatisfaction with the new regime at the OCC,”
including Mr. Curry’s efforts “to distance the agency from the perception that it is too lenient on banks.
If the agency gets tougher on the industry, that may prompt more calls to change its structure” in order
to give Republican legislators and the banking industry “more control over Curry than they currently
have”).
567. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 941.
568. Id.; see also ALLAN H. MELTZER, 1 A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913–1951, at
65–67, 483–86 (2003) (explaining that the Fed’s governance structure, which was established in 1913
and modified in 1935, represented a “compromise” between those who wanted a “central bank . . . under
political control”—as reflected in the President’s appointment of the FRB’s governors—and those who
wanted a “central bank . . . run by bankers,” as reflected in the election of two-thirds of each Reserve
Bank’s directors by member banks); BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 151 (discussing the
“many compromises” that produced the “unique . . . private-public nature of the Fed, as well as its
centralized-decentralized structure”).
569. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 941–42 (explaining that (i) member banks elect three Class A
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Five Reserve Bank presidents are voting members of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC)—which determines the nation’s
monetary policy—along with the FRB’s seven governors.570 All twelve
Reserve Bank presidents participate in the FOMC’s meetings, and each
Reserve Bank president has shared responsibility (together with the
FRB) for supervising member banks and bank holding companies
headquartered in that Reserve Bank’s district. Thus, Reserve Bank
presidents—who are subject to substantial influence from member banks
in their districts—”play significant roles in determining the Fed’s
monetary policy and bank supervisory policies.”571
Boards of directors of Reserve Banks have “typically been dominated
by senior executives of major banks, large [nonbank] financial firms and
leading nonfinancial corporations that are customers of the biggest
banks.”572 Many of the same banks and nonbank firms received federal
support during the financial crisis. For example, during the peak of the
crisis between 2007 and 2009, the New York Fed’s board of directors
included JPMorgan chairman Jamie Dimon, Lehman chairman Richard
Fuld, General Electric chairman Jeffrey Immelt, and Goldman director
and former chairman Stephen Friedman.573 Mr. Friedman’s service as a
Class C director of the New York Fed provoked substantial public
controversy because the FRB granted a waiver that allowed him to
continue serving in that role after Goldman converted to a bank holding
company in September 2008.574
and three Class B directors for each Reserve Bank, while the FRB appoints three Class C directors, and
(ii) Class B and Class C directors jointly vote to select the Reserve Bank’s president).
570. Id. at 942 (explaining that the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New
York Fed) serves as a permanent voting member of the FOMC, while four additional FOMC voting
seats rotate among the other eleven Reserve Bank presidents).
571. Id.; see also BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 89 (stating that the Fed “is not
independent of private banks” because “private banks are intimately intertwined with [Fed officials]
charged with regulating the nation’s major banks”).
572. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 943; see also Jonathan Reiss, The Regional Feds Need More
Independence, BLOOMBERG, June 13, 2012 (pointing out that six of the nine directors of each Reserve
Bank are elected by the banking industry, and also noting that the New York Fed’s three current Class C
directors were appointed by the FRB but were also leaders of “nonprofit corporations that rely on
contributions from financial corporations or their executives”).
573. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 943; see also U.S. Senator Bernard Sanders (I-VT), Jamie
Dimon Is Not Alone, June 12, 2012 (identifying 18 former and current Reserve Bank directors who
worked in banks and corporations that received Fed liquidity assistance during the financial crisis),
available at http://www.sanders.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/061212DimonIsNotAlone.pdf; William
Alden, Dimon Leaves New York Fed Board as His Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (DEALBOOK), Jan. 8,
2013 (available on Lexis) (reporting that Mr. Dimon left the New York Fed’s board in December 2012
after completing two three-year terms).
574. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 944–45 (explaining that (i) “[w]ithout the FRB’s waiver,
Friedman would have been disqualified from serving as a Class C director unless he resigned his
Goldman directorship and divested his Goldman stock,” and (ii) “Friedman purchased 37,000 additional
shares of Goldman stock while his waiver was pending, and during that period the New York Fed
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Dimon, Fuld, Immelt, Friedman and fourteen other Reserve Bank
directors worked at institutions that received massive amounts of
emergency liquidity assistance from the Fed during the crisis.575 In
addition, academic studies have shown that (i) “banks were significantly
more likely to receive capital assistance under [TARP] if their
executives served as directors of either Reserve Banks or Reserve Bank
branches,”576 and (ii) banks whose executives served as Reserve Bank
Class A directors between 1990 and 2009 “experienced significant
abnormal gains in their stock market values” and “were significantly
less likely to fail (compared with other banks).”577
During the past two decades the FRB has actively competed with the
OCC to attract the loyalty of major banks by (A) issuing rulings that
expanded the securities and derivatives activities of bank holding
companies, (B) granting exemptions that loosened restraints on
transactions between major banks and their affiliates, and (C)
advocating the adoption of less demanding capital requirements for the
largest banks under the Basel II capital accord.578 Both the FRB and the
OCC advocated an aggressive bailout policy for leading banks during
the financial crisis, and they also supported giving lenient terms to major
banks that wanted “to exit the TARP capital assistance program by
repurchasing the preferred stock they had sold to Treasury.”579
The foregoing evidence indicates that “large financial institutions
have exerted substantial influence on Fed policies” as well as those of
the OCC.580 The nature and extent of the financial industry’s influence
on the Fed and the OCC become even clearer when one considers the

directed AIG to pay $14 billion to Goldman, representing full payment of AIG’s obligations to
Goldman”).
575. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 945–46; see also Sanders, supra note 573, at 1 (stating that “at
least 18 former and current directors from Federal Reserve Banks worked in banks and corporations
that collectively received over $4 trillion in low-interest loans from the Federal Reserve”).
576. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 946 (citing a study by Ran Duchin and Denis Sosyura and
another study by Lei Li).
577. Id. at 946–47 (citing a study by Renee Adams).
578. Saule Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities
(Nov. 24, 2012), at 12–14, 33–42 (discussing OCC and FRB rulings that greatly expanded the securities
and derivatives activities of national banks and bank holding companies), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180647; Saule Omarova, From Gramm–Leach–Bliley to Dodd–Frank: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1702–03, 1706–
55 (2011) (detailing the generous exemptions that the FRB granted to large banking organizations from
rules limiting affiliate transactions, both before and during the financial crisis); BAIR, supra note 290, at
31–39 (stating that FRB and OCC officials worked together to promote more lenient capital standards
for large U.S. banks under Basel II); Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 948 (same).
579. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 948–50; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 95–129, 165–74, 207
(describing the FRB’s and OCC’s strong support for bailouts of large troubled banks and their
willingness to allow lenient terms for major banks that wanted to leave the TARP program).
580. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947, 950.

1404

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

contrasting record of the FDIC. As I explained in a previous article, the
FDIC “has demonstrated a significantly higher degree of independence
from industry influence” by virtue of its “clearly defined mission” as
well as its “assured source of funding.”581 The FDIC’s twin purposes
are to protect bank depositors and preserve the Deposit Insurance Fund
(DIF), and both goals encourage the FDIC to consider the broader public
interest and not just the financial industry’s self-interest.582 In addition,
the FDIC funds its operations by collecting premiums from FDICinsured banks. Because FDIC insurance is a practical necessity for all
banks that accept deposits from the public, the FDIC—unlike the
OCC—is not vulnerable to industry influence through “charter
competition.”583
The FDIC’s “guaranteed funding source” also means that the agency
is not subject to congressional domination through the appropriations
process.584 As I previously pointed out, “Congress has frequently
undermined the effectiveness of CFTC and SEC over the past two
decades by frequently failing to provide those agencies with adequate
funds.”585 Two former chairmen of the CFTC and SEC recently
declared that both agencies “need a robust—and dependable—source of
funding” that is not subject to deep cuts imposed by congressional
appropriators.586 As both former chairmen explained, an independent
funding source “insulates [agencies] from political pressure exerted by
the deep-pocketed institutions they regulate” and allows agencies to
“implement strategic decisions to adapt to changing markets and build
581. Id. at 947.
582. Id.; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 8, 12–13, 21–24, 43–47, 81–82, 192–93, 226, 340
(describing the FDIC’s strong commitments to protect depositors and preserve the DIF as well as the
FDIC’s relative independence from the financial industry); Brendan Greeley, Ditch Basel Rules, Just
Raise Capital, Vitter Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESWEEK (May 1, 2013) (stating that the FDIC has
followed “more conservative” supervisory policies because of its dual role as “both a regulator and an
insurer”), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-01/ditch-basel-bank-rules-just-raise-capitalvitter-says.
583. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 340 (stating that the FDIC
“has repeatedly proven itself to be significantly more independent of the big banks than the OCC”
because the FDIC “does not have to rely on fees from the nation’s biggest banks to fund itself, as does
the OCC”).
584. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947.
585. Id. at 951–53; see also supra notes 87–89, 160–62 (describing successful efforts by the
financial industry and its congressional allies to cut or freeze the budgets of the CFTC and SEC and
thereby constrain the ability of both agencies to implement Dodd–Frank’s reforms); BAIR, supra note
290, at 342–43 (stating that “industry lobbyists have found that the best way to harass the SEC and
CFTC and block efforts at financial reform is through convincing appropriations committees to restrict
how these agencies can use their money,” and contending that the “effectiveness [of the SEC and
CFTC] will not be improved if their senior staff and chairmen have to spend time and resources on the
Hill constantly battling industry lobbyists for enough money to operate”).
586. Brooksley Born & William Donaldson, Self-Funding of Regulators Would Help Fiscal Mess,
POLITICO.COM, Mar. 10, 2013.
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needed information technology . . . all of which require multiyear budget
certainty.”587
Because of the FDIC’s well-defined public interest mission and its
assured funding, the FDIC has demonstrated a much higher degree of
independence from the financial industry than the FRB, OCC, CFTC or
SEC. During the period leading up to the financial crisis, the FDIC (i)
generally took a tougher position against subprime mortgage lending,588
and (ii) “fought hard to maintain tougher capital rules for U.S. banks
(including leverage capital requirements) during international
negotiations over the Basel II capital accord.”589 The FDIC also pushed
the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision to adopt stronger capital
standards—including a leverage requirement—in the post-crisis Basel
III accord,590 although Basel III did not go far enough.591 The FDIC
prevailed (over the opposition of New York Fed and Treasury officials)
in deciding that WaMu’s bondholders would not be bailed out when
WaMu failed in September 2008.592 The FDIC achieved partial
success—again despite the contrary views of Fed and OCC officials—
when it pressured the largest banks to satisfy tougher capital-raising
requirements in order to exit the TARP capital assistance program.593
Sheila Bair, who served as FDIC chairman from 2006 to 2011,
deserves much of the credit for the FDIC’s comparatively better
performance during those years. However, the FDIC’s public interest
mission and its structural independence from the banking industry also
appear to be key factors. An example of that independence is shown by
the fact that, over the past three decades, industry insiders have
repeatedly attacked the FDIC for seeking to impose stronger capital
standards and higher deposit insurance premiums to reduce bank failures
and protect the DIF.594 Industry critics have frequently mocked the
FDIC’s acronym as standing for “Forever Demanding Increased
Capital.”595 An appropriate response to that mockery might be, “Isn’t
that the FDIC’s job?”

587. Id.
588. BAIR, supra note 290, at 43–49, 57–58.
589. Wilmarth. supra note 19, at 947–48; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 30–40.
590. BAIR, supra note 290, at 257–72.
591. See ADMATI AND HELLWIG, supra note 516, at 96, 169–70, 176–88 (showing that Basel III is
inadequate to ensure that large global banks can withstand future shocks similar to the financial crisis of
2007–09).
592. BAIR, supra note 290, at 90–94, 99–100; see also Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 948–49, 949
n.283 (explaining that then-New York Fed president Timothy Geithner and Treasury officials strongly
favored protecting WaMu’s bondholders).
593. BAIR, supra note 290, at 201–07; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 949–50.
594. BAIR, supra note 290, at 22–25; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947.
595. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 947, 947–48 n.279.
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3. The “Revolving Door” and “Cultural Capture” Provide Important
Sources of Regulatory Influence for the Financial Industry
The far-reaching deregulation of the U.S. financial services industry
after 1980 and the resulting proliferation of new financial activities and
products promoted rapid growth in the industry’s size, profitability and
compensation.596 For example, U.S. financial-sector assets (including
assets under financial management) mushroomed from $15.06 trillion
(254% of GDP) in 1991 to $37.71 trillion (360% of GDP) in 2002 and
$55.62 trillion (420% of GDP) in 2006.597 Similarly, U.S. financialsector debt rose from 40% of GDP in 1988 to 70% of GDP in 1998 and
120% of GDP in 2006.598 U.S. financial-sector profits experienced a
comparable growth curve, rising from 13% of total pretax domestic
profits in 1980 to 27% of such profits in 2007.599 Stocks of financial
firms included in the S&P 500 index accounted for the highest aggregate
market value of any industry sector from 1995 to 1998 and again from
2002 to 2007.600
Compensation in the U.S. financial industry steadily moved upward
596. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 70–87, 104–09, 120–44; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at
972–97, 1002–15; see also Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
Financial Industry: 1909–2006, Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 14644 (Jan. 2009), at 3–4,
16–22, 30 (finding that the two most important factors behind the significant rise in financial sector
compensation between 1980 and 2006 were (i) deregulation of banking and financial operations and (ii)
expansion of corporate finance activities linked to IPOs and credit risk management), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14644.
597. For the U.S. financial industry’s assets in 1991, see Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Flow
of Funds Accounts of the United States, 4th Qtr. 1996 (Statistical Rel. Z.1), at 68, 72–79 (line 1 of tbls.
L.109, L.114, L.115, L. 116, L.117, L.118, L.119, L.120, L.121, L.122, L.123, L.124, L.125, L.126),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/19970314/z1.pdf. For GDP in 1991, see Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, 3d Qtr. 1996 (Statistical
Rel.
Z.1),
at
12
(tbl.F.6,
line
1),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/19961211/z1.pdf. For the financial industry’s assets in 2002
and 2006, see Ins. Co. Instit. & Fin. Serv. Roundtable, The Financial Services Fact Book 2008, at 2.
For GDP in 2002 and 2006, see Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, 4th Qtr. 2006 (Statistical Rel. Z.1.), at 12 (tbl.F.6, line 1). See also Steven M. Kaplan &
Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, (Nat’l
Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper 13270, July 2007), at 18 (noting that the global capital of the top 50
U.S. securities firms grew by more than 20 times between 1987 and 2004, while total assets under
management at U.S. mutual funds rose from $135 billion to $8.9 trillion between 1980 and 2005),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13270.
598. The gods strike back: A special report on financial risk, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2010, at 3
(Borrowed time chart 1).
599. Justin Lahart, Has the Financial Industry’s Heyday Come and Gone?, WALL ST. J., April 28,
2008, at A2.
600. Elizabeth Stanton, Bank Stocks Cede Biggest S&P Weighting to Technology (Update 1),
BLOOMBERG, May 21, 2008; see also Tom Lauricella, Crumbling Profit Center: Financial Sector
Showing Life, but Don’t Bank on Long-Term Revival, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2008, at C1 (reporting that
financial stocks accounted for 22.3% of the toal market value of all stocks included in the S&P 500
index at the end of 2006, “up from just 13% at the end of 1995”).
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in tandem with the dramatic growth in the industry’s size and profits
after 1980. Wages in the financial sector were approximately the same
as average wages in the rest of the U.S. economy in 1980. However,
relative wages in the financial sector increased rapidly thereafter and
were seventy percent higher than average wages in the rest of the U.S.
economy by 2006.601
The peak reached in 2006 for relative
compensation in the financial industry matched a similarly high level
recorded in the early 1930s, which also marked the end of a long period
of aggressive deregulation and rapid growth in the financial sector.602
The remarkable expansion of the financial industry’s size, profits and
compensation over the past three decades produced a parallel growth in
the industry’s political clout. As described above, the financial sector’s
lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions increased
dramatically after 1990.603 Wall Street’s ability to wield great political
influence and to offer highly-compensated employment also created
powerful incentives for a rapidly spinning “revolving door” between
leadership positions in financial regulatory agencies and senior positions
at Wall Street firms and their law firms, accounting firms and trade
associations.604 As shown below, the “revolving door” and the related
problem of “cultural” or “cognitive” capture provide additional
explanations for Wall Street’s continued ability to shape Washington’s
financial policies.
a. The Impact of the “Revolving Door” in Magnifying the Financial
Industry’s Influence in Washington
The “revolving door” between government service and Wall Streetrelated employment has undoubtedly played a major role—along with
political contributions and lobbying—in helping to foster a pro-industry

601. Philippon & Reshef, supra note 596, at 3–4, 8 & fig. 1; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra
note 15, at 113–14, 252 n.77 (discussing the study by Philippon & Reshef and noting that the “excess
relative wage” paid to financial industry workers over other workers—representing “the difference
between [higher] average finance wages and what one would predict based on educational differences—
reaches a peak of around 40 percentage points in the 2000s”); Kaplan & Rauh, supra note 597, at 2–6,
32–34, 37–40, tbl.8a (concluding that executives of U.S. securities firms, hedge funds, private equity
funds, venture capital funds and mutual funds accounted for more than half of the most highlycompensated American individuals in 2004).
602. Philippon & Reshef, supra note 596, at 3–4, 8, 16–17 (describing the impact of deregulation
and the growth of IPOs and other corporate finance activities between 1900 and 1930 and again between
1980 and 2007).
603. See supra Part IV(A)(1); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 90–92.
604. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 92–105, 113–19; see also BARTH, CAPRO & LEVINE,
supra note 19, at 89, 209–10 (stating that “[t]he revolving door spins often and rapidly” between
financial regulatory agencies and Wall Street and noting that “regulatory officials often raise their
salaries by a factor of ten, if not more, by moving from their regulatory offices to financial firms”).
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outlook among many members of Congress, senior Executive Branch
officials and financial regulators.605 A former senior legislative aide and
lawyer-lobbyist recently declared, “Money is the basis of almost all
relationships in [Washington,] DC . . . . [O]ur political campaign
system and DC’s mushrooming Permanent Class—who alternate
between government jobs and lawyering, influence-peddling and
finance—mean Wall Street always wins.”606
In recent years the financial industry has employed hundreds of
former members of Congress, legislative staffers, senior regulators and
agency staffers as lobbyists and advisers. In 2009 and 2010, as noted
above, (i) the financial industry hired more than 1,400 lobbyists who
were former federal employees, including 73 former members of
Congress and two former Comptrollers of the Currency, and (ii) the six
largest U.S. banks employed more than 240 lobbyists who were former
government insiders.607 Financial industry trade groups frequently
appoint former politicians as their leaders.608 For example, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) recently named former
Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE) as its CEO. In announcing Senator
Nelson’s appointment, the president of NAIC declared, “We needed the
gravitas, the phone calls returned, to go to Capitol Hill, to tell our story,
defend our turf . . . . I think all the way up to and including President
Obama would return Senator Nelson’s phone calls.”609

605. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 92–93 (contending that the “constant flow of people
from Washington to Wall Street and back ensured that important decisions were made by officials who
had absorbed the financial sector’s view of the world and its perspective on government policy, and who
often saw their future careers on Wall Street, not in Washington”); see also BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE,
supra note 19, at 7, 89, 209–10 (agreeing that the “revolving door” contributes to a situation in which
“regulators are not completely independent of private financial institutions”); ADMATI & HELLWIG,
supra note 523, at 204–05, 325–26 n.56 (reaching a similar conclusion).
606. CONNAUGHTON, supra note 367 , at 11.
607. See supra notes 389–90 and accompanying text; see also supra note 375 and accompanying
text (citing study finding that the financial industry employed 3,000 lobbyists in 2007, including many
former government insiders).
608. SIFMA, Wall Street’s preeminent trade association, recently hired former Senator Judd
Gregg (R-NH) as its CEO while retaining former congressman Kenneth Bentsen (D-TX) as its
president. Stephen Joyce, Financial Services: SIFMA Names New Leadership, Says Focus Shifting
Away From 2008 Crisis, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 980 (May 27, 2013). The Financial Services
Roundtable, which represents most of the 100 largest U.S. financial institutions, hired former Minnesota
Governor and Republican Presidential candidate Tim Pawlenty in September 2012 to replace former
Texas Republican congressman Steve Bartlett. Barbara Rehm, Roundtable’s Pawlenty: A Blunt Boss
Set for Long Haul, AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 2012. Similarly, the American Bankers Association appointed
former Republican Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating as its president in 2011. Stacy Kaper, Next
Leader of ABA Vows to Put Aside His Politics, AM. BANKER, Nov. 24, 2010, at 1, 2010 WLNR
23356127.
609. Zachary Tracer & Alex Nussbaum, Ex-Senator Nelson to Run Insurer Watchdog Group,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 22, 2013 (quoting NAIC president Jim Donelson, and noting that former Senator
Nelson had previously served as Nebraska’s insurance commissioner and Governor).
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JPMorgan chairman Jamie Dimon confirmed the crucial importance
of political influence in shaping financial policy when he described
government relations as JPMorgan’s “seventh line of business.”610
JPMorgan has hired a large number of executives and in-house lobbyists
who formerly worked as top government officials or senior
congressional staffers.611 Citigroup has employed a similar array of
former government heavyweights, including former Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin from 1999 to 2009,612 as well as former Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Director and current Treasury
Secretary Jacob Lew from 2006 to 2008, and former OMB Director
Peter Orszag since 2010.613
Goldman Sachs is probably the best-known participant in the
revolving-door phenomenon. Indeed, the firm is often referred to as
“Government Sachs,” due to the steady flow of senior personnel
between the firm and government agencies.614 Two former Treasury
Secretaries—Robert Rubin (1995–99) and Henry Paulson (2006–09)—
were chairmen of Goldman Sachs before their government service, and
Henry Fowler joined Goldman Sachs as a partner after his term as
Treasury Secretary ended in 1968.615 Fowler introduced Rubin to
610. Jackie Calmes & Louise Story, In Washington, One Bank Chief Still Holds Sway, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2009, at A1.
611. John McCormick et al., The Administration: Fixing the Things the Chicago Way,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 17–23, 2011, at 25 (reporting that President Obama appointed
William Daley as his chief of staff after Mr. Daley—a former Secretary of Commerce under President
Clinton—worked for JPMorgan for seven years as the bank’s “political coordinator”) (quoting Leo
Melamed); Robert Schmidt, JPMorgan Drafts Republicans for Damage Control, BLOOMBERG, June 12,
2013 (reporting that JPMorgan employed former Senator Mel Martinez (R-Fl) as a regional chairman
and Peter Scher, a former Clinton Administration official, as the bank’s head of global government
relations); Kevin Wack, JPMorgan Builds Vast Web of Staff, Money Connections to Lawmakers, AM.
BANKER, June 13, 2012 (explaining that, in addition to giving large political contributions to key
members of the Senate and House banking committees, JPMorgan employed 11 in-house lobbyists who
were former staffers on Capitol Hill, including six who worked for Democrats and five who worked for
Republicans).
612. William D. Cohan, Rethinking Rubin, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 24–30, 2012, at
60; see also Michael Hirsh, In Bob We Trust, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 2013, at 12, 17–18
(reporting that Rubin advocated legislation to repeal Glass–Steagall as Treasury Secretary, and
Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill hired Rubin in 1999 “to secure a ‘highly visible public endorsement’ for the
repeal of Glass–Steagall later that year”); Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 220–21, 306–07 (explaining that
the passage of GLBA, which repealed Glass–Steagall, was necessary to enable Citigroup to continue to
operate as a diversified financial conglomerate).
613. Eric Lipton, Advisers’ Citigroup Ties Raise Questions, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A21;
Jonathan Weil, Citigroup’s Man Goes to the Treasury Department, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 21, 2013;
Zachary Goldfarb, Regulators see chance to cash in, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2010, at A11; David Griffin,
Citigroup’s Orszag to Oversee Strategy Unit as Chiefs Picked, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 25, 2013.
614. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Ben White, The Guys from ‘Government Sachs,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2008, § BU, at 1; Michael Hirsh, ‘Government Sachs,’ Italian Style, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Nov. 10,
2011 (available on Lexis); Michael J. De La Merced, Bank of England’s New Leader a Member of the
‘Government Sachs’ Club, NEW YORK TIMES BLOGS (DEALBOOK), Nov. 26, 2012 (available on Lexis).
615. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 93–95; Joseph Weber, The Leadership Factory,

1410

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

Democratic “powerbroker” Robert Strauss in 1971, a step that launched
Rubin’s active involvement in politics and government.616 Both Rubin
and Paulson appointed several of their Goldman colleagues to senior
Treasury posts during their respective tenures as Treasury Secretary.617
Many other former Goldman partners have served in senior federal
government positions since World War II.618 As noted above, former
Goldman chairman Stephen Friedman had a controversial tenure as a
Class C director of the New York Fed, and he was also chair of the
search committee that nominated William Dudley, Goldman’s former
chief economist, as the new President of the New York Fed in 2009.619
Goldman’s alumni also include two leading international central
bankers—Mario Draghi (former head of the Bank of Italy and current
head of the European Central Bank), and Mark Carney (former head of
the Bank of Canada and current head of the Bank of England).620
Robert Rubin’s career—including his ability to secure top-level
government and private-sector positions for his acolytes—provides a
striking illustration of the revolving door’s powerful impact.621 After
being mentored by Henry Fowler and Robert Strauss, Rubin was
appointed by President Clinton as head of the National Economic
Council in 1993 and as Treasury Secretary in 1995. Rubin received
widespread praise for “his handling of the Asian financial crisis and the
bailout of Long-Term Capital Management” in 1998.622 Along with
FRB chairman Alan Greenspan and Deputy Treasury Secretary
Lawrence Summers, Rubin “was lionized on the cover of Time, which
dubbed the troika the ‘Committee to Save the World.’”623 Rubin helped
to arrange the appointments of many of his mentees to senior positions
in the federal government, including (i) Lawrence Summers as Treasury
Secretary in 1999 and as chief economic adviser to President Obama in

BUSINESSWEEK, June 12, 2006, at 60.
616. William D. Cohan, Bob Rubin’s Washington Reign Reaches 20 Years, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 20,
2013.
617. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 93–100; Creswell & White, supra note 614.
618. Weber, supra note 615 (noting, inter alia, that former Goldman chairman Jon Corzine served
as a U.S. Senator and Governor of New Jersey, while former Goldman chairman Stephen Friedman
served as a senior advisor to President George W. Bush).
619. See supra note 574 and accompanying text; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 944–45.
620. Hirsh, supra note 612; Landon Thomas Jr. & Jack Ewing, Can Super Mario Savie the Day
for Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, § BU, at 4; Landon Thomas Jr. & Julia Werdigier, Britain
Selects a Canadian to Lead the Bank of England, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, at B1; De La Merced,
supra note 614.
621. Gabriel Sherman, Revolver, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, April 18, 2011 (“More than anyone else,
it was Bob Rubin who made the Democratic revolving door work as smoothly as it has.”) (available on
Lexis).
622. Id.
623. Id.
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2009, (ii) Timothy Geithner as President of the New York Fed in 2003
and as Treasury Secretary in 2009, (iii) Peter Orszag as OMB Director
in 2009, and (iv) Jacob (Jack) Lew as Treasury Secretary in 2013.624
Three recent Comptrollers of the Currency provide further prominent
examples of the revolving door between the private sector and
government service. Eugene Ludwig practiced law at Covington &
Burling, served as Comptroller from 1993 to 1998 and was a vice
chairman at Bankers Trust before he founded Promontory Financial
Group—”a consulting firm that has built a reputation as a shadow
regulator by hiring scores of former government officials”—in 2001.625
John D. Hawke, Jr., served as the FRB’s General Counsel from 1975 to
1978, practiced law at Arnold & Porter and worked as a top Treasury
official from 1995 to 1998, after which he served as Comptroller from
1998 to 2004 and then returned to Arnold & Porter.626 John C. Dugan
was a senior House banking committee counsel, worked as a senior
Treasury official and practiced law at Covington & Burling before
serving as Comptroller from 2005 to 2010, when he returned to
Covington & Burling.627
As three economists recently observed, “The speed of the revolving
door at the SEC makes one’s head spin.”628 Between 2001 and 2010,
624. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 93–100; Jackie Calmes, Rubinomics Recalculated,
NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at A1; Cohan, supra note 612; Hirsh, supra note 612; Eamon Javers,
Robert Rubin returns, POLITICO.COM, April 8, 2010 (available on Lexis).
625. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ex-Chief Lands at Consultant—Schapiro Is Latest Former U.S.
Regulator to Join Promontory Financial, WALL ST. J., April 2, 2013, at C1 (reporting that Promontory
hired former SEC chairman Mary Schapiro to lead the firm’s “governance and markets practice and
advis[e] clients on risk management and compliance” and noting that “[m]ore than one-fourth of
Promontory’s nearly 400 full-time employees are former regulators”); see also Jeff Horwitz & Maria
Aspan, How Ludwig’s Promontory Became a Regulatory Braintrust, AM. BANKER, April 2013
(describing Ludwig’s career and his success in building Promontory as an “ex-regulator omnibus,
capable of forecasting, mimicking and occasionally even substituting for the financial industry’s
supervisors”), available at http://www.promontory.com/uploadedFiles/Articles/News/How%20Ludwi
gs%20Promontory%20Became%20a%20Regulatory%20Braintrust%20%20April%202013.pdf;
Ludwig: 21st Century Spells Challenge, Change, BANK INVESTMENT SERVICES REP., Mar. 15, 1999, at
1 (discussing Ludwig’s career) (available on Lexis).
626. Arnold & Porter LLP, firm biography of John D. Hawke, Jr., available at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?u=HawkeJohnDJr&action=view&id=716.
627. Covington & Burling, firm biography of John C. Dugan, available at
http://www.cov.com/jdugan/; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 95 (explaining that Dugan served as
“a Treasury official during the George H.W. Bush administration, [where] he led a study that advocated
the repeal of interstate banking restrictions and of the Glass–Steagall Act; as a lawyer advising the
American Bankers Association, he helped steer [GLBA] through Congress”); see also U.S. Dept. of the
Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks
xviii, 5–8, 49–61 (Feb. 1991) (stating that Dugan was “Study Director” for the Treasury study, which
recommended legislation that would authorize nationwide banking and branching and would also repeal
the Glass–Steagall Act).
628. BARTH, CAPRIO & LEVINE, supra note 19, at 209–10. The revolving door also spins rapidly
at the CFTC. According to one news story, “fully three-quarters of those who had served as CFTC
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more than 400 SEC alumni filed nearly 2,000 requests to represent
clients before the SEC within two years after they had left the agency.629
Former SEC officials have helped Wall Street clients to obtain hundreds
of special waivers from the agency since 2001. Those waivers have
allowed Wall Street firms to continue selling securities in public
offerings as “well-known seasoned issuers,” and to sell securities in
exempt private offerings, even though the firms previously settled SEC
charges for securities law violations.630 In addition, former SEC
employees obtained dozens of no-action letters that allowed their Wall
Street clients to provide financial support to sponsored money market
mutual funds (MMMFs) during the financial crisis.631 SEC alumni also
actively participated in the mutual fund industry’s lobbying campaign
that successfully blocked SEC chairman Mary Schapiro’s efforts to
impose stronger regulations on MMMFs in 2012.632
The powerful impact of the revolving door is confirmed not only by
those who enter it but also by those who refuse to enter or decide to
leave it. In his recent memoir, Neil Barofsky recounts a meeting in
April 2010 with Herbert Allison, a senior Treasury official and former
Wall Street executive. After first praising Barofsky as “very talented,
with a bright future,” Allison warned Barofsky that he was causing
himself “real harm” by issuing reports (in his capacity as Special
Inspector General for TARP) that sharply criticized Treasury’s
implementation of TARP.633 Allison advised Barofsky that “[a]ll you
really have to do is to change your tone, just a bit, and things can really
commissioners over the past decade are among the noisy crowd of lobbyists beseeching [CFTC
chairman Gary Gensler] to soften the proposed derivatives rules, delay their implementation or simply
chuck them out altogether.” Rivlin, supra note 7.
629. Project on Government Oversight, Dangerous Liaisons: Revolving Door at SEC Creates
Risk of Regulatory Capture 8 (Feb. 11, 2013) [hereinafter POGO SEC Revolving Door Report],
available
at
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2013/dangerous-liaisons-revolving-door-atsec.html?print=t; see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Securities and Exchange Commission:
Existing Post-Employment Controls Could Be Further Strengthened, GAO-11-654, at 5,10 (July 2011)
(finding that, between 2005 and 2010, 224 SEC alumni filed 825 requests to represent clients before the
SEC within two years after those former employees left the agency) [hereinafter GAO SEC Revolving
Door Study].
630. POGO SEC Revolving Door Report, supra note 629, at 8–10; Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Is
Avoiding Tough Sanctions for Large Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at A1. In many cases the SEC
granted the requested waivers even though the requesting firms had entered into more than one
settlement with the SEC. Id.
631. POGO SEC Revolving Door Report, supra note 629, at 14.
632. Id. at 3–6.
633. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at xii–xiii; see also supra notes 337–40, 344-49 and
accompanying text (discussing Barofsky’s critique of Treasury’s implementation of HAMP); Gretchen
Morgenson, TARP’s Watchdog: A Tough Act to Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, § BU, at 1
(explaining that Barofsky criticized Treasury’s implementation of several TARP programs, and noting
that Barofsky’s reports “often put him at odds with the Treasury officials whose work he [was] charged
with overseeing”).
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change for you. Including with the White House.”634 Allison further
suggested that the Obama Administration might be willing to offer
Barofsky “[s]omething else in government” or a “judgeship,” but
Barofsky politely declined to follow Allison’s advice, and he continued
to criticize Treasury’s implementation of TARP in subsequent reports.635
Of course, Barofsky did not receive any offers of senior government
positions or Wall Street partnerships when he completed his government
service in 2011.636
While Barofsky’s experience indicates the consequences of refusing
to enter the revolving door, Gary Gensler’s career reveals the likely
costs of exiting that door. After working at Goldman Sachs from 1979
to 1997, Gensler served as a senior Treasury official under Rubin and
Summers during the Clinton Administration and later helped Senator
Paul Sarbanes to draft the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002.637 Although
viewed as a champion of financial deregulation during his Treasury
service, Gensler adopted a very different approach after he was
appointed as CFTC’s chairman in 2009. Gensler became the leading
government champion for enacting and implementing Dodd–Frank’s
new regime for regulating derivatives markets.638 He also became the
“driving force” for prosecuting large U.S. and foreign banks for having
manipulated Libor, in sharp contrast to other U.S. and U.K. financial
regulators who largely ignored evidence of widespread Libor
manipulation in 2007 and 2008.639
Gensler publicly declared his independence from Wall Street in early
2010, while he actively negotiated Dodd–Frank’s derivatives reforms.
He stated in an interview that he could “take on the banks . . . because
they are part of his past, not his future.” 640 As Gensler explained, “I
don’t see myself going back to Wall Street . . . .
That’s very
liberating.”641
In response to Gensler’s vigorous reform efforts, Wall Street and its
634. BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at xiv.
635. Id. at xiv–xvi; 200–25.
636. Id. at 225 (explaining that Barofsky accepted an offer to teach at New York University Law
School); see also Morgenson, supra note 633 (reporting that “comments by unnamed Treasury officials
deriding Mr. Barofsky and his work often appeared in news articles after he published his reports. In
mid-February [2011], when he announced his retirement, an unidentified Treasury source told The
Washington Post that the news was ‘a nice valentine to us.’”).
637. Fana Foroohar, The Money Cop, TIME, Dec. 24, 2012, at 36, 40; Foroohar, supra note 71; Ian
Katz & Robert Schmidt, Gensler Turns Back on Wall Street to Push Derivatives Overhaul,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 12, 2010.
638. See authorities cited supra in note 637.
639. Foroohar, supra note 637, at 36, 39–40; Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch, “Secret Libor
Transcripts Expose Trader Rate Manipulation,” BLOOMBERG, Dec. 13, 2012.
640. Katz & Schmidt, supra note 637 (paraphrasing Mr. Gensler).
641. Id. (quoting Mr. Gensler).
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legislative allies blocked his requests for increases in the CFTC’s budget
and used both lobbying and litigation to obstruct the CFTC’s rulemaking
efforts.642 Gensler’s term as CFTC chairman expired in April 2012,
although he could potentially remain in that position until the end of
2013.643 As of mid-2013, the Obama Administration had not nominated
Gensler for a second term, and efforts by reform advocates to elevate
Gensler to a more influential position as Treasury Secretary or SEC
chairman went nowhere.644 In June, industry lobbyists began to spread
rumors that President Obama would nominate a replacement for Gensler
“as soon as July.”645 Analysts explained the absence of any new
appointment for Gensler—despite his “brave and lonely battle” to
implement Dodd–Frank’s reforms—by pointing out that Wall Street
strongly opposed any such appointment.646
While bypassing Gensler, the Obama Administration received
widespread praise from the financial industry when President Obama
appointed two veterans of Wall Street—Jacob (Jack) Lew and Mary Jo
White—as Treasury Secretary and SEC chairman in early 2013.647
From 2006 to 2008 Lew worked as a senior executive at Citigroup,
642. Foroohar, supra note 71; see also supra notes 73–89, 95–99, 160-62 and accompanying text
(discussing the financial industry’s use of lobbying and litigation to cut the CFTC’s budget and obstruct
the agency’s rulemaking).
643. Silla Brush, Gensler Said to Discuss Chance of Second Term at CFTC, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 5,
2013.
644. Id.; Hirsh, supra note 612, at 15; Simon Johnson, My Top Five Choices for a New Treasury
Secretary, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 11, 2012.
645. Gregory Meyer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission faces top-level shake-up, FT.COM
(June 18, 2013).
646. Hirsh, supra note 612, at 15; see also Faroohar, supra note 637 (reporting that “some
insiders speculate that if Gensler hadn’t made so many enemies in finance in the past few years, he
might be a contender for a bigger gig, like head of the SEC or Treasury”); Ben Protess & Jessica SilverGreenberg, With an Obama Victory, Wall Street Pivots to Plan B, NY TIMES BLOG, Nov. 7, 2012, 2012
WLNR 23715366 (reporting that “lobbyists at several New York banks” were working to prevent any
reappointment of Mr. Gensler as CFTC chairman). The financial industry’s ability to block the
reappointment of a regulator who is a fearless proponent of strong supervisory policies is not a
phenomenon limited to the U.S. In the U.K., leading banks reportedly helped to persuade Chancellor of
the Exchequer George Osborne to reject Robert Jenkins’ application for a second term on the Bank of
England’s Financial Policy Committee. The banks opposed Jenkins’ reappointment because of his
outspoken advocacy for higher bank capital requirements as well as stricter limits on executive
compensation paid by systemically important banks. Ben Chu, How George Osborne threw our
guardian angel overboard, THE INDEPENDENT (London, U.K.), April 5, 2013 (available on Lexis); Iain
Dey, Treasury to shake up bank watchdog: Two of City’s fiercest critics may be axed from regulator set
up after financial crisis, THE SUNDAY TIMES (London, U.K.), Mar. 24, 2013, § Bus., at 2 (available on
Lexis); see also Meera Louis, Banks Should Defer Bonuses for Up to 10 Years, Jenkins Says,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 8, 2012 (reporting on Robert Jenkins’ proposal that “[b]ankers’ bonuses should be
deferred for as long as 10 years to hold executives accountable for risks,” and noting that Jenkins also
“called for higher capital requirements and said ‘too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-bail and too-big-to-jail’
institutions remain a challenge for regulation”).
647. Hirsh, supra note 612, at 15–17; William D. Cohan, Mary Jo White Spins the SEC’s
Revolving Door, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 17, 2013.
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which hired him on Robert Rubin’s recommendation.648 Citigroup paid
Lew a bonus of nearly $1 million in late 2008, one day after the federal
government provided a huge TARP bailout to Citigroup.649 In addition,
Lew’s employment contract with Citigroup gave him a stock-based
payout worth up to $500,000 when he left the bank to join the Obama
Administration in 2009.650 Given Lew’s strong connections with
Citigroup and Rubin, as well as his past support for financial
deregulation,651 it is hardly surprising that Wall Street warmly praised
his nomination.652
Mary Jo White also attracted strong support from Wall Street when
President Obama nominated her as SEC chairman.653 White served as
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York from 1993 to 2002,
and during her tenure she pioneered the use of deferred prosecution
agreements instead of indictments to resolve criminal charges against
large corporations.654 White then spent more than a decade defending
648. Jonathan Weil, Citigroup’s Man Goes to the Treasury Department, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 21,
2013; Jia Lynn Yang, Treasury pick faced a storm at Citigroup, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2013, at A01.
649. Victoria Finkle, Lew Defends Citi Experience, Outlines Banking Views, AM. BANKER, Feb.
14, 2013, 2013 WLNR 3623822; Yang, supra note 648.
650. Weil, supra note 648; Jonathan Weil, Is NYU a Charity? Another Question Orrin Hatch
Should Ask Jack Lew, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 25, 2013. As shown by Citigroup’s payout to Lew, major
Wall Street firms have promoted revolving-door behavior by allowing their senior executives to collect
deferred compensation and cash out their stock option awards when they enter government service.
Susanne Craig, Financial Windfalls for Wall St. Executives Taking Government Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2013, at B5; Project on Government Oversight, Big Businesses Offer Revolving Door Rewards, Mar.
21, 2013, available at http://www.pogo.org/blog/2013/03/big-businesses-offer-revolving-doorrewards.html.
651. Hirsh, supra note 612, at 15, 17 (noting Lew’s close connection to Rubin and reporting that
(i) during his confirmation hearing for OMB Director in 2010, Lew stated, “I don’t believe that
deregulation was the proximate cause” of the financial crisis, and (ii) during Lew’s earlier service as
OMB Director between 1998 and 2001, the OMB cleared both GLBA and CFMA); Finkle, supra note
649 (reporting that, during Lew’s confirmation hearing for Treasury Secretary in 2013, he disagreed
with the view that Congress made a mistake when it repealed Glass–Steagall in 1999).
652. Hirsh, supra note 612, at 17 (quoting an unnamed financial-industry lobbyist who said that
“Lew’s appointment is a huge relief precisely because Wall Street executives believe they’ll get
something close to another Geithner, or someone even more pliable”); Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama picks Lew
for Treasury as fiscal issues loom, ASSOCIATED PRESS FINANCIAL WIRE, Jan.10, 2013 (quoting praise
for Lew’s appointment from Thomas Donohue, head of the Chamber of Commerce, and Rob Nichols,
head of the Financial Services Forum); “Forum Statement on Senate Confirmation of Jack Lew,” Feb.
27, 2013 (press release by the Financial Services Forum, an organization “comprising the CEOs of 19 of
the largest and most diversified financial services institutions doing business in the United States,”
which praised Lew as having “a unique understanding of the important role the financial sector plays in
our
economy”),
available
at
http://www.financialservicesforum.org/index.php/news/pressreleases/1403-forum-statement-on-senate-confirmation-of-jack-lew.
653. Jessica Holzer, SEC Nominee Signals Shift, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 25, 2013, at
(quoting Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., a “top official” at SIFMA, “Wall Street’s main trade group,” who
called White “a solid choice”); ICI Statement on Nominee for SEC Chair, Jan. 24, 2013 (press release by
Investment Company Institute, praising White’s “record of extraordinary accomplishment” and
“applaud[ing] her nomination”), available at http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/13_secchair_nominee.
654. Dave Michaels, Obama’s SEC Pick Wary of Zealous Wall Street Prosecutions, BLOOMBERG,
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Wall Street firms and their executives as a partner at Debevoise &
Plimpton.655 She declared in 2003 that she feared a “feeding frenzy of
enforcement” after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, and she
expressed similar concerns in 2012, when she urged prosecutors to
“distinguish what is actually criminal and what is just mistaken
behavior, what is even reckless risk-taking, and not bow to the
frenzy.”656 In 2005, White made a controversial intervention on behalf
of a Wall Street client in an SEC insider trading investigation, and an
SEC lawyer involved in that investigation later called her “Wall Street’s
protector-in-chief.”657
Given White’s past defense of Wall Street interests and the fact that
her husband is also a prominent lawyer representing Wall Street clients,
some analysts warned that the SEC’s conflict of interest rules and her

Feb. 27, 2013 (discussing Mary Jo White’s career and describing her “invention of corporate probation,
or deferred prosecution” in 1994 as a method for resolving criminal charges against Prudential
Securities for “fraudulently marketing $8 billion in ruinous energy partnerships to small investors”);
Kurt Eichenwald, Brokerage Firm Admits Crimes in Energy Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at A1
(quoting White’s explanation that she approved the deferred prosecution agreement with Prudential
Securities to avoid “‘crippling collateral consequences to thousands of innocent employees’ that could
have occurred if the firm had been indicted”); see also Peter Spivak & Sujit Raman, Regulating the
‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 164
(2008) (stating that the Prudential Securities settlement was “the first deferred prosecution agreement
involving a major company”). For criticisms of the use of deferred prosecution agreements for settling
criminal charges against large financial firms, see supra notes 434–49 and accompanying text
(discussing the public outcry against recent deferred prosecution agreements with HSBC and UBS);
Michaels, supra (quoting former Treasury official Jimmy Gurulé’s charge that “resolving complex cases
pursuant to deferred-prosecution agreements is creating a culture of impunity within the financial
services community”).
655. Michaels, supra note 654 (reporting that Mary Jo White’s clients as a “Wall Street defense
lawyer” at Debevoise & Plimpton included JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, UBS and Bank of
America CEO Ken Lewis).
656. Id. (quoting White’s statement during a Bloomberg Radio interview in 2003); Roger
Runningen & Joshua Gallu, Obama Will Name Former Prosecutor Mary Jo White SEC Chairman,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 24, 2013 (quoting White’s statement at a New York University School of Law event
in Feb. 2012); see also Talks of the Campus, New York University School of Law, THE LAW SCHOOL
MAGAZINE 84 (2012) (quoting White as criticizing President Obama’s creation of a federal-state
financial fraud task force during a program at NYU Law School on Feb. 8, 2012, because “[i]t gets back
to my frenzy concern. You don’t want that kind of pressure in the system. You don’t want the search
for scalps to be the metric for success. Politics doesn’t belong in this space at all.”), available at
http://issuu.com/nyulaw/docs/2012mag?mode=embed&layout=http%3A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv
%2Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true.
657. Jean Eaglesham & Liz Rappaport, The Six Degrees of Mary Jo White, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
2013, at B1 (quoting Gary Aguirre, “a former SEC investigator and whistleblower”). As discussed
supra in note 456, White contacted SEC enforcement director Linda Thomsen on behalf of Morgan
Stanley to inquire whether John Mack was implicated in an SEC insider trading investigation involving
Pequot Capital. At the time, Morgan Stanley was considering appointing Mack as its CEO. The SEC
fired Aguirre after he sought to depose Mack, and the agency took no action against Mack. A Senate
joint committee report and an SEC’s inspector general report criticized the SEC for responding to
White’s inquiry and for creating the impression that White might have influenced the agency’s
investigation. Morgenson & Bogdanovitch, supra note 456; Runnigen & Gallu, supra note 656.
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personal inclinations could discourage her from pursuing strong
regulatory and enforcement policies against Wall Street firms and their
executives.658 In any event, the career paths of Robert Rubin, Peter
Orszag, Jack Lew, Mary Jo White, Neil Barofsky and Gary Gensler
indicate that the revolving door spins quickly and lucratively for those
who sympathize with Wall Street but repels those who criticize Wall
Street.
b. The Impact of “Cultural” and “Cognitive” Capture” in Undermining
the Effectiveness of Financial Regulation
In addition to the revolving door between government service and the
financial industry, extensive professional and social contacts encourage
regulators to align themselves with the outlook of industry officials, a
phenomenon that analysts have described as “cultural capture” and
“cognitive capture.”659 As James Kwak has explained, “‘cultural
capture’ . . . operates through a set of shared but not explicitly stated
understandings” leading to “regulatory actions that serve the ends of
industry.”660 Similarly, Willem Buiter has argued that “cognitive
regulatory capture” occurs when regulators “internalis[e], as if by
osmosis, the objectives, interests and perception of reality of the vested
interest they are meant to regulate and supervise in the public
interest.”661 The likelihood of cultural capture increases when (i)
financial regulators feel part of an “in-group” with industry executives
due to close professional contacts and shared “social networks,” and (ii)
658. William D. Cohan, Mary Jo White Spins the SEC’s Revolving Door, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 17,
2013; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Nominee for ‘Sheriff’ Has Worn Banks’ Hat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2013, at
B1 (noting, inter alia, that John W. White “is a corporate partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore” and
“counts JPMorgan Chase, Credit Suisse and UBS as clients”); Jonathan Weil, Mary Jo White’s Latest
Conflict of Interest, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 14, 2013; David Zeiler, Mary Jo White: SEC Pick Compromised
by Links to Wall Street, MONEY MORNING (Jan. 28, 2013), http://moneymorning.com/2013/01/28/maryjo-white-sec-pick-compromised-by-links-to-wall-street/.
659. See Lawrence G. Baxter, ‘Capture’ in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the
Comon Good?, 21 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 175, 183–86 (2011) (explaining that “cultural” and
“social” capture arise when “the language of regulation is shaped by the common backgrounds,
education, experience and intermingling of the more powerful players [in government and industry] in
the policy formation process” and noting the impact of “the very visible revolving doors between the
SEC and other financial regulators and industry”) (footnotes omitted).
660. James Kwak, “Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis,” at 9, in Preventing Capture:
Special Interest Influence on Regulation, and How to Limit It (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss., eds.)
(Cambridge
Univ.
Press,
2013)
(forthcoming),
chapter
manuscript
available
at
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Kwak%20Cultural%20Capture%20%281.
16.13%29.pdf.
661. Willem H. Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises, in Maintaining Stability in a
Changing Financial System: Proceedings of the 2008 Economic Policy Symposium 495, 601 (Fed. Res.
Bank
of
Kansas
City,
MO,
Aug.
21–23,
2008),
available
at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2008/Buiter.03.12.09.pdf.

1418

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

regulators view industry insiders as occupying a “higher status” based
on wealth, intellectual achievement and social prominence.662
Regulators and bankers maintain close working relationships through
frequent supervisory meetings as well as policy discussions about
regulatory initiatives.663 Banking agencies maintain continuous contacts
with megabanks by virtue of their “permanent resident teams of bank
examiners at the largest banks.”664 In addition, financial regulators are
inclined to identify with the views and experiences of industry officials
because (i) regulators “operate within a relatively narrow, insulated and
expertise-based” field of work that they share with “sophisticated repeat
players” in the financial industry, and (ii) regulators and industry
officials frequently have similar educational and professional
backgrounds and are therefore “likely to share social, educational, or
experiential ties.”665
The New York Fed calls its on-site examination teams “relationship
management teams,”666 a term that suggests a very close and symbiotic
connection between on-site regulators and the institutions they regulate.
The New York Fed’s self-study of supervisory failures during the
financial crisis determined that on-site examiners often lacked sufficient
independence from the banks they regulated. The study found that “the
Relationship teams [often] become gate-keepers at their banks, seeking
to control access [by other regulators] to their institutions.”667 In
addition, “relationship managers were too deferential to bank
management and too dependent on the bank’s goodwill and
[management information systems] to gain information”668 Bank
examiners complained that they often did not “receive sufficient support
from senior management when banks complain about supervisory
662. Kwak, supra note 660, at 11–25.
663. Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial
Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 630 (2012).
664. Levitin, supra note 514, at 159 (noting that permanent on-site teams of bank examiners bear
“an uncanny resemblance to [the teams] of outside accountants at Enron and WorldCom, who abdicated
their regulatory role to become enablers”).
665. Ford, supra note 523, at 614–15.
666. Caroline Salas & Bradley Keoun, New York Fed’s Dahlgren Overhauls Bank Supervision to
Beef Up Oversight, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 21, 2011.
667. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Report on Systemic Risk and Bank Supervision”
(“Discussion Draft” of Aug. 18, 2009 [rev1]), at 11 (emphasis added), FRBNY-FCIC-General10080241
[hereinafter
FRBNY
Systemic
Risk
Report],
available
at
http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2009-09-10%20FRBNY%20Report%20on%20Systemic%
20Risk%20and%20Bank%20Supervision%20draft.pdf.
668. Id. at 19, FRBNY-FCIC-General10080249; see also id. at 8, FRBNY-FCICGeneral10080238 (“Banks inherently have an information advantage over supervisors . . . . Getting
good, timely information is therefore dependent on the willingness and enthusiasm of bank staff in
providing that information. Supervisors . . . believe that a non-confrontational style will enhance that
process.”).
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intrusion,” and one examiner admitted, “Within three weeks on the job, I
saw the capture set in.”669
The precarious position of on-site bank examiners is part of a larger
context in which politicians and industry leaders have pushed financial
regulators to treat banks as their “customers.”670 The Clinton–Gore
Administration promulgated a “Reinventing Government Initiative” that
described “government as being in the ‘customer service’ business with
regulatees as the ‘customers.’”671 Frank Keating, head of the American
Bankers Association (ABA) and a former Oklahoma Governor,
expressed a similar view of the role of regulators. When asked by a
journalist why the ABA’s members gave a “less than friendly reception”
to FDIC chairman Sheila Bair at a 2011 conference, Keating criticized
Bair’s “aggressive” remarks and stated that regulators are “servants of
the served” while bankers are “regulated people who pay [Bair’s]
salary.”672 In contrast to Bair’s strong personal commitment to
independence from the industry she regulated,673 some bank regulators
have accepted the industry’s view that they should treat financial
institutions as their “constituents.”674
669. Id. at 8 n.2, FRBNY-FCIC-General 10080238.
670. See supra notes 528–43 and accompanying text (describing intense political pressures on
U.K. and U.S. regulators to adopt industry-friendly policies during the 2000s).
671. Levitin, supra note 514, at 159 n.65; see also National Partnership for Reinventing
Government, Our Vision for the Future: America @ Our Best, (stating a goal of achieving “customer
satisfaction with federal services equal to or better than the business service sector” and declaring, “We
provide our customers with products and information they want and need”), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/vision2000.html.
672. Barbara A. Rehm, Editor at Large: How Keating Got to ABA and Where He’ll Take It, AM.
BANKER, May 26, 2011, at 1, 2011 WLNR 10443141; see also BAIR, supra note 290, at 312–16
(describing the “combative heckling” she received at the ABA conference in 2011 after delivering a
speech in which she called for stronger regulation of banks (including tighter restrictions on bank
overdraft fees) and also suggested that “the success of the financial sector is not an end in itself, but a
means to an end—which is to support the vitality of the real economy and the livelihood of the
American people”).
673. BAIR, supra note 290, at 316 (describing Keating’s remarks as “[f]rightening, but that is how
a lot of industry lobbyists see the role of regulators. We do not have our jobs to serve the public. The
banks pay our salary, so we work for them”); id. at 8, 41 (declaring that Bair based her regulatory
decisions on “common sense,” including support for “stronger capital and better lending standards,” as
well as “independence, doing the right thing for the general public, and ignoring the special interests”).
674. See supra note 551 and accompanying text (referring to OTS Director John Reich’s
description of WaMu as “my largest constituent”); see also supra note 517 (discussing Darrel Dochow’s
controversial career at OTS, during which he was criticized for helping Lincoln Savings, Countrywide
and IndyMac avoid regulatory constraints); Levitin, supra note 514, at 159–60 (stating that Dochow’s
career “indicates that at least some bank regulatory agencies view themselves as a business in which
supervised institutions are customers”); Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal
Regulator Often Helps Banks Fighting Consumers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A1 (reporting that
Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. appeared in a 1999 OCC video, which described “how
the OCC and a national bank charter can help banking organizations achieve their goals,” and also
quoting Hawke’s statement that the OCC’s preemption of state consumer protection laws was “one of
the advantages of a national bank charter, and I’m not the least bit ashamed to promote it”).
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Beyond the deferential supervisory attitudes produced by a “customer
service” view of regulation, the revolving door between government and
the financial industry creates additional pressures for regulatory
acquiescence. The revolving door encourages a similarity of views
between regulators and financial executives because (i) “regulators and
the representatives of financial institutions are [frequently] the same
people, only at different points in their careers,” and (ii) the continuous
movement of senior officials between government and the financial
sector promotes “social connections between people on opposite sides of
the [revolving] door.”675 For example, after former SEC Commissioner
Annette Nazareth returned to private law practice at Davis Polk &
Wardwell in 2008, she maintained close connections with SEC
Chairman Mary Schapiro and SEC General Counsel and Senior Policy
Director David Becker. Nazareth met frequently with Schapiro and
Becker, and she sent them Davis Polk’s memoranda analyzing Dodd–
Frank’s provisions as the legislation proceeded through Congress.
Nazareth also invited Schapiro and Becker to attend December holiday
parties hosted by her and her husband, former FRB Vice Chairman
Roger Ferguson. In extending one such invitation, Nazareth noted that
“we expect [former FRB Chairman Alan] Greenspan to lead us in a
sing-along,”676
The perceived socioeconomic and intellectual superiority of Wall
Street insiders provides further inducements for regulators to accept the
financial industry’s viewpoints.
During the 1990s and 2000s,
“[f]inancial regulators . . . saw firsthand the vast sums of money being
made by Wall Street bankers and traders. And . . . the financial sector
was routinely lionized as both an exemplar of the knowledge economy
and an engine of economic growth.”677 Moreover, “as the world of
675. Kwak, supra note 660, at 15, 23; see also Omarova, supra note 663, at 630 (agreeing that,
due to “strong professional and personal relationships” between financial regulators and industry
executives, regulators “often come to view their institutional interests or mission as largely congruent
with the interests of their regulated industry constituency”).
676. Top Bank Lawyer’s E-Mails Show Washington’s Inside Game, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 5, 2012
(noting that (i) Nazareth met with Schapiro 11 times in 2009 and 2010, “twice as many as any single
competitor in the law and lobbying business,” and (ii) “[w]ith Nazareth on board, Davis Polk was hired
as outside counsel on Dodd–Frank by the six largest U.S. banks and the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association, the Wall Street trade group”). In her email correspondence with Becker
about Dodd–Frank’s draft provisions, Nazareth told Becker that the proposed CFPB made her “feel ill”
and she assured Becker that she had urged SIFMA to “trash” the proposed new office of investor
advocacy at the SEC after hearing Becker’s strong criticism of that office. Id.
677. Kwak, supra note 660, at 19; see also id. at 20–21 (contending that “as the world of finance
became more technical, its academic pedigree became more imposing”; as a result, “subscribing to
cutting-edge financial theories” endorsed by “famous economists” offered “perceived status benefits” to
regulators); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 105 (“Over the past twenty years,
finance . . . [became] the glistening centerpiece of the modern American economy . . . . [W[here it
mattered most—on elite campuses, in the business and financial media, and in the halls of power in
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finance became more complicated and central to the economy, the
federal government became more dependent” on Wall Street executives
not only as potential candidates for regulatory posts but also as essential
sources of information and intelligence about financial institutions and
markets.678 Thus, the standard response by regulators and industry
officials to outsiders’ critiques of the revolving door was that only
people who worked on Wall Street possessed the necessary expertise to
develop enlightened policies for regulating Wall Street.679
For all of the above reasons, financial regulators and Wall Street
executives developed a “confluence of perspectives and opinions” in
which “Wall Street’s positions became the conventional wisdom in
Washington.”680 Regulators increasingly viewed the “well-being and
profitability of the financial sector as [a policy] objective in its own
right,” regardless of the potential risks of pro-industry policies to the
broader economy and consumers.681 At the same time, regulators
“marginalized” the views of consumer advocates and other critics of
financial deregulation, because they viewed such critics as “people who
simply did not understand the bright new world of modern finance.”682
In short, cultural and cognitive capture occurred within financial
Washington—banking became the latest chapter in the American Dream, the way to make vast riches by
working hard and creating innovative new products that would supposedly improve life for everyone.”).
678. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 92–94; see also id. at 94 (“[A]s finance became more
esoteric and policy questions became more technical, . . . all the people with relevant expertise were
Wall Street veterans.”); Rothkopf, supra note 5, at 259 (“[T]op financial executives offered to political
leaders . . . the ability to understand and communicate with markets that were increasingly seen as vital
to the economic success or failure of governments.”).
679. David G. Hilzenrath, SEC head struggles to turn agency around, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2011,
at A1 (“Regulators frequently draw staff members from the industries they regulate, saying it’s
impossible to function without industry expertise.”); Sherman, supra note 621 (quoting an unnamed
former senior Goldman Sachs partner, who argued that it would be “a dangerous and scary thing” to
conclude that “someone’s past work on Wall Street disqualifies them from playing a role in something
as complex as government,” because in that case “you’ll essentially have people [in government] who
have no understanding of how financial markets operate”). Former regulators have justified their postgovernment work on behalf of financial clients in similar terms. For example, former Comptroller of
the Currency Eugene Ludwig defended the former regulators employed by his consulting firm,
Promontory Financial Group, by stating that “his firm sells expertise and not access to their former
employers and co-workers.” Jesse Hamilton & Cheyenne Hopkins, Banking Consultant Promontory to
Face U.S. Senate Panel, BLOOMBERG, April 10, 2013 (summarizing interview with Ludwig). Ludwig
further explained that “people who dedicated their careers to public service can continue to ensure that
regulations are implemented properly.” Id. (same).
680. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 97.
681. Buiter, supra note 661, at 602.
682. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 97; see also id. at 94 (“Financial policy took on the
trappings of a branch of engineering, in which only those with hands-on experience on the cutting edge
of innovation were qualified to comment.”); Binyamin Appelbaum, As Subprime Crisis Unfolded,
Watchdog Fed Didn’t Bother Barking, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, at A1 (reporting that FRB officials
dismissed repeated warnings by consumer advocates about the dangers posed by subprime mortgage
lending, because officials believed that those advocates did not have sufficient expertise to provide
reliable advice).
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agencies as the financial industry persuaded regulators that
“deregulation was in the public interest” and “unfettered financial
activity is always good for society.”683
FRB chairman Alan Greenspan was the best-known advocate for the
view that “regulators should seek to minimize any interference with
innovation and competition in the financial markets” because “market
discipline and private risk management produced better results than
government regulation over the longer term.”684 However, Greenspan
was hardly alone in holding that view. During the late 1990s, Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin and his deputy and successor Lawrence
Summers actively pursued the same public policy goals of encouraging
financial innovation and reducing regulation of financial markets.685
Rubin and Summers played key roles (along with Greenspan) in passing
GLBA, which repealed Glass–Steagall, and also in blocking efforts by
CFTC chairman Brooksley Born to regulate OTC derivatives.686 At the
Presidential signing ceremony for GLBA in 1999, Summers thanked
Greenspan “for your constant advocacy for modernization of our
financial system,” and he also praised “former Secretary of the Treasury
Bob Rubin, who worked very hard on this.”687 Summers lauded GLBA
as “the right framework for America’s future financial system,” and he
stressed “the crucial role of markets” in the Clinton Administration’s
“national economic strategy of which this bill is a part.”688
683. Kwak, supra note 660, at 8–9.
684. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 903–04 (summarizing Greenspan’s views); see also JOHNSON
& KWAK, supra note 15, at 100 (stating that there was “no truer believer in the ideology of free markets,
financial innovation, and deregulation” than Greenspan); ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 19, at 192
(stating that “Greenspan made it his mission to minimize government oversight by outsourcing risk
management to banks”).
685. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 99 (stating that Summers “shared Rubin’s opinion that
financial innovation and free markets were generally good for America”); Hirsh, supra note 612, at 18
(“[Rubin’s] advice always sounded sage: Don’t tamper too much with finance or the flow of capital;
keep changes minimal.”); “America’s Role in Global Economic Integration,” Speech by Treasury
Deputy Secretary Lawrence Summers at the Brookings conference on “Integrating National Economies:
The Next Step” (Jan. 9, 1996 [sic]) (“At Treasury, our most crucial international priority remains the
creation of a well-funded, truly global capital market.”), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/pr9701091.aspx.
686. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 8–10, 104, 133–37; Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 220–
21, 306–07; Cohan, supra note 612, at 63–64; Hirsh, supra note 612, at 17; see also ROTHKOPF, supra
note 5, at 260 (“Robert Rubin led the Clinton administration to promote an aggressively pro-market
agenda, . . . [including] a systematic effort . . . to continue the process of deregulating the American
financial community.”).
687. Statement by President Bill Clinton at the Signing of the Financial Modernization Bill, Nov.
12, 1999 (remarks of Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers) [hereinafter Summers GLBA Remarks],
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ls241.aspx. Rubin stepped down
as Treasury Secretary in July 1999 and joined Citigroup as co-chairman shortly before GLBA’s
enactment. Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 306; Cohan, supra note 612, at 64–65.
688. Summers GLBA Remarks, supra note 687. At the same signing ceremony, Senator Phil
Gramm (R-TX) declared, “We are here today to repeal Glass–Steagall because we have learned that
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Greenspan, Rubin and Summers set the tone for a broader regulatory
“mindset” that favored deregulatory policies during the long boom of
the 1990s and 2000s. As FRB General Counsel Scott Alvarez later
acknowledged, “The mind-set was that there should be no regulation;
that the market should take care of policing, unless there already is an
identified problem.”689 Richard Spillenkothen, the FRB’s Director of
Bank Supervision from 1991 to 2006, observed in 2010 that regulators
had “a high degree of faith that financial markets were largely efficient
and self-correcting and, therefore, that counterparty and market
discipline were generally more effective ‘regulators’ of risk-taking and
improper practices than government rules and supervisors.”690 The New
York Fed’s self-study in 2009 similarly conceded that regulators placed
too much faith in the assumption that “[m]arkets will always selfcorrect.”691
This overriding faith in financial innovation and self-correcting
markets became part of the “conventional wisdom” among Washington
policymakers and regulators as well as Wall Street leaders.692 The
government is not the answer. We have learned that freedom and competition are the answers.” Id.
(remarks of Sen. Gramm). President Clinton agreed with Senator Gramm’s view that GLBA
represented “a victory for freedom and free markets,” although President Clinton also claimed that
GLBA was “a victory for consumer protection.” Id. (remarks of President Clinton). Unfortunately,
President Clinton’s second claim proved to be illusory. Federal regulators repeatedly failed to protect
consumers during the subprime mortgage boom that led to the financial crisis, and the OCC and OTS
preempted efforts by the states to safeguard consumers. Wilmarth, supra note 211, at 896–919; see also
supra Part III(B).
689. FCIC Report, supra note 36, at 96 (quoting from an FCIC interview with Alvarez).
690. Richard Spillenkothen, “Notes on the performance of prudential supervision in the years
preceding the financial crisis by a former director of banking supervision and regulation at the Federal
Reserve Board (1991 to 2006),” May 31, 2010, at 12 [hereinafter Spillenkothen FCIC Memo]; see also
id. at 27 (stating that “the culture of the Federal Reserve—an agency dominated by professional
economists whose mindset and intellectual biases were to enhance the workings of free markets, not to
design regulations—was reinforced by a Chairman who had a strong, deep, and abiding philosophical
belief that market and counterparty discipline were more effective in controlling risks than
governmental regulation and oversight”), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicdocs/2010-05-31%20FRB%20Richard%20Spillenkothen%20Paper-%20Observations%20on%20the%2
0Performance%20of%20Prudential%20Supervision.pdf.
691. FRBNY Systemic Risk Study, supra note 667, at 2, FRBNY-FCIC-General0080232; see
also id. at 6 (describing “the common expectation [at the New York Fed] that market forces would
efficiently price risks and prompt banks to control exposures in a more effective way than
regulators . . . . Regulators faced and often shared skepticism that regulators could push for more
effective practices than those required by the market for controlling firm risk.”).
692. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 105–09 (quotes at 105); see also id. at 67–70, 106–07
(explaining how neoclassical economic theories, including the “Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis,”
provided “the intellectual justification for financial deregulation. If a free market will always provide
fundamentally correct asset prices, then the financial sector can be left to its own devices,” id. at 69);
JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON
WALL STREET xiii (2009) (explaining that “rational market theory,” including “the efficient market
hypothesis,” persuaded many academics and policymakers that “[f]inancial markets possessed a wisdom
that individuals, companies, and governments did not.”).
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resulting “group-think” among policymakers, regulators and financial
executives was “a major reason why the federal government deferred to
the interests of Wall Street repeatedly in the 1990s and 2000s.”693 A
similar mindset held sway in the U.K. and at the IMF. Two FSA postmortem reports on the financial crisis found serious flaws within the
“intellectual assumptions on which previous regulatory approaches have
been largely built,” including (i) misplaced confidence in “[m]arket
discipline . . . as an effective tool in constraining harmful risk-taking”
and (ii) the mistaken assumption that “[f]inancial innovation can be
assumed to be beneficial since market competition would winnow out
any innovations which did not deliver value added.”694 An IMF postmortem study similarly concluded that:
IMF’s ability to correctly identify the mounting risks [of a global
financial crisis] was hindered by a high degree of groupthink, intellectual
capture, [and] a general mindset that a major financial crisis in large
advanced economies was unlikely . . . [because] market discipline and
self-regulation would be sufficient to stave off serious problems in
financial institutions . . . [and] ‘sophisticated’ financial markets could
thrive safely with minimal regulation.695

Another key component of the mindset shared by Washington and
Wall Street was the conviction that large financial conglomerates
(universal banks) were essential institutions for meeting the needs of
global business corporations and for ensuring the international primacy
693. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 97–104 (quote at 97); see also BAIR, supra note 290, at
17 (when Sheila Bair began her tenure as FDIC chairman in 2006, she encountered a regulatory
“groupthink” based on the assumption that the “golden age of banking was here and would last forever.
We didn’t need regulation anymore.”); id. at 27, 41 ( Bair discovered that the FRB “had acquired a
strong antipathy to regulation” under Greenspan’s leadership and “the other bank regulators were still
moving in the direction of less regulation, at least for larger institutions”; as a result, “early in my
tenure, I frequently found myself isolated in advocating for stronger regulatory standards.”);
Spillenkothen FCIC Memo, supra note 690, at 8–9 (contending that “the dynamics of group-think” led
to widespread confidence by regulators in “a stronger and more resilient financial system” because
regulators assumed
that “banking organizations’ risk management and measurement
capabilities . . . were generally effective and with the right incentives would continue to improve”).
694. Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global
banking
crisis
(Mar.
2009),
§ 1.4,
at
39,
available
at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090320232158/http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_re
view.pdf; see also FSA RBS Report, supra note 528. ¶ 3,1.3, at 260 (“A consensus among practitioners
and policy-makers across the world . . . confidently assumed that the financial system had been made
more stable as a result of the very financial innovation and complexity which we now understand played
a significant role in the failure both of the overall system and of [major banks] within it.”).
695. Int’l Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation Off., IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the
Financial and Economic Crisis: IMF Surveillance in 2004–07, ¶¶ 40, 42 at 17 (2011), available at
http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/Crisis%20Main%20Report%20(without%20Moises%20Signature).pdf; see also id. at 34 (Annex 7) (“The
Fund’s general mindset that markets know best and financial innovation reduces risk would have made
it difficult for the staff to see the buildup of systemic risks.”).
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of U.S. financial markets. In pushing for GLBA’s passage, Greenspan
and other advocates maintained that the U.S. must authorize universal
banks in order (i) to provide global corporations with “full-service
provider[s] that can handle their entire range of financing needs,”696 and
(ii) to enable U.S. financial institutions to preserve their
“competitiveness” in foreign markets and thereby ensure “the global
dominance of American finance.”697
Amazingly, the global financial crisis—and the enormous sums spent
by the U.S., U.K. and European governments in bailing out failing
megabanks—did not shake the confidence of Robert Rubin, Lawrence
Summers and Timothy Geithner in the value of giant financial
conglomerates as key ingredients for domestic and international
economic prosperity. During a 2009 interview, Summers declared, “I
don’t think we can or want to turn back the clock” to a time when the
federal government imposed strong limitations on bank activities.698 In
2012, Summers dismissed proposals to reestablish Glass–Steagall-type
restrictions on banks as “revisionism, warped by hindsight and political
convenience,” and Rubin similarly declared, “It is a myth that the repeal
of Glass–Steagall contributed to the financial crisis.”699
Summers and Geithner strongly opposed—and helped to defeat—the
attempt by Senators Sherrod Brown and Ted Kauffman to amend Dodd–
Frank by imposing strict size limits on banks.700 In separate meetings
with Senator Kauffman, Summers argued that breaking up the
megabanks “would hurt our ability to serve large companies and hurt the
competitiveness of the United States,” while Geithner contended that
federal regulators could adequately control the risks of megabanks by
strengthening Basel’s international capital standards, thereby ensuring
696. Statement by FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan before the House Comm. on Banking and
Financial Services, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 578, 579 (1997) (providing testimony on H.R. 10, one of GLBA’s
predecessor bills); see also James R. Barth et al., “Policy Watch: The Repeal of Glass–Steagall and the
Advent of Broad Banking,” 14 Journal of Economic Perspectives No. 2 (Spring 2000), at 191, 198–99
(contending that GLBA’s authorization for universal banking powers would benefit the U.S. economy
by allowing large U.S. banks to provide “one-stop” shopping with improved financing opportunities and
“more product and service choices to their customers”).
697. Senate Report No. 106-44, at 5 (1999) (quoting Greenspan’s testimony).
698. ROTHKOPF, supra note 5, at 231–32, 393 (quoting from the author’s interview with Summers
in 2009); see also id. at 18, 260 (noting that the author worked with Rubin, Summers and Geithner
during the Clinton Administration).
699. Cohan, supra note 612, at 63–64 (quoting statements made by Summers and Rubin in 2012).
700. CONNAUGHTON, supra note 371, at 227–44; see also id. at 228 (describing the Brown–
Kauffman amendment, which would have “impos[ed] a strict 10 percent cap on any bank-holding
company’s share of the United States’ total insured deposits” and “limit[ed] the size of non-deposit
liabilities at financial institutions (to 2 percent of GDP for banks, and 3 percent of GDP for non-bank
institutions)”); id. at 243–44 (explaining that Brown–Kauffman was defeated by a vote of 33–61, and
quoting a senior Treasury official who said, “If we’d been for [Brown–Kauffman] , it probably would
have happened. But we weren’t, so it didn’t.”).
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that “U.S. banks wouldn’t be disadvantaged relative to foreign
banks.”701 Indeed, Geithner believed that he couldn’t solve the
economic crisis “without keeping the banks intact.”702
The most adamant defense of megabanks was offered by Rubin
himself. During an interview with David Rothkopf after the financial
crisis, Rubin maintained that he and Summers “had advocated the right
policies [during the Clinton Administration] and would argue the same
things today.”703 When Rothkopf asked “whether the biggest and most
influential financial organizations ought to be broken up, whether being
‘too big to fail’ was a problem to be addressed,” Rubin’s response was
immediate and emphatic:
“‘No, [Rubin] said, ‘don’t you see? Too big to fail isn’t a problem with
the system. It is the system. You can’t be a competitive global financial
institution serving global corporations of scale without having a certain
scale yourself. The bigger multinationals get, the bigger financial
institutions will have to get.’”704

Trade associations for megabanks have echoed Rubin’s arguments in
favor of preserving the same universal banking model that precipitated
the global financial crisis.705 For example, five major financial trade
associations criticized the FRB’s proposed enhanced prudential
supervisory requirements for SIFIs because the FRB’s proposal sought
to provide “incentives” for SIFIs “to reduce their systemic footprint.”706
The trade associations declared that the FRB was “misguided” in
suggesting that “big is bad,” and they also asserted, “Banks must mirror
the economic system they are designed to serve. In the 21st century,
701. Id. at 234, 236 (describing arguments made by Summers and Geithner during their meetings
with Sen. Kaufman).
702. Hirsh, supra note 612, at 17; see also BAROFSKY, supra note 337, at 156–57, 199–200
(maintaining that Geithner administered HAMP and other TARP programs in order to “foam the
runway” for large troubled banks and guarantee their survival); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at
208–09 (noting that Diana Farrell, a member of President Obama’s National Economic Council, rejected
proposals to break up big banks and argued that “the genie’s out of the bottle and what we need to do is
to manage them and to oversee them, as opposed to hark back to a time that we’re unlikely to ever come
back to or want to come back to.”).
703. ROTHKOPF, supra note 5, at 266.
704. Id.
705. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 211 (“A common argument, put forward by
[advocates for big banks], is that large corporations require financial services that only large banks can
provide. Related to this is the idea that the global competitiveness of U.S. corporations requires that
American banks be at least as large as anyone else’s banks.”); Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value,
Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 Rev. of Banking &
Financial L. 765, 786–87 (2012) (“Big bank executives insist that . . . modern global banking services
require large-scale capacity in order to deliver products and innovations that smaller banks could not do
effectively . . . [and] that U.S. banks would need to be large enough to be competitive internationally.”).
706. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 16 (quoting FRB Proposed Rule
for SIFIs, supra note 40, 77 Fed. Reg. at 596).
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companies served by international banks compete in a global economic
system . . . . [T]hey need banks that are competitive around the
world.”707
As Simon Johnson and James Kwak have observed, the arguments
advanced by advocates for megabanks “suffer from a shortage of
empirical evidence.”708 Most studies indicate that banks larger than
$100 billion do not generate favorable economies of scale or scope after
one eliminates the significant funding advantages that megabanks
currently enjoy due to their huge explicit and implicit TBTF
subsidies.709 Even before the financial crisis began in 2007, studies
confirmed that large financial conglomerates generated “higher levels of
systemic risk on both sides of the Atlantic.”710 Moreover, financial
markets did not endorse the universal banking model since they applied
a significant “conglomerate discount” to the value of banks that engaged
in multiple lines of financial activity.711
There is no reason to believe that multinational corporations would
fail to obtain adequate financial services in the absence of trillion-dollar
financial conglomerates. Large corporations have long relied, both
before and after GLBA, on syndicates (groups) of banks and securities
firms—not single institutions—for underwriting loans as well as equity
and debt securities.712 Prior to GLBA’s repeal of Glass–Steagall in
1999, large U.S. commercial banks and securities firms were widely
viewed as global leaders in efficiency, innovation and profitability.
They consistently outperformed European and Japanese universal banks

707. Big Bank Systemic Risk Comment Letter, supra note 44, at 17. Similarly, three trade
associations representing the largest financial institutions—the Financial Services Forum, the Financial
Services Roundtable and SIFMA—issued a joint policy brief in Mar. 2013, which declared, “The value
provided by large diversified institutions is particularly important to large, globally active U.S.
corporations and the further development of global markets for U.S. goods and services.” Victoria
Finkle, Industry, Lawmakers Clash Over ‘Too Big to Fail’ AM. BANKER (Mar. 12, 2013), 2013 WLNR
6051393 (quoting policy brief).
708. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 211.
709. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 89, 136–39, 143–44, 290–91 nn.28–34; Andrew G.
Haldane, “On being the right size,” The 2012 Beesley Lecture at the Institute of Directors (London), 25
Oct.
2012,
at
12–13,
available
at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech615.pdf. As Haldane
points out, “Over the period 2002 to 2007, the implied annual subsidy to the world’s [29] largest banks
averaged $70 billion per year using a ratings-based measure . . . . That is roughly 50% of the average
post-tax profits of these banks over the period . . . . By 2009, the . . . implied monetary subsidy [for the
largest banks increased to] over $700 billion per year.” Id. at 4. For additional evidence of the explicit
and implicit TBTF subsidies exploited by megabanks, see Wilmarth, supra note 12, at 958–59, 978–84;
Wilmarth, supra note 109, at 3–5; supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
710. Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 996.
711. Wilmarth, supra note 283, at 748–49.
712. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 212; Wilmarth, supra note 15, at 980–84; Wilmarth,
supra note 206, at 378–81.
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in international financial markets.713 Indeed, based on the global
superiority of U.S. commercial banks and securities firms during the
1980s and 1990s, some analysts concluded that “the decentralized
financial industry structure mandated by the Glass–Steagall Act
encouraged competition . . . [and] spurred continuing innovation by U.S.
banks and securities firms, [giving] them a clear technical superiority
over European universal banks.”714 Large U.S. financial institutions
would likely recover the innovative and competitive spirit they exhibited
in the 1980s and 1990s if they were obliged to abandon the excessively
complex universal banking model along with its bloated TBTF
subsidies.715
C. Attorney General Holder’s “Too Big to Jail” Admission and
JPMorgan’s “London Whale” Trading Debacle Show that TBTF Banks
Continue to Operate Without Effective Control by Federal Regulators
Two events in March 2013 demonstrated that Wall Street megabanks
remain a major unresolved problem for U.S. financial policy in view of
their TBTF status and their ability to operate without effective oversight
or restraint by federal agencies. First, during a Senate committee
hearing, Attorney General Eric Holder acknowledged that DOJ was
reluctant to pursue criminal prosecutions against the largest financial
institutions because of the potentially destabilizing effect of such
proceedings on domestic and global financial systems. Second, a Senate
subcommittee’s investigation of the JPMorgan “London Whale” scandal
revealed that JPMorgan’s executives and the bank’s primary regulator
(the OCC) failed to prevent the bank’s traders from making disastrous
bets on high-risk derivatives.
Both events provided dramatic
confirmation that the largest banks remain too big to fail, manage or
713. Wilmarth, supra note 206, at 440–43, 451–53.
714. Id. at 441; see also id. (“Several observers have noted that [Glass–Steagall] had an ironic but
important effect on competition and experimentation in U.S. financial markets.”); “A Turning Point:
Defining the Financial Structure,” Speech by FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig, presented at the
22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference at the Levy Economic Institute of Bard College (New York,
NY), April 17, 2013 (“We have a long tradition of financial institutions competing on a global basis and
doing so successfully under [a Glass–Steagall] model similar to that proposed here. The largest
commercial banks under the umbrella of the safety net would remain mega banks and hold scale capable
of offering payments services and loans of any size to firms that operate globally. U.S. broker–dealers
and investment banks have long offered specialized capital market services that are competitive and
second to none in the world.”) [hereinafter Hoenig April 17, 2013 Speech], available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr1713.html.
715. See “Finance: The fall of the universal bank,” Economist, Nov. 21, 2012 (predicting that “the
power of universal banks will be eroded by market forces” and stronger regulation, and concluding that
“[t]he promise of the cross-selling financial supermarket has long been eclipsed by the destruction of
shareholder value after the crash”), available at http://www.economist.com/news/21566439-exit-rockstar-bosses-fall-universal-bank.
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regulate.
1. Attorney General Holders’ “Too Big to Jail” Testimony Confirms that
Federal Agencies Cannot Discipline the Largest Financial Institutions
Effectively
During a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 6,
2013, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) asked Attorney General Eric
Holder to comment on DOJ’s use of a deferred prosecution agreement to
settle HSBC’s massive money-laundering violations. Grassley declared
he was “concerned we have a mentality of ‘too big to jail’ in the
financial sector,” and he also noted the absence of “any high-profile
financial convictions [for] either companies or individuals.”716 In
response to Grassley’s question, Holder admitted that “the size of some
of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us
to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if we do
prosecute—if we do bring a criminal charge—it will have a negative
impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.”717
Holder’s candid recognition of the “too big to jail” problem was
“stunning” and “even more direct” than Assistant Attorney General
Lanny Breuer’s prior acknowledgments of DOJ’s reluctance to
prosecute major banks.718 Holder’s statement was also “embarrassingly
at odds with the Obama administration’s view that too-big-to-fail was
fixed by the Dodd–Frank [Act].”719 In addition, Holder failed to explain
why the “too big to jail” status of megabanks prevented DOJ from
indicting even one top executive of any of the large financial institutions

716. Transcript: Attorney General Eric Holder on ‘Too Big to Jail’, AM. BANKER, Mar. 7, 2013
(quoting statements by Sen. Grassley and Attorney General Holder during the Mar. 6 hearing)
[hereinafter Holder Transcript] (available on Lexis); see also supra notes 434–38 and accompanying
text (discussing DOJ’s deferred prosecution agreement with HSBC).
717. Holder Transcript, supra note 716 (also conceding that the size of major banks “has an
inhibiting influence, impact on our ability to bring resolutions that I think would be more
appropriate . . . . The concern you raised is actually one that I share.”); see also Rob Blackwell &
Victoria Finkle, How Holder’s Surprising ‘Too Big to Jail’ Admission Changes Debate, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 7, 2013 (describing Holder’s “stunning admission” and reporting that his testimony “marked the
first time such concerns have been raised by a top member of President Obama’s cabinet”) (available
on Lexis).
718. Blackwell & Finkle, supra note 717; see also Danielle Douglas, Attorney general says big
banks’ size inhibits prosecution, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2013, at A12 (reporting that “Holder’s admission
bolsters criticisms that federal prosecutors are deeming some banks ‘too big to jail’”); supra notes 436–
37, 447–48 (discussing Breuer’s explanations as to why DOJ chose not to indict HSBC or UBS).
719. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities Behind Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, at
B1; see also Blackwell & Finkle, supra note 717 (reporting that Holder’s statement appeared “to
conflict with” the Obama Administration’s repeated claim that Dodd–Frank “effectively ended too big
to fail”).
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that were at the center of the financial crisis.720 As Andrew Ross Sorkin
observed, Holder’s concern about the systemic impact of indictments
against megabanks created a “powerful argument . . . that prosecutors
should focus on the individuals responsible for the misconduct” at those
banks.721
During a follow-up hearing before the Senate Banking Committee on
March 7, 2013, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) pointed out that
HSBC paid a fine, but none of HSBC’s executives was criminally
prosecuted or was banned from the banking industry and HSBC was
allowed to continue operating in the U.S.722 In response to a question
from Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) on how regulators could “explain
[the HSBC settlement] to your neighbor,” FRB Governor Jerome Powell
conceded that it was difficult to reconcile HSBC’s treatment with the
principle that “we’re all equal under the law.”723 Powell also admitted
that questions about “the fairness of the system” would not be resolved
until the FRB and other federal regulators demonstrated their ability to
end TBTF treatment for megabanks.724
2. The Senate Investigation of JPMorgan’s “London Whale” Scandal
Shows that Wall Street Banks Continue to Engage in Speculative
Risk-Taking While Avoiding Regulatory Oversight
On March 14, 2013, the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (PSI) released its report on JPMorgan’s “London Whale”
trading debacle, which inflicted $6.2 billion of losses on the bank.725
The PSI’s report presented a “devastating” and “scathing” portrayal of
systemic failures of risk management and oversight by JPMorgan and by
its primary regulator, the OCC.726 As shown below, JPMorgan’s
executives (i) allowed the bank’s traders to make enormous bets on
synthetic credit derivatives that exceeded the bank’s internal risk limits,
(ii) sought to conceal the bank’s rapidly growing trading losses from the
720. Sorkin, supra note 719; supra notes 415-16, 426–30 and accompanying text (discussing the
absence of criminal prosecutions against any senior executives of major financial institutions).
721. Id.
722. Victoria Finkle, Six Takeaways from Senate Bruising of Regulators on ‘Too Big to Jail’, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 8, 2013 (describing the Mar. 7 hearing before the Senate Banking Committee) (available
on Lexis).
723. Id.
724. Id.
725. Mike Ferullo, Bank Supervision: JP Morgan and OCC Officials Face Criticism For Failure
to Stem Risky Derivatives Trades, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 502 (Mar. 19, 2013).
726. Jessie Eisinger, Lessons Learned After Financial Crisis: Nothing Much Has Changed, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2013, at B5 (describing the PSI report as “devastating”); Dan Fitzpatrick et al., Senate
Slams Bank on ‘Whale’—Panel Says J.P. Morgan Misled Regulators and Investors, Ignored Risks in
Big Trades, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2013, at A1 (describing the PSI report as “scathing”).
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OCC until several weeks after the “London Whale” problem was
exposed by the press, and (iii) made statements to the press about the
trading losses that were false or misleading. For its part, the OCC
ignored numerous warning signs about JPMorgan’s high-risk trading
activities and failed to take prompt and effective action after the agency
saw press reports about the bank’s trading losses.
•

In 2005, JPMorgan created the Chief Investment Office (CIO) to
invest the bank’s “excess deposits,” and CIO began investing in
synthetic credit derivatives in 2006.727 CIO did not disclose the
existence of its Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) to the OCC until
January 2012.728 An internal bank audit in late 2007 stated that
SCP was pursuing “proprietary position strategies,” and an OCC
official later described SCP’s operations as “‘classic prop
trading,’ a view buttressed by the fact that CIO had no clientfacing customers or client-facing activity.”729

•

Between 2007 and 2011, SCP produced about $2.5 billion in
revenues for JPMorgan, with peak revenues of $1.05 billion in
2009.730 CIO’s traders expanded the aggregate notional amount
of SCP’s synthetic credit derivatives from $4 billion to $51
billion during 2011 and generated trading gains of more than
$450 million by the end of that year.731 JPMorgan’s senior
management was pleased with CIO’s performance, and CIO
head Ina Drew encouraged CIO’s traders to try to “repeat their
performance” in 2012.732 During 2010 and 2011, Drew received
total compensation of $29 million, while CIO’s chief investment
officer, Achilles Macris, received $31.75 million and CIO’s key
traders—Javier Martin-Artajo and Bruno Iksil—received $22.73
million and $14.08 million, respectively.733 Those employees
were “among the most highly-paid employees in [JPMorgan],
and their compensation was reviewed by the bank’s Operating

727. By 2012, CIO used JPMorgan’s “excess deposits” to create “a portfolio of approximately
$350 billion, a historic high.” U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, JPMorgan
Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: Majority and Minority Staff
Report 21-22, 35–37 (Mar. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Senate London Whale Report], available at
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/senate-investigations-subcommittee-holds-hearingand-releases-report-on-jpmorgan-chase-whale-trades/?section=alltypes.
728. Id. at 35, 38–39.
729. Id. at 38, 41–42 (quoting JPMorgan internal audit report dated Nov. 29, 2007, and PSI
interview with Mike Sullivan, OCC, on Aug. 30, 2012).
730. Id. at 50, 56.
731. Id. at 50–54.
732. Id. at 54–56.
733. Id. at 57–58; see also id. at 21–25 (describing the roles of Ina Drew, Achilles Macris, Javier
Martin-Artajo and Bruno Iksil within CIO).
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Committee and approved by CEO Jamie Dimon.”734
•

At the end of 2011, JPMorgan’s senior managers told CIO to
reduce SCP’s risk-weighted assets (RWA) in order to decrease
the amount of capital JPMorgan would be required to maintain
under “upcoming Basel III standards.”735 However, instead of
reducing SCP’s portfolio (which would have involved trading
losses), CIO’s traders greatly expanded SCP’s notional size from
$51 billion at the end of 2011 to $157 billion at the end of March
2012.736 CIO’s traders gambled that their purchases of massive
volumes of synthetic long positions (which bought protection) on
investment-grade debt would permit them to reduce JPMorgan’s
RWA without having to sell SCP’s very large existing synthetic
short positions (which sold protection) on high-yield debt.737

•

CIO’s traders also gambled that they could generate gains from
newly-purchased synthetic long positions on investment-grade
debt that would offset large losses that were already embedded in
SCP’s existing synthetic short positions on high-yield debt.738
Unfortunately, “[n]ot only did the SCP’s short positions lose
value as the economy improved [in early 2012], but the long
credit protection the CIO purchased for investment grade
companies did not increase in value as much as was needed to
offset the losses.”739 As a result, SCP’s losses rapidly escalated
from early January to the end of March 2012.740

•

When Ina Drew finally ordered CIO’s traders to stop SCP’s
trading operations on March, 23, 2012, SCP’s portfolio was so
large that its positions “became visible to the rest of the
market.”741 News reports about CIO’s “London Whale” trades
began to appear in early April, and hedge funds and other

734. Id. at 59.
735. Id. at 60–61.
736. Id. at 62–85; see also id. at 93 (“At its height in March 2012, the [SCP] portfolio included
holdings of more than 100 types of credit derivatives, almost all index or tranche holdings, most of
which had lost value since their acquisition.”).
737. Id. at 65–73.
738. Id. at 68–85.
739. Id. at 75–90 (quote at 78). The PSI report and the OCC subsequently described the behavior
of CIO’s traders in the first quarter of 2012 as “doubling down” on a “losing trading strategy.” Id. at 82
(quoting email from Elwyn Wong, OCC, to Scott Waterhouse and others, OCC, dated June 29, 2012).
740. Id. at 75–90.
741. Id. at 85–86, 90. On Mar. 23, when Drew told CIO’s traders to stop trading in SCP, Bruno
Iksil told a CIO colleague that “[i]t is over/it is hopeless now . . . . I tell you, they are going to
trash/destroy us . . . . I am going to be hauled over the coals . . . you don’t lose 500M without
consequences.” Id. at 123, 124 (quoting Iksil’s instant messages to Julien Grout on Mar. 23, 2012). In a
subsequent message on the same day to another colleague, Iksil admitted that “the guys” in the market
“know my position because [I] am too big for the market . . . . [I] am too visible.” Id. at 124 (quoting
instant message from Iksil to Ade Adetayo on Mar. 23, 2012).
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investors placed large bets against SCP’s positions.742 Jamie
Dimon ordered JPMorgan’s derivatives team to “dismantle”
SCP, and the team transferred most of SCP’s positions to
JPMorgan’s investment bank for liquidation. JPMorgan’s losses
from SCP’s trades exceeded $6.2 billion by the end of 2012.743
•

SCP breached CIO’s trading risk limits on hundreds of occasions
without any effective response from JPMorgan’s risk managers.
After SCP surpassed CIO’s value-at-risk (VAR) limit in January
2012, CIO persuaded JPMorgan’s risk managers to approve a
new, unproven and flawed VAR model. The new model—which
JPMorgan revoked in May 2012—reduced CIO’s reported VAR
by half and thereby doubled CIO’s VAR risk limit.744 CIO’s
traders used the new VAR model to justify large increases in
SCP’s notional size and risk.745 Similarly, when SCP exceeded
CIO’s Comprehensive Risk Measure (CRM) in March 2012,
CIO’s chief market risk officer dismissed the CRM results as
“garbage” and CIO failed to heed the CRM breach.746 SCP also
jumped over additional trading restrictions, including “credit
spread risk metrics,” “mark-to-market stress limits,” “stop loss
advisories” and “concentration limits,” but JPMorgan’s risk
managers did not respond to any of those breaches.747 The
Senate PSI report concluded:
In contrast to JPMorgan Chase’s reputation for best-inclass risk management, the [London] whale trades exposed
a bank culture in which risk limit breaches were routinely
disregarded, risk metrics were frequently criticized or
downplayed, and risk evaluation models were targeted by
bank personnel seeking to produce artificially lower capital
requirements.

. . . In fact, from January 1 through April 30, 2012,
CIO risk limits and advisories were breached more than
330 times.748
•

When CIO finally disclosed SCP’s existence to the OCC in
January 2012, “the CIO downplayed the portfolio’s importance
by misinforming the OCC that it planned to reduce the SCP.”749

742. Id. at 90–93.
743. Id. at 92–93.
744. Id. at 160, 166–81, 185–87.
745. Id. at 182–25.
746. Id. at 187–92; see also id. at 190 (quoting email from Peter Weiland to Javier Martin-Artajo
dated Mar. 2, 2012).
747. Id. at 198–213 (quotes at 198, 207, 208, 211).
748. Id. at 154.
749. Id. at 216 (quote), 227–29.
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During February and March, as SCP’s size and losses steadily
mounted, JPMorgan “began to omit key CIO performance data
from its standard reports to the OCC.”750 As a result, the OCC
was “surprised” to learn about SCP’s enormous size and
extensive losses when “media reports unmasked the role of
JPMorgan Chase in the whale trades” in April 2012.751 After
reading these press reports, the OCC asked for more information
about SCP, but JPMorgan provided “inadequate information that
delayed effective oversight.”752 Indeed, the OCC “received such
limited data [from JPMorgan] about the trades and such blanket
assurances from the bank about them that, by the end of April,
the OCC considered the matter closed.”753 On May 4, 2012,
shortly before JPMorgan filed its first-quarter financial results
showing a large loss from SCP’s trades, JPMorgan’s chief
financial officer, Douglas Braunstein, finally told Scott
Waterhouse, the OCC’s examiner-in-chief, about the magnitude
of SCP’s problems.754
•

Despite having more than sixty resident examiners at
JPMorgan,755 the OCC failed (i) to inquire about CIO’s
extraordinary trading gain of $400 million at the end of 2011, (ii)
to identify SCP’s rapidly growing size and losses until press
reports about SCP appeared in April 2012, (ii) to inquire about
CIO’s adoption of a new VAR model that cut SCP’s risk profile
in half, (iii) to notice or respond to numerous reports from
JPMorgan indicating that CIO was breaching multiple trading
risk limits, and (iv) to notice that JPMorgan omitted key CIO
performance data from its reports to the OCC in February and
March 2012.756 The OCC understood CIO’s operations so
poorly that OCC examiners initially viewed SCP as “a low risk
hedge-management activity, and thus not a high supervisory
priority.”757

•

Even after JPMorgan publicly disclosed large losses from SCP’s
trading activities in May 2012, two senior OCC officials at first
downplayed the seriousness of those losses until Thomas Curry,

750. Id. at 216 (quote), 230–31.
751. Id. at 217 (quotes), 236.
752. Id. at 237.
753. Id. at 217 (quote), 237–41.
754. Id. at 242–43; see also id. at 243 (stating that Waterhouse was “taken aback” by Braunstein’s
call “since the bank should have updated him about the mounting losses prior to that telephone call”).
755. Id. at 27 (stating that the OCC had “approximately 65 on-site examiners who are responsible
for reviewing nearly every facet of JPMorgan Chase’s activities and operations. Several OCC
examiners were responsible for overseeing the CIO.”).
756. Id. at 9, 216–17, 226–34.
757. Id. at 234, 234 n.1322 (quoting memorandum from Sally Belshaw, OCC, to Mike Brosnan,
OCC, dated Oct. 26, 2012, entitled “Surrounding Losses at CIO and Lessons Learned”).
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the recently-appointed Comptroller of the Currency, demanded a
more thorough review.758 The OCC subsequently issued a caseand-desist order against JPMorgan in January 2013, which
required the bank “to undertake a number of actions to
strengthen its risk management and derivatives trading
practices.”759 However, as of mid-2013, the OCC had not
assessed any civil money penalties against JPMorgan despite
finding that the bank committed “regulatory violations” and
engaged in “unsafe and sound practices in its derivatives trading
and valuation activities.760
•

JPMorgan’s evasion of OCC oversight of SCP was part of a
larger pattern of resistance to OCC supervision. In December
2010, when the OCC requested better documentation of CIO’s
investment policies and portfolio decisions, Ina Drew “sternly”
declared that the OCC was trying to “destroy” JPMorgan’s
business and remove “necessary flexibility from the CIO.”761
The OCC’s examiner-in-charge for JPMorgan admitted that it
was “very common” for the bank to “push back on examiner
findings and recommendations,” and that senior bank executives
“yelled at OCC examiners” and called them “stupid” during one
meeting.762 In early 2012, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon
instructed JPMorgan’s investment bank to stop providing daily
profit and loss reports to the OCC for a week, claiming that the
OCC did not need such reports.763 When the OCC finally asked
for daily profit and loss reports from CIO in May 2012, the head
capital markets examiner told his colleagues, “Bank will likely
object to this.”764 The PSI’s report viewed the examiner’s
comment as “disturbing evidence of not only the bank’s
resistance to OCC oversight, but also the OCC’s failure to
establish a regulatory relationship in which the bank accepted its

758. Id. at 246–48 (explaining that Mike Brosnan, head of the OCC’s Large Bank Supervision
division, and OCC Chief Counsel Julie Williams at first did not view JPMorgan’s disclosure of SCP’s
trading losses as presenting a serious problem for JPMorgan or the OCC); see also id. at 234–36
(reporting that senior OCC officials, including Mr. Brosnan and Ms. Williams, “initially accepted the
bank’s characterization of the SCP as a hedging mechanism intended to reduce bank risk”).
759. Id. at 250; see also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, In re JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., Enforcement Action #2013-001, Jan. 14, 2013 [hereinafter OCC JPMorgan Order], available at
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-001.pdf.
760. Senate London Whale Report, supra note 727, at 236, 249–50; see also OCC JPMorgan
Order, supra note 759, at 1–4, 25–26 (stating that the OCC reserved the future right to assess civil
money penalties “based on the findings set forth in this Order”).
761. Senate London Whale Report, supra note 727, at 222–23.
762. Id. at 224 (quoting PSI interview with Scott Waterhouse on Sept. 17, 2012).
763. Id. at 225 (noting that Dimon “raised his voice in anger” when he learned that JPMorgan’s
chief investment officer ordered the investment bank to resume providing the daily profit and loss
reports to the OCC).
764. Id. at 231 (quoting email from Fred Crumlish, OCC, to Scott Waterhouse and others, OCC,
dated May 7, 2012).
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obligation to readily provide data requested by its regulator.”765
•

In an earnings call with investors, analysts and the media on
April 13, 2012, Dimon called SCP’s trading problems “a
complete tempest in a teapot” and indicated that it was “our job
to invest that portfolio wisely and intelligently . . . over a long
period of time to earn income and to offset other exposures we
have.”766 During the same call, Braunstein stated that SCP’s
trading decisions “are made on a very long-term basis” and
“effectively balanced from a risk standpoint” so that “[w]e are
very comfortable with our positions as they are held today.”767
He further maintained that “those positions are fully transparent
to the regulators” because the regulators “get the information on
those positions on a regular and recurring basis as part of our
normalized reporting.”768

•

The PSI’s report strongly criticized Dimon’s and Braunstein’s
statements during the earnings call for being “incomplete,
contain[ing] numerous inaccuracies, and misinform[ing]
investors, regulators and the public.”769 The PSI’s report
concluded that the earnings call and other statements by
JPMorgan misled investors, regulators and the public by
“downplaying the portfolio’s size, risk profile, and losses;
describing it as the product of long-term investment
decisionmaking to reduce risk . . . and claiming it was vetted by
the bank’s risk managers and transparent to regulators, none of
which was true.”770

Gretchen Morgenson concluded that the Senate’s PSI’s report
“disproves the premise” that the Dodd–Frank Act will “make our system
safe from the kinds of reckless banking activities that brought the
economy to its knees.”771 Similarly, in Jesse Eisinger’s view, the PSI’s
765. Id.
766. Id. at 259 (quoting Dimon’s comments during the earnings call on April 13, 2012).
767. Id. at 258 (quoting Braunstein’s comments during the same earnings call).
768. Id. at 258–59 (same). Dimon had previously approved a list of “talking points” about SCP’s
trading problems prepared by JPMorgan’s chief spokesman, Joe Evangelisti, and many of those talking
points were echoed by Dimon and Braunstein in the earnings call on April 13, 2012. Id. at 255–56,
258–59.
769. Id. at 252–54.
770. Id. at 16; see also id. at 10–13, 252–55, 265–300 (criticizing JPMorgan’s public disclosures
related to its SCP trading problems in April and May 2012); Eisinger, supra note 726 (“The Senate
report makes it clear that JPMorgan misled shareholders and the public, particularly on its April 13,
2012, conference call.”).
771. Gretchen Morgenson, JPMorgan’s Follies, for All to See, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, § BU,
at 1 (contending that the PSI’s report confirms that “JPMorgan is too big to regulate” as well as being
“too big to be allowed to fail and too big to prosecute”); see also Eisinger, supra note 726 (concluding
that, in view of the PSI’s report, the claim that bankers and regulators “have learned their lesson” from
the financial crisis is only “a sham”).
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report demonstrates that “[b]ankers aren’t acting cautious and chastened.
Risk managers aren’t in the ascendance on Wall Street. Regulators
remain their duped and docile selves.”772 Simon Johnson agreed that the
“London Whale” scandal “reinforce[s] the view” that the “largest banks
have become too complex to manage,” while Attorney General Holder’s
testimony confirms that “too-big-to-fail exists and Dodd–Frank did not
end it.”773
V. CONCLUSION: WALL STREET’S “VICTORY” OVER DODD–FRANK, THE
BROWN–VITTER BILL AND THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE TBTF DEBATE
Based on the analysis set forth above, one might conclude that the
battle for financial reform has been irretrievably lost. Wall Street’s
leaders are largely unrepentant for the immense harm their institutions
inflicted on the U.S. economy during the financial crisis, and their
outlook and behavior have not changed in any significant way since the
crisis. Congress and federal regulators continue to knuckle under to the
enormous political influence wielded by megabanks. Wall Street has
blocked any meaningful implementation of Dodd–Frank’s reforms that
might have forced large financial conglomerates to change their
business model or to reduce their appetite for risk-taking. Financial
giants continue to make speculative bets and to disregard regulatory
restrictions, believing that federal agencies will not interfere with their
gambling ex ante and will not hold their managers personally
accountable for reckless behavior or legal violations ex post.
Megabanks and their creditors remain confident that federal agencies
will arrange bailouts when the next systemic financial crisis occurs.
“And so, despite Dodd–Frank, we are still threatened by the same
dangers” from Wall Street.774
772. Eisinger, supra note 726. In a similar vein, Jonathan Weil alleged that the OCC was
“complicit” in “keep[ing] quiet while JPMorgan spread falsehoods,” because the OCC failed to correct
JPMorgan’s assertion on April 13, 2012, that SCP’s positions were “fully transparent to the
regulators . . . on a regular and recurring basis.” Jonathan Weil, JPMorgan Silent Partner Revealed in
Whale Fiasco, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 21, 2013 (also reporting that (i) during the PSI’s hearing on Mar. 15,
2013, Scott Waterhouse, the OCC’s examiner-in-chief, acknowledged that the statement on April 13,
2012, by JPMorgan’s chief financial officer, Douglas Braunstein, was “not true,” and (ii) “[t]his was the
first time anyone from the OCC had said publicly that Braunstein’s statement was false”).
773. Simon Johnson, Big Banks Have a Big Problem, NY TIMES BLOGS (ECONOMIX), Mar. 14,
2013 (available on Lexis).
774. Rivlin, supra note 7. In a speech to a Philadelphia conference in April 2013, Columbia
University economist Jeffrey Sachs voiced similar but even stronger conclusions in much starker
language. He declared, “I regard the moral environment [on Wall Street] as pathological . . . [Wall
Street bankers believe they] have no responsibility to their clients, they have no responsibility to people,
to counterparties in transactions, . . . they have gamed the system to a remarkable extent.” Sachs also
alleged that “financial fraud” was endemic on Wall Street due to “a docile president, a docile White
House and a docile regulatory system that absolutely can’t find its voice . . . . We have a corrupt politics
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While it is increasingly clear that Dodd–Frank’s key reforms have
failed to accomplish their goals, that lamentable fact may contain a
silver lining. The financial industry may come to regret its remarkable
achievement in “delaying and undermining the Dodd–Frank financial
overhaul law and staving off criminal investigations into
wrongdoing.”775 Wall Street’s apparent victory over Dodd–Frank may
ultimately prove to be a “catastrophic success.”776
Attorney General Holder’s “too-big-to-jail” admission and the Senate
PSI’s “damning report” on JPMorgan could prove to be a “crucial
turning point,” because they could trigger a new wave of public outrage
that would force Congress and federal regulators to adopt “more radical
solutions” to the TBTF problem.777 In late March 2013, a national
survey found that half of American adults supported a mandatory
breakup of the twelve largest banks.778 A few days later, Senators voted
99–0 in favor of a non-binding resolution calling for an end to implicit
government subsidies for banks larger than $500 billion.779
Also in March, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard
Fisher and FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig repeated their previous
calls for far-reaching reforms to address the TBTF problem. Fisher and
Hoenig argued that Dodd–Frank’s complex and highly discretionary
reforms would not eliminate large explicit and implicit TBTF subsidies
to the core, I am afraid to say, and . . . both parties are up to their neck in this.” John Aidan Byrne, Wall
St.’s Criminal Behavior: Sachs rips into bankers, N.Y. POST, April 28, 2013, at 35 (quoting speech by
Sachs), 2013 WLNR 10678310.
775. Jesse Eisinger, In Brown–Vitter Bill, a Bank Overhaul with Possible Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 2013, at B4.
776. Ezra Klein, Big Banks’ Success Could Spell Their Doom, BLOOMBERG, April 3, 2013.
777. Victoria Finkle, Seven Reasons the Debate Over ‘Too Big To Fail’ Is Here to Stay, AM.
BANKER, April 2, 2013, 2013 WLNR 7937747; see also CBS News, “Banks too big to jail, fail or nail
face new scrutiny,” Mar. 15, 2013 (available on Lexis) (detecting “a new spirit . . . among [Washington]
policy makers, amplified by a growing chorus of media voices, that is willing to challenge Wall Street
and push for additional reform”); Finkle, supra note 707 (reporting that Attorney General Holder’s
testimony triggered a petition drive by Moveon.org calling on the Obama Administration “to break up
the big banks and prosecute the criminals who used them to destroy our economy”); Ben Weyl, Banks
on the Block in GOP Rebranding, CQ WEEKLY, Mar. 23, 2013, 2013 WLNR 7833025 (reporting that
Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s “outspoken” attacks on TBTF banks have “drawn popular support”; for
example, a video clip of a Senate committee hearing in which she “lectured regulators for not
prosecuting wrongdoing by large institutions . . . has been viewed on YouTube more than 900,000
times”).
778. Jeff Bater, ‘Systemic Risk’ Survey Finds Half of Americans Would Favor Plan to Break Up
Banks,100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 551 (Mar. 26, 2013) (reporting on a nationwide survey released by
Rasumussen Reports on Mar. 21, 2013, which found that 50% of American adults supported a
mandatory breakup of the twelve largest U.S. banks, while 23% were opposed and 27% were
undecided).
779. The unanimous Senate vote occurred on a “non-binding” amendment to a Senate budget
resolution. Cheyenne Hopkins, Senators Give Unanimous Support to Ending Too-Big-to-Fail Banks,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 25, 2013; Simon Johnson, The Debate on Bank Size Is Over, NY TIMES BLOGS
(ECONOMIX), Mar. 28, 2013 (available on Lexis).
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for megabanks.780 Accordingly, they maintained that (i) the federal
safety net—including federal deposit insurance and the Fed’s emergency
credit facilities—must be restricted to the traditional deposit-taking,
payment services and lending activities of commercial banks, and (ii)
nontraditional activities (including derivatives and other capital markets
operations) must be conducted in separate nonbank entities that would
not be protected against failure by the federal government.781 Fisher’s
and Hoenig’s proposals to deny federal safety net subsidies to nonbank
affiliates of financial conglomerates are conceptually similar to the
“narrow banking” proposal I have previously advocated as well as the
“ring-fencing” reforms that are currently being considered by the U.K.
and EU governments.782
Hoenig also maintained—like Andrew Haldane of the Bank of
England—that global bank regulators should abandon Basel III’s riskweighted capital rules. In place of Basel III, Hoenig would establish
much higher leverage capital requirements for megabanks, to be
determined by dividing each bank’s tangible equity by its unweighted
assets (including off-balance-sheet risk exposures).783 Many analysts
780. Richard Fisher, “Ending ‘Too Big to Fail’,” Remarks before the Conservative Political
Action Conference, National Harbor, MD, Mar. 16, 2013 (arguing that Dodd–Frank’s “promise” to end
TBTF “rings hollow . . . . Dodd–Frank is long on process and complexity but short on results” and
“market discipline is still lacking” for the largest banks) [hereinafter Fisher Mar. 16, 2013 Speech],
available at http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2013/fs130316.cfm]; Thomas M. Hoenig,
Stop the subsidies for big banks, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2013, at A13 (“While some suggest that the
2010 Dodd–Frank Act removed all protections and subsidies for these largest firms, there is no evidence
to support that assertion.”). For additional evidence that Dodd–Frank has not ended TBTF subsidies for
megabanks, see Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part I), at 1–18; supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
781. Fisher Mar. 16, 2013 Speech, supra note 780; Richard Fisher & Harvey Rosenblum,
“Vanquishing Too Big to Fail,” Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, 2012 Annual Report (2013), available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/fed/annual/2012/ar12b/index.cfm; Hoenig, supra note 780; Hoenig
April 17, 2013 Speech, supra note 714; Thomas M. Hoenig, Banking Safety Net Makes Wall Street
BANKER
(online
ed.),
Jan.
17,
2013,
available
at
Dangerous,
AM.
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/banking-safety-net-makes-wall-street-dangerous-10559491.html.
782. For my “narrow banking” proposal, see Wilmarth, supra note 109 (Part II), at 1–7; Wilmarth,
supra note 12, at 1034–52. For the “ring-fencing” reforms currently under consideration by the U.K.
and EU governments, see Michael Beaton, Bank Ring-Fencing in the UK: The Financial Services
(Banking
Reform)
Bill
2013,
Feb.
15,
2013,
available
at
http://www.economonitor.com/blog/201302/bank-ring-fencing-in-the-uk-the-financial-services-bankin
g-reform-bill/#idc-container; Julie Patient, International Banking: Next Stage of the UK’s Banking
Reform Bill: Putting Up the Fencing, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 403 (Feb. 26, 2013); Martin Wolf,
Liikanen is at least a step forward for EU banks, FT.COM, Oct. 4, 2012; Alex Barker, EU review wants
bank trading ringfenced, FT.COM, Oct. 2, 2012.
783. Thomas M. Hoenig, “Basel III Capital” A Well-Intended Illusion,” Remarks before the 2013
Research Conference of the Int’l Ass’n of Deposit Insurers, April 9, 2013 [hereinafter Hoenig April 9,
2013 Speech], available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr0913.html; Andrew G.
Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee,” Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th
economic policy symposium, Aug. 31, 2012, at 6–14, 18–20, available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech596.pdf.
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agree that Basel’s regime of complex risk-weighting formulas has long
been subject to gaming and arbitrage by the largest banks, and that much
stronger leverage requirements are needed to discourage excessive risktaking and reduce the likelihood of a future financial crisis.784
In April 2013, Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and David Vitter (RLA) introduced a bill (Brown–Vitter) that incorporated key aspects of
Fisher’s and Hoenig’s reform proposals. Brown–Vitter would (i) direct
federal banking agencies to abandon the Basel III risk-based capital
regime and instead impose minimum leverage capital requirements (to
be phased in over five years) of 8 percent for banks with assets between
$50 billion and $500 billion and 15 percent for banks larger than $500
billion, (ii) require large banking organizations to satisfy separate
capitalization requirements for their nonbank subsidiaries, (iii) prohibit
FDIC-insured banks from transferring their safety net subsidies to
nonbank affiliates, and (iv) prohibit regulators from using the federal
safety net to protect nonbank affiliates.785 Brown–Vitter’s mandate for a
15 percent leverage capital ratio for banks larger than $500 billion
would be similar to the capital ratios that large banks maintained
between the creation of the Fed in 1913 and the establishment of federal
deposit insurance in 1933.786 Senator Brown declared that the bill
would impose “more market discipline on the financial services
industry” and present megabanks with a clear choice: “they can increase
their capital or bring down their size.”787 Senator Vitter explained that it
was time to “level the playing field” between big and small banks and
remove the government “subsidy” favoring megabanks.788
784. E.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 94–191, 217–24; Brendan Geeley, Ditch Basel
(May
1,
2013),
Rules,
Just
Raise
Capital,
Vitter
Says,
BUSINESSWEEK
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-01/ditch-basel-bank-rules-just-raise-capital-vitter-says;
Simon Johnson, The Case for Megabanks Fails, NY TIMES BLOGS (ECONOMIX), May 2, 2013 (available
on Lexis); Gretchen Morgenson, Trying to Slam the Bailout Door, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2013, § BU, at
1; John Plender, Make simplicity a priority in banking, FT.COM, Dec. 6, 2012; Big Banks Still Aren’t
Safe Enough, BLOOMBERG, April 30, 2013 (editorial); What’s So Radical About a Safer Financial
System?, BLOOMBERG, April 9, 2013 (editorial).
785. Sherrod Brown & David Vitter, Make Wall Street Choose: Go Small or Go Home, N.Y.
TIMES, April 24, 2013, 2013 WLNR 9991786; Cjors Bruce, Capital: Senate Bill Would Hike Capital
Requirements for Large Banks, 100 BNA’S BANKING REP. 784 (April 30, 2013); Cheyenne Hopkins,
Too-Big-to-Fail Bill Pitched as Fix for Dodd–Frank Act’s Flaws, BLOOMBERG, April 24, 2013.
786. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 243 n.26 (quoting May 16, 2012 op-ed by Alan
Meltzer, which stated, “In the 1920s, capital ratios for large New York banks ranged from 15% to 20%
of assets.”); Hoenig April 9, 2013 Speech, supra note 783 (stating that “the equity capital to assets ratio
for the [banking] industry [from 1913 to 1933] ranged between 13 and 16 percent, regardless of bank
size”).
787. Morgenson, supra note 784 (quoting interview with Sen. Brown).
788. David Dayen, Banking Regulation: Closed for Business, AMERICAN PROSPECT BLOGS, April
24, 2013, 2013 WLNR 10013210 (quoting Sen. Vitter); see also Jack Torry, Brown bill puts onus for
failure on banks, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (OH), April 25, 2013, at 4A, 2013 WLNR 10171762 (quoting
Sen. Brown’s statement that “taxpayers shouldn’t have to subsidize . . . risk-taking” by megabanks).
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Supporters praised Brown–Vitter as a direct challenge to the TBTF
subsidies enjoyed by megabanks.789 In contrast, Wall Street institutions
and their lobbyists vehemently attacked the bill for mandating
“[e]xcessively high capital [that] will restrict banks’ ability to lend to
business . . . and hurt economic growth.”790 Critics also argued that
Brown–Vitter would force the largest banks to break up because they
could not raise the estimated $1 trillion or more in new capital that
Brown–Vitter would mandate.791
Wall Street’s assertion that Brown–Vitter’s higher leverage capital
requirements would significantly reduce business lending is
unpersuasive. Additional equity capital would be advantageous as a
funding source for bank loans (especially if TBTF subsidies are
removed) because equity investors—unlike depositors and other shortterm creditors—cannot “run” on banks by suddenly withdrawing their
investments during a crisis.792 In fact, S&P’s report on Brown–Vitter
concluded that it would be “manageable” for banks with assets between
$50 billion and $500 billion to satisfy Brown–Vitter’s 8 percent leverage
capital requirement.793 Most small banks (with assets under $10 billion)
789. E.g., Matt Taibbi, Too-Big-To-Fail Takes Another Body Blow, May 1, 2013 (describing
Brown–Vitter as “a gun aimed directly at the head of the Too-Big-To-Fail Beast”), available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/too-big-to-fail-takes-another-body-blow-20130501;
see also Morgenson, supra note 784 (“[I]f you’re a large and powerful financial institutions that’s too
big to fail, you won’t like this bill one bit.”); Simon Johnson, Brown–Vitter Rearranges FinancialReform Battlefield, BLOOMBERG, April 28, 2013 (“Intellectually, the tide has turned . . . . Brown-Vitter
provides an appropriate roadmap for addressing some of the core problems [of TBTF megabanks] and
making the financial system significantly safer.”).
790. Mark DeCambre, A bank-buster bill; Critics: Regs would cripple big lenders, N.Y. POST,
April 9, 2013, at 28, 2013 WLNR 8632050 (quoting Rob Nichols, CEO of the Financial Services
Forum); see also Torry, supra note 788 (quoting Jeff Sigmund of the American Bankers Ass’n, who
asserted that Brown–Vitter “would harm banks and their customers, local communities and the broader
economy”); SIFMA Statement on Brown–Vitter Legislation, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, April 24, 2012
(available on Lexis) (quoting SIFMA news release alleging that Brown–Vitter “would force financial
institutions to raise capital excessively higher than current levels, which would limit an institution’s
ability to lend to businesses, hampering economic growth and job creation”).
791. Eisinger, supra note 775 (summarizing arguments made by critics of Brown–Vitter); Taibbi,
supra note 789 (same); see also Standard & Poor’s, “Brown–Vitter Bill: Game-Changing Regulation
For U.S. Banks,” April 25, 2013 (“We do not see equity markets being able to meet the massive level of
common equity the bill requires of the largest banks . . . . Instead, the largest banks would need to break
up
or
deleverage.”)
[hereinafter
S&P
Brown–Vitter
Report],
available
at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=124535076
2438#ID273.
792. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 523, at 49–51, 97–100, 107–47; see also Barbara A. Rehm,
Why We Don’t Need Brown–Vitter, At Least Not Yet, AM. BANKER, May 2, 2013 (summarizing the view
of Fred Cannon, director of U.S. research for Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, that “higher capital can lead to
less lending, but it doesn’t have to . . . . Some banks may choose to shrink assets, including loans, to
reach the stricter capital ratios, but others won’t.”) (available on Lexis).
793. S&P Brown–Vitter Report, supra note 791 (determining that banks with assets of $50 to
$500 billion already have an average leverage capital ratio of 6.6% and “should be able to meet the
proposed minimum requirement [of 8%] in five years,” as required by Brown–Vitter).
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already have tangible equity ratios that exceed 8 percent.794
The largest banks (with assets over $500 billion), which would need
to satisfy Brown–Vitter’s 15 percent leverage requirement, devote a
relatively small share of their assets to business lending. A recent Fed
staff study found that big banks (with assets over $250 billion) allocated
only 14 percent of their assets to business lending in 2007, and that
share declined to 12 percent in 2012. In contrast, smaller banks (with
assets under $10 billion) devoted 30 percent of their assets to business
lending in both 2007 and 2012. 795 In 2012, smaller banks also provided
more than half of all loans to small businesses—the most bankdependent class of business borrowers—while big banks furnished only
a quarter of such loans.796 Thus, requiring big banks to maintain higher
levels of equity capital would be unlikely to reduce lending dramatically
to bank-dependent business firms.
Wall Street’s second argument—that it would be impossible for
megabanks to raise the additional capital required by Brown–Vitter—
actually proves the need for the bill. If it is true, as claimed in S&P’s
report, that megabanks would be “[f]aced with little to no access to
equity markets,” then we should want megabanks to “be forced into
asset sales, divestitures, or . . . to break up.”797 Moreover, contrary to
Wall Street’s claim that Dodd–Frank has eliminated TBTF subsidies,
S&P’s report essentially admitted that an implicit TBTF subsidy still
exists for megabanks. In that regard, S&P’s report warned that
enactment of Brown–Vitter might force the credit agency to remove its
current ratings upgrade for the largest U.S. banks because that upgrade
is dependent on the presumed access of those banks to “government
support” during a crisis: “Under our methodology, we would potentially
no longer factor in government support if we believed that once large
banks are broken up [due to Brown–Vitter], we would not classify those
banks as having high systemic importance.”798
794. Id. (chart 3) (showing that all size groups of banks smaller than $10 billion had average
tangible equity ratios higher than 8 percent in 2012, except for banks smaller than $500 million, which
had an average tangible equity ratio of 5.99%).
795. Jeffrey W. Gunther & Kelly Klemme, “A Lender for Tough Times,” in Fed. Res. Bank of
Dallas,
2012
Annual
Report
(text
and
Chart
2),
available
at
http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/fed/annual/2012/e2/1201e2.cfm.
796. Id.
797. Taibbi, supra note 789 (quoting S&P Brown–Vitter Report, supra note 791); see also
Eisinger, supra note 775 (observing that the claim by megabanks that “they couldn’t sell that much
stock” actually “make[s] Senator Brown’s and Senator’s Vitter’s case for them. If investors are so
terrified of the big banks that they won’t buy their stock, that’s a terrific problem”).
798. S&P Brown–Vitter Report, supra note 791; see also Taibbi, supra note 789 (observing that
the quoted passage represents “an explicit admission that Dodd–Frank didn’t fix the Too-Big-To-Fail
issue,” despite Wall Street’s assertions to the contrary). In a previous research report, issued in July
2011, S&P similarly acknowledged that an implicit TBTF subsidy remained for megabanks,
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In view of Wall Street’s vehement attacks on Brown–Vitter and likely
opposition to the bill from the Obama Administration and key
congressional leaders, the bill’s chances of passage seemed very
doubtful in mid-2013, as this article went to press.799 However, some
analysts suggested that Brown–Vitter had produced three significant
changes in the political and regulatory landscape surrounding the TBTF
debate. First, Brown–Vitter highlighted the inadequacy of Dodd–
Frank’s reforms as well as the very poor implementation of those
reforms.800 Second, Brown–Vitter focused the TBTF debate on issues
where Wall Street was highly vulnerable, including (i) the dangerously
low levels of tangible equity capital held by the largest banks, (ii) the
unfairness of their safety net subsidies, and (iii) the risks to the FDIC
and taxpayers posed by the ability of megabanks to transfer their
subsidies to their nonbank affiliates engaged in derivatives and other
speculative capital markets activities.801 Third, Brown–Vitter could
notwithstanding Dodd–Frank’s reforms. The 2011 report concluded: “We believe that under certain
circumstances and with selected systemically important financial institutions, future extraordinary
government support is still possible.” Standard & Poor’s, Global Credit Portal: RatingsDirect: The
U.S. Government Says Support For Banks Will Be Different ‘Next Time’—But Will It?, July 12, 2011, at
2; see also id. at 8, 9–10 (classifying the U.S. as “supportive” of major banks because “[t]he U.S.
government indeed has a long track record of supporting its large and systemically important financial
institutions despite its stated preference for not doing so. [Dodd–Frank] may limit this activity, but we
believe the government may try to avoid contagion and a domino effect if a SIFI finds itself in a
financially weakened position in a future crisis.”), available at http://www.politico.com/pdf/PPM223_712-11__the_us_government_says_support_for_banks_will_be_different_nexttime_but_will_it_071211.pdf.
799. Donna Borak, Treasury’s Lew Aligns with Fed, Big Banks in TBTF Debate, AM. BANKER,
May 22, 2013, 2013 WLNR 12477817 (reporting that Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew testified during a
Senate Banking Committee hearing that “lawmakers should hold off on further legislative reforms to the
financial system until Dodd–Frank is fully implemented,” and he “also expressed worry about [the
Brown-Vitter] bill”); Dayen, supra note 788 (reporting that Treasury Undersecretary Mary Miller
“poured a giant bucket of cold water” on Brown–Vitter in her speech claiming that Dodd–Frank had
“already solved” the TBTF problem and that megabanks did not have an “unfair advantage” over
smaller banks in the form of TBTF subsidies, and noting that “[w]hat’s striking about Miller’s speech is
how closely it mirrors the arguments set forth in several recent papers put out by the big banks, their
lobbyists, and their allies”); Victoria Finkle, ‘Too Big To Fail’ Bill Puts Banking Chairmen in Tight
Spot, AM. BANKER, May 1, 2013 (reporting that (i) Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD), chairman of the
Senate Banking Committee, probably would not support Brown–Vitter because he was “a staunch
defender of Dodd–Frank” and also maintained “ties with Citigroup,” whose “employees and political
action committee were Johnson’s top contributors during the 2012 election cycle,” and (ii) Rep. Jeb
Hensarling (R-TX), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, also seemed unlikely to
support Brown–Vitter) (available on Lexis); Shahien Nasiripour & Tom Braithwaite, Finance: Out to
break the banks, FT.COM, April 30, 2013 (stating that many members of Congress “like the donations of
the biggest [banking] groups and are susceptible to the argument that breaking up banks such as
JPMorgan would push their business to foreign groups, such as Deutsche Bank or Barclays, that can
offer a full suite of products”).
800. Finkle, supra note 777; Hopkins, supra note 785; Nasirpour & Braithwaite, supra note 799.
801. Rob Blackwell, Why the Brown–Vitter Bill Matters—Even If It Doesn’t Pass, AM. BANKER,
April 29, 2013 (available on Lexis); Finkle, supra note 777; Johnson, supra note 789; Nasirapour &
Braithwaite, supra note 799.
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provide political cover for federal regulators to wield their (as yet
unexercised) powers under Dodd–Frank to impose significantly higher
capital requirements on megabanks and to require divestitures of assets
by large banks that fail to submit satisfactory orderly resolution plans
(living wills).802
As Senators Brown and Vitter explained in floor statements, the
TBTF issue raises profound questions about the concentrated economic
and political power wielded by a small group of megabanks.803 In
1990—before the advent of nationwide and conglomerate banking—the
four largest U.S. banks held $519 billion of assets, equal to just 9
percent of domestic GDP.804 By 2011, the four largest U.S. banks—
JPMorgan, BofA, Citigroup and Wells Fargo—held $7.5 trillion of
assets, equal to 50 percent of GDP.805 Similarly, the total assets of the
six largest U.S. banks (including Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley)
grew from 18 percent of GDP in 1995 to 63 percent of GDP in 2012.806
The foregoing figures include only the on-balance-sheet assets of the
largest banks and considerably understate their actual risk exposures and
economic significance.807 Under international accounting standards—
which would require on-balance-sheet recognition of much larger
amounts of their derivatives exposures and mortgage securitizations—
the four largest U.S. banks would have held 93 percent of domestic GDP
in 2012, while the six largest banks would have held 102 percent of
GDP.808
802. Blackwell, supra note 801; Michael R. Crittenden, Banks Feel Heat on Capital—Long-Term
Debt Proposal Aims to Ensure Creditors Share in Cost of Failure, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2013, at C1;
Peter Eavis, A New Fed Thought for ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks: Shrink Them, NY TIMES BLOGS
(DEALBOOK), May 3, 2013, 2013 WLNR 10900409; Nasiripour & Braithwaite, supra note 799.
803. 159 Cong. Rec. S994 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2013) (remarks of Sen. Brown) [hereinafter Brown
Floor Statement]; id. S995 (remarks of Sen. Vitter) [hereinafter Vitter Floor Statement].
804. Fisher & Rosenblum, supra note 781 (text and Chart 1); see also supra notes 354–56 and
accompanying text (describing 1994 and 1999 federal laws that authorized the creation of nationwide
banks and financial conglomerates (universal banks)).
805. Fisher & Rosenblum, supra note 781 (text and Chart 2) (showing that the four largest U.S.
banks in 1990 were Citicorp, BofA, Chase Manhattan and JPMorgan).
806. Brown Floor Statement, supra note 803, at S994.
807. Fisher & Rosenblum, supra note 781.
808. Yalman Onaran, U.S. Banks Bigger Than GDP as Accounting Rift Masks Risk, BLOOMBERG,
Feb. 19, 2013 (providing figure for the four largest banks); Brown Floor Statement, supra note 803, at
S994 (providing figure for the six largest banks). Unlike international accounting standards, U.S.
accounting principles allow U.S. banks to exclude from their balance sheets (i) derivatives positions that
are subject to netting agreements with counterparties and (ii) mortgage securitizations that are
guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The on-balance-sheet assets of major U.S. banks, as
shown under U.S. accounting principles, understate their true risks because (i) derivatives netting
agreements frequently fail during financial crises due to defaults by counterparties, and (ii) since 2008
the four largest U.S. banks “have faced demands to take back $67 billion of mortgages sold to
securitizations backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . . . because the loans hadn’t met underwriting
standards”). Onaran, supra.
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As shown above, the explosive growth and consolidation of
megabanks during the past two decades have produced a comparable
expansion of their political clout.809 In criticizing the “intense
concentration of power” held by the largest banks, Senators Vitter and
Brown pointed to the examples of Senator John Sherman and President
Theodore Roosevelt, who opposed “unfettered growth and power”
among the industrial trusts of the late 19th century.810 Similarly, Louis
Brandeis and Franklin Roosevelt fought against the concentrated
economic and political power of the largest banks during the first four
decades of the 20th century.811 Brandeis denounced the leading New
York investment banks of the early 1900s as a “financial oligarchy,”812 a
term also used by Simon Johnson and James Kwak to describe today’s
megabanks.813 Similarly, Richard Fisher has attacked megabanks as
beneficiaries of “crony capitalism” that enjoy “an unlevel playing field,
tilted to the advantage of Wall Street against Main Street, placing the
financial system and the economy in constant jeopardy.”814
Writing at the end of 2009, Johnson and Kwak expressed serious
doubts about the Obama Administration’s financial reform plan that led
to the Dodd–Frank Act. As they explained, the Obama reform plan
presented a series of “technical solutions” based on the assumption that,
given additional tools, financial regulators could “regulate large banks
more effectively.”815 Unfortunately, as they also pointed out, “solutions
that depend on smarter, better regulatory supervision and corrective
action ignore the political constraints on regulation and the political
power of the large banks” and also avoid “tackling the underlying
problem: the existence of TBTF institutions.”816 Accordingly, they
809. Brown Floor Statement, supra note 803, at S994 (noting that the four largest U.S. banks are
the product of 33 mergers involving 37 banks since 1995, and describing the largest banks as “so often
having their way in this city and with regulators all over the country”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note
15, at 84–152 (discussing the rapid growth of major banks and the political influence they wielded
during the 1990s and 2000s); supra Parts III and IV(A)(1) (describing the financial industry’s political
clout and its many legislative and regulatory victories over the past two decades).
810. Vitter Floor Statement, supra note 803, at S995; see also Brown Floor Statement, supra note
803, at S994 (describing Senator Sherman’s opposition to the “outsized economic and political power”
of the trusts).
811. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 22–37, 121; see also id. at 14–22, 33–34 (pointing out
that Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson provided earlier examples of successful opposition to
entrenched financial and political power).
812. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 3–4 (1914,
Norman Hapgood reprint ed. 1933).
813. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 6, 10, 89–90, 120–21.
814. Fisher Mar. 16, 2013 Speech, supra note 780; see also id. (criticizing the “privileged status”
of TBTF megabanks that “places them above the rule of law” and “undermines citizens’ faith in the rule
of law and representative democracy”).
815. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 191–92, 205–08 (quotes at 191, 207).
816. Id. at 207, 213.
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called for explicit restrictions on the maximum size of banks, based on
“a popular consensus that too big to fail is too big to exist.”817 As noted
above, an attempt by Senators Brown and Kauffman to impose
maximum size limits on banks was opposed by the Obama
Administration and defeated in the Senate.818 Instead, Congress passed
Dodd–Frank, which—as partially implemented to date—has left the
TBTF status of megabanks largely intact.
Johnson and Kwak warned that anyone “tak[ing] a stand against
concentrated financial power” today would face daunting political
obstacles, just as Theodore Roosevelt faced long odds when “he took a
stand against concentrated industrial power” in the early 1900s:819
The challenge we face today is similar to the one faced by President
Roosevelt a century ago . . . . The conventional wisdom, shaped through
three decades of deregulation, innovation, and risk-taking that brought us
the financial crisis, is that large, sophisticated banks are a critical pillar of
economic prosperity. The conventional wisdom has entrenched itself in
Washington, where administration officials, regulators, and legislators
agree with the Wall Street line on intellectual grounds, or see their
personal interests (financial or political) aligned with Wall Street . . . .
The megabanks used political power to obtain their license to gamble
with other people’s money; taking that license away requires confronting
that power head-on.820

Wall Street’s political machine has thus far succeeded in watering
down Dodd-Frank’s statutory language and in undermining the
implementation of those provisions that survived the legislative gauntlet.
Nevertheless, as Johnson & Kwak observed, “the most effective
constraint on the financial sector is public opinion.”821 It remains
possible that continued revelations of excessive risk-taking and other
abuses on Wall Street could finally “shift the weight of public opinion
against our new financial oligarchy.”822 Critics of Wall Street must
persevere in their efforts to persuade the American people to demand
fundamental reforms, like Brown Vitter, that could finally end TBTF
subsidies for megabanks and thereby break Wall Street’s seemingly
invincible power.

817. Id. at 221 (quote). Johnson & Kwak proposed “a hard cap on size” of 4 percent of domestic
GDP (about $600 billion in 2009) for commercial banks and a similar cap of 2 percent of GDP for
investment banks. Id. at 214–17.
818. See supra note 700 and accompanying text (discussing the defeat of the Brown–Kauffman
Amendment).
819. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 15, at 222.
820. Id. at 221.
821. Id.
822. Id. at 221–22.

